1. National Security Strategy – United Kingdom
Presentation to the 20th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protection
Peter Tallantire
Cabinet Office
United Kingdom
Ljubljana May 2008

2. Mutual learning opportunities
Exchange of best practices:
United Kingdom:
National Risk Method
The Netherlands:
National Safety and Security Strategy

3. The Role of the Cabinet Office The Role of the Cabinet Office
The aim of the Cabinet Office is:
To make government work better
The Cabinet Office Objectives:
Supporting the Prime Minister
Supporting the Cabinet
Strengthening the Civil Service
Cabinet Office Groups / Secretariats:
Security, Intelligence & Resilience, Civil Contingencies, Foreign & Defence Policy, European & Global Issues, Economic & Domestic, and Ceremonial
Service Cabinet and its Committees
Broker agreement between Departments where policy initiatives cannot otherwise be agreed

4. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom:
Another part of CO led the production of the recent NSS
Spend a bit of time talking about this since major step in Govt’s approach to and definition of security.
Co-ordinated in CO but cross-departmental process to produce it
AIMS: framework / inform public of Govt thinking / improve public engagement / provide strategic perspective but include deliverables
LIMITATIONS: not revisit CSR / build on existing strategies eg CONTEST

5. Security Challenges TERRORISM CONTEST strategy in place
Serious and sustained threat from violent extremists. Threat levels published. Mass casualty impact using CBRN technology and can include CNI targets.
STATE LED THREATS TO THE UK
No state or alliance has both the intent and the capability to threaten the UK militarily
UK subject to high levels of covert non- military activity by foreign intelligence organisations.
GLOBAL INSTABILITY and CONFLICT and FAILED and FRAGILE STATES
Violent and serious conflict within states
Difficult to predict shocks or conflicts.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS and other WMD
Stockpile of nuclear weapons
No state currently has the intent or capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the UK but risk might emerge in the future.
CIVIL EMERGENCIES
Over half the COBR activations in 2007
Ability to respond to disruptive challenges such as FMD, pan flu, fuel shortages, power failures and extreme weather.
TRANS NATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME
fraud, illegal drugs trade, weapons, immigration and human trafficking
Threat to legitimate livelihoods, undermine & corrupt economies, societies & governments ; cause or exacerbate state failures leading to civil war or violent conflict. Support of terrorist networks?
DRIVERS OF INSECURITY
Climate change, competition for energy, poverty / inequality, globalisation & increasing interdependence of risks.
Chap 3 outlines key security challenges: can see here:
CT – sustained – mass cas but also poss CBRN
WMD – not current but poss future
OC- fraud, drugs, arms, people – link CT?
FAILED / FRAGILE STATES – leads to global instability
STATE LED THREATS – not military but cyber?
CIVIL EMERGENCIES – over half all COBR last year – FMD, avian flu, flooding etc also threat pan flu
Also identified some drivers of insecurity eg CC, competition for energy, poverty / inequality, globalisation & increasing interdependence of risks.
Going to focus on CT / Civil emergencies but

6. Working Together STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES
JOINT PARLIAMENTARY NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
STRENGTHEN FORWARD PLANNING
IMPROVE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON PRIORITIES THROUGH BETTER CONNECTIONS
NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM
PULISH NATIONAL RISK REGISTER
CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS & COMMUNITIES
Individuals have essential role to play:
BEING VIGILANT AGAINST TERRORISM
PLANNING FOR AND TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES
PLAYING PART IN TACKLING LONGER TERM CHALLENGES
VOLUNTEERING & DIALOGUE TO ENSURE SHARED VALUES UPHELD
Chap 4 goes through each of the security challenges and outlines current and future priorities for action in each field.
Talk more about CT and civil emergencies in a minute explain how being taken forward
Armed forces – Jason?
Chap 5 – working together:
Strengthening national security structures – Parliamentary Committee, Forum and NRR
Contribution of individuals and communities to national security – role of individual and communities vigilance and response

7. National Risk Assessment Matrix5
Key
Very high 4
High
T38, H41
Impact 3
H4, H48, T3, T4
T13, T37, T39, T41
Medium
H6, H25
H26, H38, T5
T10, T18, T26
T35, T46, T59
Low 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
Likelihood

8. National Resilience Planning Assumptions5 4 3 2 1
Risks
What risks should drive planning?
What is the reasonable worst case, taken across those risks
plus
Consequences
What are the generic consequences?
Reasonable worst case warning time?
Regional variation?
Military involvement?
Interdependency? =
Functional Planning Assumptions
Essential Services Planning Assumptions
We then take the risks with the highest scores and outline the generic consequences we may face. These assumptions provide a common standard that drives preparedness planning.
Planning assumptions are drafted on a confidential basis - but this year restricted, unclassified and business continuity planning assumptions (for government planners) were also created to enable wider dissemination.

9. Planning Assumptions - Functional
Human Fatalities with Infectious Disease
People with Illness
Human Fatalities caused by Conventional Incidents
Human Casualties caused by Conventional Incidents
Biological Release
Radiological Environmental Contamination
Radiological Release
Chemical Releases
Debris / Rubble
Major Flooding
Influx of British Nationals
Infected Animals
Fire and Rescue Cover
The National Resilience Planning Assumptions cover a five year timeframe.
They are split into two sections.
The Functional Planning assumptions set out the challenges that responder organisations may face.

10. Planning Assumptions - Essential Services
Water Supply
Transport
Oil and Fuel
Gas
Electricity
Telecoms
Health
Financial Services
The essential services planning assumptions set out assumptions about the extent to which essential services could be interrupted or otherwise affected by disruptive events.

11. The Future – Continue Building Capability
Technical:
Mass fatalities
Humanitarian Assistance
CBRN (Model Response)
Telecomms resilience
Planning
Flu; and …
Human:
The Human Component of Resilience
Crisis leadership capacity
Professionalism through standards

12. Raise the Bar Catastrophic Events: Wide Area Flooding ‘Black Start’
Recovery
Continue Learning the Lessons (Newton, Pitt, Anderson)
CCA ‘6000-mile Service’
London Olympics 2012
New or more physical capabilities
The human component
New/more/different procedures
Horizontal Mutual Aid
Training – especially collective.
‘Reaching Out’:
Citizens and their families
Citizens in communities

13. National Security Strategy The Netherlands The first results:
National Risk Assessment
Mass Evacuation Task
Dick Schoof
Director-general for Public Safety and Security
Ministry of the Interior & Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands
Ljubljana, May 2008

14. Short background Netherlands’ Security Strategy
National Security Strategy published May 2007
There is a need for a more coordinated
and integrated approach on National Security
More complex society
Increased dependence on complex systems
Diffuse and changing threats
Interdependence dimension of threats
International dimension of threats
Focus: all-hazard approach

15. What is National Safety & Security?
Focus on 5 vital interests:
- Territorial security
- Physical security
- Economical security
Ecological security
Social & political stability
Scope:
(Potential) disruption of society
throughout the entire security chain

16. National Security Strategy
Which threats do we face? And what is the impact?
What do we need to do?
What do we need to have?
Threat/risk analysis
Risk
Assessment
Tasks
Capabilities
(planning
assumptions)
Policy
arrangements
Horizon scanning
National threat progress report (short & long term horizon scanning)
National risk assessment
Advice national capabilities
In fact the national Security strategy gives answer to three basic questions:
First of all which threats do we face and what are their effects?
And in one of my previous sheets I have shown you these threats. The government-wide threat and risk analysis will help us in identifying the known and unknown threats.
Secondly, what do we have to do to, what are our tasks and which capabilities do we need, in order to prevent or to minimize the effects of these threats.
And finally what do we really need to perform those activities.
Next sheet please

17. National Risk Assessment
priority is given to:
Climate change
Polarization and radicalization
Certainty of the energy supply
In total 13 risk scenarios

18. Impact Risk Diagram I II III Likelihood Very unlikely UnlikelyB A
Likelihood
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Possible
Likely
Very likely
Results presented in risk diagram
Category 1 : pandemic flu
Category 2 : severe coastal flooding
Category 3 : riots, heatwave

19. 3 Risk categories High impact and highly probable: Flu pandemic
Oil crisis
High impact but unlikely:
Malicious disruption of electricity
Floods
Low impact but highly probable:
Polarisation and radicalisation
National black-out electricity

20. Overall analysis high impact risks:
High impact criteria:
costs
disruption common life
psychological/social impact
Shortage vital products and services
Management of vital products and services
In critical phase: government cannot do it alone
Self help of citizens

21. Shared responsibilities
Government (Central, Regional, Local)
Private sector
Citizens
Cooperation with non-profit and international organizations
Dilemma’s
How to activate the private sector without financial donations?
How to raise awareness of citizens without a real time threat?
Risk communications

22. Mass evacuation 2 scenario’s: coast and rivers Conclusion:
Coast: preventive evacuation is no option
Rivers: preventive evacuation is possible

23. 10 actions for the future 1. Itensify preparation flu pandemic
2. Review IEA mechanism (oil crisis)
3. National operational evacuation plan
4. National strategy distribution of shortage (securing, guarding, energy, (drinking) water)
5. Research solidness communication (C2000, cell broadcast)
6. National information system (Netcentric)
7. Continuity vital infrastructure
8. Increase self helpness citizens
9. Investigation capabilities civil-military cooperation
10. Broaden mass evacuation to CBRN and forest fires

24. In the near future End of May reports:
National Risk Assessment + Mass Evacuation Task
 Council of Ministers
Advice: all information is made public
Follow-up international conference on national safety & security
Questionnaire: to set up a network of people (government, science, private sector) interested in issues of particular aspects of national safety & security
Analysis outcomes questionnaire will follow before the Summer

25. Thank you for your attention
Questions?