1. Computer-Mediated Communication
Collective Action and CMC: Game Theory Approaches and Applications

2. Critiquing Hardin and Olson
I do believe there is another side to this, which is that people's actions may not match their intentions. How actively are people really balancing these issues of public good and free riding on a daily basis? People's concepts and mental models of contribution might also be very different.
-George H.
I worked at Microsoft, which (as a pretty sizable company) is often afflicted with some of the shortcomings that Olson ascribes to large groups. On several occasions, I witnessed events and occurrences where bodies within the company (both individuals and teams) would essentially work against the greater good because they wanted a certain outcome that would have been more locally beneficial to themselves.
-Brendan C.
Consider the Hardin reading as well: Not everyone ‘chooses’. It is a simplification, a model. That doesn’t make it less useful, but it isnt a statement of fact.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

3. Critiquing…topics of research
After reading the collaborative action background pieces, I was totally ready to read about amazing developments in Web2.0 and enabling more flash mobs…I guess I should have expected two Usenet articles seeing how last week featured two eBay articles. Anyways, enough ranting.
-Adam J.
…so, honestly: Why would I want you to read about research on “older” systems that have been around decades (usenet and Ebay) instead of the most popular sites today?
Just remember: there is plenty of popular press material out there already and most of you already read it. Real research on such systems usually lags because it takes time and maturity of these systems to really study them. Otherwise, it is just a lot of noise about the latest trend.
BUT: I am not saying that we shouldn’t be applying what we learn (or do not learn) to other systems. That is precisely why I ask you to reflect on these articles.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

4. Computer-Mediated Communication
Considering the Core of Olson’s Argument: Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups
Bigger impact of self interest in small groups…but it entirely depends on costs and benefits.
Olson’s prediction that small groups will produce collective action later got reversed by Oliver and Marwell’s “paradox of group size”
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

5. Computer-Mediated Communication
The “Free-Rider Problem” in Online Systems of Collective Action (Bimber et al.)
Communality and Discretionary Databases
“Second-Order” Communality
From Bimber et al. reading:
Communality: a public good derived from collecting, storing and sharing information resources among members.
What is 2nd Order Communality?
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

6. Choice, Assumption of Intention and Collective Action
I would argue, however, that in the case of blogs in particular, the individual is still making a decision to enter into the public sphere. If an individual really did want to write a blog solely for personal reflection, he or she could write in an offline journal instead. The person is specifically choosing to put his or her reflections in the public sphere. In doing so, it becomes a public good rather than a private one.
-Alison M.
This is an important point, and one that Peter Kollock (remember rice/rubber market?) also pointed out in ’99. In information sharing, a single person can create a public good.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

7. When is it a public good…private good…club good?
Pressing a little harder on their use of language which characterizes a deterioration of the public/private boundary, one might wonder why they still cling to the language of 'public good' in the end. Namely, if the boundary slips away between these two terms, then the two terms themselves slip away since they are mutually co-constitutive. No more public, no more private—just one big muddy swamp. And if there is no more public as we know it, can we say that there are still 'public' goods as such?
-David H.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

8. Computer-Mediated Communication
Why Game Theory for mediated communication?
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

9. Game Theory (definition)
“Game theory is the systematic study of interdependent rational choice. It may be used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate human behavior in contexts where the outcome of action depends on what several agents choose to do and where their choices depend on what others choose to do.”
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

10. Game Theory and Core Concepts
Analytical vs. Behavioral Game Theory
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games
Zero and Non-Zero Sum Games
One-Shot vs. Repeated
Equilibria
(i.e., Nash Equilibrium)
Analytic: simulation, projection
Behavioral: actual observed, empirical
Cooperative games involve contracts (binding agreements), non-cooperative do not.
(example for cooperative game)
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

11. Types of Social Dilemmas
Different social dilemma games
make different use of the payouts:
T>R>P>S Prisoner’s Dilemma
But also…
T>R>S>P Chicken
T>P>R>S Deadlock
R>T>P>S Stag Hunt B
Coop.
Defect
3 (R)
5 (T)
Reward
Temptation
Sucker
Punishment
3 (R)
0 (S)
Ebay example A
0 (S)
1 (P)
5 (T)
1 (P)
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

12. Computer-Mediated Communication
Example: Chicken Game
T>R>S>P Chicken
Coop = Swerve
Defect = Do Not Swerve B
Swerve
No Swerve
3 (R)
5 (T)
Reward
Temptation
Sucker
Punishment
3 (R)
1 (S)
Extra points if you remember Paula Abdul’s 1991 video for Rush, Rush w/ Keanu…
Or, just Rebel Without a Cause on which it was based … A
1 (S)
-1 (P)
5 (T)
-1 (P)
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

13. Computer-Mediated Communication
2-person repeated PD
N-person PD
Public Good
What kind of relationships that we have been studying are 2-person repeated?
Obviously, collective action and pooled resources better fit an N-person PD
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

14. Computer-Mediated Communication
The N-person PD
“No one wants to pay taxes because the benefits are so diffuse and the costs are so direct. But everyone may be better off if each person has to pay so that each can share the benefits”
cf. Schelling 1973; Axelrod 1984
Imagine everyone has to play PD at same time, but no one knows until all decisions are made who cooperated or defected.
N-person game is same idea as a standard 2-person, except you now have to account for a new parameter (k) which represents the minimum coalition necessary to produce the optimal outcome.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

15. The Evolution of Cooperation
Axelrod’s famous (1984) tournament allowed individuals to submit any strategy.
All strategies played each other in the tournament.
The winner was one of the shortest submissions, about 4 lines of code.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

16. The Simple Effectiveness of the Tit-for-Tat Strategy
Tit-for-Tat: begin with ‘cooperate’ and then do whatever the opponent did on the last turn.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

17. Lessons from Tit-for-Tat
Be nice
It starts by cooperating. Most top-scoring strategies do this.
Be forgiving
It quickly and happily returns to cooperation without holding a grudge.
Be able to retaliate
It never allows defection to go unpunished.
Be clear
It is predictable and easy to understand. It pays to be predictable in non-zero sum games.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

18. Considering the “Shadow of the Future”
We anticipate based on prior experience…the more experience, the better our predictions of future interactions in dependent relationships.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

19. How is tit-for-tat different in the two types of situations?
2-person repeated PD
N-person PD
Public Good
It really depends if we are doing this over time, or just one-shot.
As we read, what happens to behavior over time in public goods where people join/leave?
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

20. Some common complaints…
“A theoretical tool cannot explain real life, right?”
“Hey, isnt this rational choice?”
Elinor Ostrom agrees with the critiques-- but also points out that they are incredibly instructive if we just don’t reify them.
Game theoretical ‘models’ are just that: models. They help us understand difficult things.
(Picture courtesy vismod.media.mit.edu)
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

21. The Value Fallacy: Individuals and Collectives
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

22. Finding “Roles” in Online Collective Action Behaviors
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

23. Structural similarity
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

24. Computer-Mediated Communication
Answer person role type
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

25. Computer-Mediated Communication
Discussion person role type
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

26. Computer-Mediated Communication
Critique…
…some of methods seems too obvious. For example, with the first method, authorline, authors suggest that they can find 'answer person' by finding users who only answers rather than start new threads. Isn't it a 'definition' of 'answer person'? :( However, I think utilizing multiple signatures is a good approach to deal with varying levels of relations between users' actual behavior and structural consequences.
-Chulki L.
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication

27. Revisiting our earlier question…Where does this apply to CMC?
Wherever we find mixed-motive situations and collective action…
Del.ic.ious
11/21/2018
Computer-Mediated Communication