1. Feasibility Study of FIA
2018/11/21
Jun 2010
Feasibility Study of FIA
Authors:
Date:
Name
Company
Address
Phone
Hitoshi MORIOKA
ROOT Inc.
#33 Ito Bldg Tenjin, Chuo-ku, Fukuoka JAPAN
Hiroshi MANO
8F TOC2 Bldg Nishi-Gotanda, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo JAPAN
Paul A Lambert
Marvell
Marvel lane, MS 2-201
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Marc Emmelmann
TU Berlin
Einsteinufer 25
10587 Berlin
Germany
24580
Hiroki Nakano
Trans New Technology
Sumitomo-Seimei Kyoto Bldg. 8F,
62 Tukiboko-cho Shimogyo-ku,
Kyoto JAPAN
Mineo Takai
Space Time Engineering
609 Deep Valley Drive, Suite 200　Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274, USA
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Hiroshi Mano, ROOT Inc.

2. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Month Year
doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
Abstract
This presentation introduces a feasibility of FIA.
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
July 2010
John Doe, Some Company

3. Use Case Scenario Walk Jun 2010
2018/11/21
Jun 2010
Use Case Scenario
Large number of STAs are constantly entering and exiting the coverage area of an AP within an existing ESS at pedestrian speed.
Every STA passes through the coverage area in a short time.
The authentication process specified by IEEE limits STAs to fully exploit the system capacity
 A faster initial authentication is needed
FIA aims at amending IEEE with a fast initial authentication mechanisms which
scales with a high number of users simultaneously entering a ESS
supports a very small dwell time in coverage area of a ESS
securely provides initial authentication
Walk
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Hiroshi Mano, ROOT Inc.

4. Sequence of Establishing Connection
Jun 2010
Sequence of Establishing Connection
Discover an appropriate AP
Channel Scanning, Probe, IEEE u…
WLAN association
Authentication, Association…
Upper layer setup
DHCP…
Out of scope:
It’s sufficient by current IEEE
specification.
Channel scanning is animplementation
Issue, so it does not need
standardization.
Our scope
Out of scope:
It’s out of scope of
IEEE
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

5. How to solve the issues Jun 2010
Transmit Rate
1Mbps (DSSS)
6Mbps (OFDM)
DIFS
50us
34us
CW Min
620us
(ave. 310us)
135us
(ave. 67us)
CW Max
20,460us
9,207us
Preamble Length
144us
16us
PLCP Header
48us
4us
MAC Header
256us
43us
FCS
32us
5us
SIFS
10us
Ack
304us
39us
Overhead
1,154us (59%)
224us (63%)
Data (100byte)
800us (41%)
133us (37%)
Each management frames needs overhead such as preamble, IFS, headers, ACK, etc…
60% of air-time is consumed by the overhead for each frame.
Reducing overhead is difficult because of coexistence with existing system.
Reducing number of frame exchanges is effective.
Preamble
FCS CW
Ack
Data
DIFS
SIFS
PLCP Header
MAC Header
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

6. November 2005
doc.: IEEE /1859r0
Jun 2010
Protocol Sequence to Establish a Connection to the Internet by IEEE802.11i ( PEAP/EAP-MSCHAPv2) and DHCP
STA AP
14 round trip
2ms/oneway: 56ms
Total: 166ms
RADIUS
Probe
Authentication
11 round trip
5ms/oneway: 110ms
Association
PEAP
/EAP-MSCAPv2
(11 round trip)
DHCP is also slow.
So we’ll propose a new protocol in IETF
DHCP
(2 round trip)
DHCP Server
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Page 6
Hitoshi MORIOKA, ROOT Inc.

7. Protocol Sequence to Establish a Connection to the Internet by FIA
Jun 2010
Protocol Sequence to Establish a Connection to the Internet by FIA
STA AP
Total: 14ms
RADIUS
1 round trip
2ms/oneway: 4ms
1 round trip
5ms/oneway: 10ms
Beacon
FIA
Connection established
FIA functions
Authentication
Key exchange
in one round trip time.
Technical details were presented
and discussed in WNG SC. (10/361r1)
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

8. Jun 2010
Security Feasibility
An example FIA protocol was evaluated and compared with IEEE i by security experts.
Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai, “Security Analysis of MIS Protocol on Wireless LAN comparison with IEEE802.11i,” Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile technology, applications & systems, 2006, ISBN:
Ilsun You, Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai, "Toward Formal Analysis of Wireless LAN Security with MIS protocol," International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing, accepted for publication
Well-known Yahalom protocol is also evaluated.
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

9. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Yahalom Protocol
Yahalom protocol is an authentication and secure key sharing protocol.
The protocol is originally introduced by M. Burrow, M. Abadi and R. Needham in 1989.[1]
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
July 2010

10. Yahalom Protocol Sequence
A and B are identities of A and B respectively.
KAS is a symmetric key known only to A and S.
KBS is a symmetric key known only to B and S.
NA and NB are nonces generated by A and B respectively.
KAB is a symmetric generated key, which will be the session key of the session between A and B. A B S
A, NA
B, {A, NA, NB}KBS
{B, KAB, NA, NB}KAS, {A, KAB}KBS
{A, KAB}KBS, {NB}KAB
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
July 2010

11. Strengthened Yahalom Protocol Sequence
A and B are identities of A and B respectively.
KAS is a symmetric key known only to A and S.
KBS is a symmetric key known only to B and S.
NA and NB are nonces generated by A and B respectively.
KAB is a symmetric generated key, which will be the session key of the session between A and B. A B S
A, NA
B, NB, {A, NA}KBS
NB, {B, KAB, NA}KAS, {A, B, KAB, NB}KBS
{A, B, KAB, NB}KBS, {NB}KAB
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
July 2010

12. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Yahalom Evaluation
Yahalom protocol is evaluated by many security experts.[2][3][4]
L. C. Paulson proposed strengthened version.[4]
Strengthened Yahalom protocol is also evaluated. [5][6]
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
July 2010

13. Jun 2010
Summary
Technical feasibility of FIA has been shown in this presentation.
Reducing frame exchanges
Time Occupation
Security
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

14. Questions & Comments Jun 2010 2018/11/21 Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
Hiroshi Mano, ROOT Inc.

15. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
References
M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. M. Needham. A logic of authentication. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 426:233–271, 1989.
D. Basin, S. Mo ̈dersheim, and L. Vigano`. OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols. International Journal of Information Security, 2004.
J. Guttman. Key compromise and the authentication tests. In Proc. MPFS, volume 17 of ENTCS, pages 1–21, 2001.
L.Paulson. Relations between secrets: Two formal analyses of the yahalom protocol. Journal of Computer Security, 9(3):197–216, 2001.
M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann. On the Cryptographic Key Secrecy of the Strengthened Yahalom Protocol. Proceedings of IFIP SEC 2006.
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. A Proof of Revised Yahalom Protocol in the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) Model. The Computer Journal (5):
Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.
July 2010