1. Fukushima Lessons Learned
Brad Sawatzke
VP Nuclear Generation/Chief Nuclear Officer

2. Video

3. Overview INPO sponsored trip for U.S. CNOs
Coordinated with JANSI and TEPCO
Allow U.S. CNOs to see first-hand consequences of the Fukushima accident
Allow CNOs to interact with Japanese counterparts
Sept. 9-13, 2013, INPO sponsored a visit to Japan for U.S. industry chief nuclear officers, along with representatives from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the Nuclear Energy institute (NEI).
The trip was developed in collaboration with the Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI), and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).
The trip was an opportunity for U.S. CNOs to see firsthand the consequences of the Fukushima accident, to discuss the U.S. response to this event, and to interact with Japanese chief nuclear officers.
The trip included on-site visits to the Fukushima Daini and Fukushima Daiichi plant sites; meetings for the U.S. CNOs to discuss lessons learned from the plant visits, and preparations at U.S. plants for severe accidents; and sessions for U.S. and Japanese CNOs to discuss experiences and the benefits of increased support and engagement with each other going forward.

4. Daini plant visit
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5. Daini plant visit
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6. Dai-ichi plant visit
Fukushima Daiichi consists of six boiling water reactors. Units 1,2 and 3 were operating at full power, and Units 4,5 and 6 were out of service for refueling or maintenance when the earthquake occurred.
The earthquake damaged breakers and distribution towers, causing a loss of all off-site electrical power. All AC power for Units 1-5 was lost when emergency diesel generators and switchgear rooms flooded during the tsunami. The seawater intake structure was severely damaged and rendered nonfunctional.
All DC power from batteries was lost on Units 1,2 and 4, while some DC power from batteries remained available on Unit 3.
One air-cooled emergency diesel generator continued to function and supplied electrical power to Unit 6, and later to Unit 5, to maintain cooling to the reactors and spent fuel pools.
Units 1,2 and 3 suffered extensive fuel damage when the cores could not receive cooling.
Hydrogen generated from damaged fuel accumulated in the reactor buildings and ignited, damaging the Unit 1 and Unit 3 reactor buildings. Hydrogen generated in Unit 3 likely migrated to the Unit 4 reactor building, resulting in a subsequent explosion and damage.

7. Dai-ichi plant visit
The Fukushima Daiichi event was rated as a level 7 event on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.
The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan estimated that more than 17 million curies of iodine-131 equivalent radioactive material was released into the air and the sea during the weeks following the accident.
Today, water is being injected into each reactor on Units 1-3 to keep the damaged cores cool.
Water storage continues to be a challenge, with millions of gallons of contaminated water being stored on site.
Some 68,000 cubic yards of contaminated concrete/metal and 94,000 cubic yards of contaminated trees are being stored to reduce radiation dose at the site boundaries.

8. Dai-ichi plant visit
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9. Exclusion zone
There is a 20-kilometer exclusion zone surrounding the plants. Admittance is limited to those authorized to enter.
Within this is a 10-kilometer zone where there remain significant levels of contamination.
Buildings and homes are vacant, some with obvious damage from the earthquake.

10. Exclusion zone
There are visible signs of the decontamination effort. Black bags are filled with contaminated dirt and vegetation.

11. Exclusion zone

12. CNO meetings and interactions
U.S. and Japanese CNOs shared perspectives and insights with each other.

13. Lessons learned
Leadership – coupled with the trust and dedication of a well-trained staff – can determine the ultimate outcome of a crisis
Understanding roles and responsibilities, especially in the areas of command and control and communications, is essential

14. Lessons learned
A well-conceived FLEX strategy works. The strategy developed by U.S. operators is sound
FLEX strategies must be effectively drilled across every operating crew and emergency response team
U.S. CNO teamwork and collaboration is a strength of our industry.

15. Industry Initiatives Flooding Reevaluation Seismic Reevaluation
Site FLEX
National FLEX Centers

17. Vendor Support
Partnership
Quality

18. Questions and Answers

19. Fukushima Lessons Learned
Brad Sawatzke
VP Nuclear Generation/Chief Nuclear Officer