1. The Tay Ninh PRU and Its Role in the Phoenix Program 1969-1970
21 October 2006
Andrew R. Finlayson
Colonel, USMC (Ret.)
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2. The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Program
National level program run by the US CIA
Target: The Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Vietnam
Created in 1967
Operated in all 44 provinces of South Vietnam
Action arm of the Phoenix Program
Commanded by US military officers and NCOs until November 1969 and then transitioned to US CIA advisors until 1975
Strength: Approximately 4400 South Vietnamese and 80 Americans
Highly successful in destroying the Viet Cong political leadership at all levels
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3. Who Were the Tay Ninh PRU?
Local, experienced, and brave fighters
Experience: Cao Dai Army, French Army, South Vietnamese Airborne, and Civilian Irregular Defense Group
Strong religious affiliation with Cao Dai religious sect
Deep hatred of the communists
18 man teams in each of four districts and one 18 man team (and Headquarters) in Tay Ninh City
Each team consisted of three 6-man squads
Lightly armed but well-equipped for their mission
Weaknesses: Poorly trained, lacked fire discipline and knowledge of supporting arms
Strengths: Accurate intelligence, good planning, strong local knowledge
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4. PRU Sources of Intelligence
Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) and the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers in theory provided the PRU with multiple intelligence sources for exploitation
“Real World” problems worked against the theoretical system
Organizational jealousy
Personal intransigence
“Iron Rice Bowl” attitude of both US and Vietnamese intelligence organizations
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5. Military Intelligence Reports
US: No value
Agents paid for “piece work” – volume versus accuracy
Signals intelligence was very seldom provided
Never provided information that was operationally exploitable by the PRU
Military focus, not political
South Vietnamese: No value
Never provided unless the Province Chief requested the intelligence and then it was of no value
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6. Police Reports National Police: No value Bureaucratic jealousy
Focus on urban areas and crime
Notoriously inaccurate
Special Branch: Limited value
When provided (seldom) very exploitable
Information obtained from VCI penetrations was jealously guarded and rarely shared with the PRU
Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC): When shared, highly exploitable and accurate
Hoi Chanhs (ralliers to South Vietnamese Government) were the best source of reliable intelligence, followed by VCI cadre
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7. Census Grievance Data Often highly productive
Based upon surveys done in in conjunction with the national census.
Every house in every village and hamlet was color-coded based upon loyalty to the central government
Green: loyal
Yellow: neutral
Red: sympathetic to VC
Labor intensive mining of data
Much information was dated by
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8. Organic PRU Intelligence
The most accurate and exploitable of all sources of intelligence
Because of a lack of cooperation, the Tay Ninh PRU were forced to develop their own system of obtaining intelligence on the VCI.
Assets were family and friends of the PRU
PRU had an intimate knowledge of the local population, terrain, and the VCI
Approximately two-thirds of all exploitable intelligence came from the organic PRU intelligence system
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9. Why were the Tay Ninh PRU successful?
Locally recruited
Intimate knowledge of the province, its people, and the enemy
Strong leadership and discipline
Highly motivated due to VC atrocities committed against them and their families
Excellent intelligence system
Difficult to penetrate because of strong family, religious and civic affiliations
Paid and equipped by the US; advisors provided control, direction, pay, and support (medevac, supplies, supporting arms)
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10. Lessons Learned: Duplicating Success Elsewhere?
Professional and civic ethic – serve the people
Well trained and equipped
Paid well and regularly rewarded for tangible results
Unit cohesion based upon family, religious and/or community affiliations
Subject to judicial and political oversight
Not involved with interrogation or incarceration of prisoners – only identifying and apprehending them
Families protected from reprisal
Strong leadership
Full access to pertinent targeting intelligence through some form of interagency coordinating group similar to the PIOCC/DIOCC system.
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