1. Dr. Richard (Dick) Hayes Evidence Based Research, Inc 703-893-6800
Sensemaking in Command and Control: The Missing Ingredient Network Centric Warfare Conference September 17-18, Sensemaking = Fingerspitzengefuhl—which is the German expression for “the ability to feel the situation in one’s fingertips” ~
Dr. Richard (Dick) Hayes Evidence Based Research, Inc

2. Agenda Context Why Sensemaking? What is Sensemaking?
Sensemaking in Enhanced Decision Making
Conclusions
Recommendations
Symposium Objectives
This workshop started out as an attempt to have a workshop on Knowledge Management which is a somewhat ambiguous concept because different people come to it with different perspectives, and in struggling with what we were actually trying to get at, I don’t remember who, but we used the expression: “Well, what we’re really interested in, is how do you make sense out of this situation?” You have all this information, if you want to call it that, and there’s a huge leap between that and making sense out of the situation and we’re not going to argue whether knowledge management covers that whole thing or just parts of it, but let’s try to make what we’re doing clear, and call it sensemaking. We were at least, at least most of us, unaware that anyone else had used that term, because it’s actually been used in another discipline. But that’s the genesis of how this evolved. Now, the reason that that struck us as something worthy of our time and attention, was that in fact the central hypothesis of NCW is that you have to develop this shared awareness and that somehow if you can develop that, synchronization will follow. And many of our efforts sort of stopped short of an understanding or a description or a measuring what this notion of SA is, and certainly the link from the information to the action is what we’re concerned about.

3. Emerging View of C2 Process
Cognitive Domain
Sensemaking
Command Intent
Understanding
Awareness
Information Domain
Battlespace
Management
Now, this is one of those charts that we could talk about for 2 hours. I only put it up to make two points. One is that we’re really talking about 3 different domains. We’re talking about a physical domain, an information domain, and a cognitive domain. And that we ought to view whatever the object of our attention is through this prism to try and figure out where we measure it and what it’s really doing. Then we overlaid our construct of the OODA loop, which we’re not real comfortable with because somehow you have to get a sense in that these individual steps are related in some way and there’s some sort of fuzziness about their boundaries, and overlaps and things. So, we’ve, I think, Dave Signori and Dick Hayes developed a set of charts that this is derived from, that actually describe the evolution of the C2 process. It’s an interesting discussion. But, what I’m using this for is to show you that most of our attention in this field has been devoted to sort of sensing stuff, and getting it on someone’s display. And then once that’s done, the processes of developing plans and sort of connecting them to effects. And so we’ve been worried about this, and we’ve been worried about this. But what we’ve sort of paid scant attention to is the crossing the boundary into the cognitive domain which says, now that I’ve got the information on the screen, what’s getting in the guy’s head, putting that in context with other things and then, how does it sort of relate to the actions they take which have explicit or implicit decisions associated with it. And, when, at least I went to school and studied decision theory. It really was sort of a platonic version of the world. And it sort of described how people ought to make decisions not necessarily how people do make decisions. And so there was no thinking involved. It was a formula. You went out and got this data, you put it together, you did all your mathematics and boom, the answer fell out the other side and everything was sort of left as an exercise to the student. Well this is really obviously the important link between what we bring in as information and what we do with it to decide how to deal with the world and subsequently how we act.
Battlespace
Monitoring
Information Systems
Physical Domain
Synchronization
Operating Environment

4. Why We Need Enhanced Sensemaking
Ability to deal with
Emergent threats
Asymmetric situations
Unfamiliar situations
Dynamic situations
Desire to employ new, more appropriate operational concepts and command approaches
Network Centric Operations
Effects Based Operations
Ensure an open effective decision making process
Appreciate possible non-linear futures
Avoid premature closure
Evaluate new information appropriately
Reduce vulnerability to IO and deception
One of the reasons that I think we found that a focus on knowledge management perhaps missed the essence of the problem was first, the changes in the environment, the military forces, indeed the entire national security community has to address. Unlike the world in which most of us grew up in, and you know, cut our teeth on national security issues, the new world is different. It’s changing, it’s dynamic. There’s a set of rapidly emerging threats, asymmetric situations, unfamiliar situations, and dynamic situations. A lot of new issues, few answers. Indeed few well understood contexts even. And our sense was that knowledge management was much more interested in the sensors, and pipes, and displays, and didn’t pay much attention, to what I would call, the last six inches, to what some of my Navy friends now call the first six inches, which is sort of from here to here. What is it that goes on in the head of the decision maker? And our focus was really the Operational Commanders. As Dave indicated, both network centric operations and effects based operations, whatever you’re current term of art for these new concepts. You really are a move away from top down directive control and the sense of synchronization where you may have time as a slack resource, and so you have halt lines, and times which people are forced to meet. And move towards an operation much more like jazz, rather than like classical orchestral music, where it’s a continuous flow process. In a sense, it’s the difference between a soccer game and football, with it’s static set piece plays. Again, as Dave indicated, that really does require that the people out there share what I think is the term of art these days, the common operational picture. But deeper than that, a common appreciation of both this situation and the actions and objectives to be achieved.
Looking at the last bullet, I’d argue that what it really ought to say now is not just ensure an open decision process, but an open and effective decision process. There’s 30 years worth of research that has been largely ignored on why smart people make bad decisions. And it’s not because they don’t know facts, it’s not because we lack clarity, it’s not even because we continue to follow the overly prescriptive rational decision process. But the human brain is a couple hundred thousand years of evolutionary processes that hardwire how we handle sensory input and information. If you want to go back to the literature, 3 names that you can look for are Connomans, Sversky, and Slovik (????). Starting in the late 60s-early 70s, they developed a whole field that addresses issues of cognitive errors, illusions, and biases. One of the interesting things that was addresses, is we know that simply recognizing these errors doesn’t necessarily allow you to avoid them. And therefore, how can you build processes that allow you to implement concepts like Network centric Operations and Effects Based Operations, yet allow the decision maker to be in the process, allowing him to make sense of this vast flows of information in real time, particularly in contexts that are unfamiliar

5. What is Sensemaking?
A process at the individual, group, organizational, and cultural level
—That builds on a “deep understanding” of a situation
— In order to deal with that situation more effectively, through better judgments, decisions, and actions
Sensemaking addresses key cognitive issues
Sensemaking* is about such things as
Placement of items into frameworks
Comprehending
Constructing meaning
Interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding
Patterning
Redressing surprise
*Adapted from: Karl Weick, “Sensemaking in Organizations”
 So, what are we really talking about here? Well, the first thing that I think is really important to recognize is in a sense there are at least 3, and maybe 4 levels of sensemaking. There’s the sensemaking that occurs inside the individuals cognitive processes. There’s also the impact of group and organizational, cultural biases, objectives, and there’s an entire literature on the impact of group think. It is real. It affects how people process information and make decisions. And lastly, the societal or cultural level. Also, has a substantial impact on what cognitive psychologists call the reference frame. How we filter incoming information flows and it’s often, interestingly enough, the reason for classic intelligence failures. It’s not that the information wasn’t there. It’s that our reference frame, our mental picture, our mental model caused us to avoid seeing and being able to make sense of what was actually happening.
Dick Hayes first used the phrase deep understanding. It really does create and build on a deep understanding of the situation, it’s not just what the pipes are flowing to you, it’s what individuals, small groups, organizations, and cultures bring what we’ve termed prior knowledge and belief systems. Including value systems. And situational awareness is not just the stuff, the things, and the instantaneous picture of where they are. It’s a set of interrelated complex processes that are dynamic and continually shifting. And so, SA has to address missions and constraints, capabilities and intentions, many of which, with the new enemy, will be unknowable from studying them beforehand, because they don’t exercise, they don’t write doctrinal manuals that we can get our hands on, they don’t train in the open where we can see them. It means integrating and understanding of the environment, and also recognizing what uncertainties, opportunities, and risks exist.

6. Sensemaking: Conceptual Framework
“Deep” understanding
of situation
Cause and effect
Temporal relations
Dynamic futures
Opportunities & Risks
S h a r e d
S h a r e d
Sensemaking
Values
Anticipated dynamic
futures
Alternatives perceived
Command Intent
Choices among alternatives
including contingent choices
Choices to wait
Choices to seek information
Choices to consult others
S h a r e d
Prior
knowledge
Mental
Models
Judgment
Decision
processes C o n s t r a i
Red
Blue
S h a r e d
Capabilities &
Other
Intentions
Time & Space M
s & E v m e
Uncertainty
Awareness
Cognitive
Domain
Planning
Missions
Assets
Boundaries
Schedules
Contingencies
Emotions
Physiological Factors
Beliefs
Perceptions
Information
Domain
Decision Support
Models & Tools
Directives
Requests for support
Queries
Reports
Efforts to consult
Information (data in context)
Data (representation)
Synchronization
Physical Domain
Objects/events
Actions

7. Diagnosing Sensemaking
Prior
knowledge
Mental
Models
“Deep” understanding
of situation
Cause and effect
Temporal relations
Dynamic futures
Sensemaking
Values
Anticipated dynamic
futures
Alternatives perceived
Decisions
Choices among alternatives
including contingent choices
Choices to wait
Choices to seek information
Choices to consult others
Was shared awareness
of the situation
correctly understood?
Judgment
Was Sense made
of the situation?
Was command intent
developed collaboratively?
Decision
processes
Decision Support
Models & Tools
Were emotions, beliefs
and cognitive factors
taken into account?
Red
Blue
Other
Capabilities &
Intentions
Time & Space
Opportunities & Risks C o n s t r a i M
s & E v m e
Uncertainty
Shared Awareness
Cognitive
Domain
Was the SA shared?
Emotions
Physiological Factors
Beliefs
Perceptions
Planning
Missions
Assets
Boundaries
Schedules
Contingencies
Did the individuals develop appropriate
Situational Awareness (SA)?
Was a quality
plan developed?
Were the appropriate
models and tools used?
Was it put in a form that facilitates awareness?
Information
Domain
Now we tried to turn this also into a diagnostic framework and when we do that first thing is, you get the question, did we collect the right data? Do we have the information available to us and that means you not only have to collect the data but you’ve got to organize it, fuse it, correlate, put it in the right context, so that it means something. In turn, we want to know whether we’ve managed to organize that stuff and present it in a way that in fact, enables real humans to get it between their ears. So that we’ve actually created some awareness. And do the people in fact, and these are I hope testable, do these in fact have a situational awareness that is not incorrect and is appropriate to their roles. Then critical issue, is it shared? Do the different people working this problem have a similar understanding of what the problem is? So now, do we understand what that means. Now, you probably noticed when Dave put up the egg charts, the first one that he used, that we didn’t have the standard phrase “Commander’s Intent,” instead we had on that box labeled “Command Intent”. That’s a recognition that in Network Centric, or frankly, joint operations now, we have to get the intent of a set of commanders align. Those commanders will be at different echelons, they may be responsible for different functions, but there is a rich concept called command intent, which means that each of those commanders’ intent are complimentary, and that’s part of what we have to wrestle with. And in order to do that, they have to understand the situation in a parallel way. So, ultimately the question is, were we able, not only individually, but organizationally, to make sense of the situation? If we have done that, then we stand a good chance that the rest of this will work well.
So, that, if you will, is the broad version of what sensemaking is, and I hope, enables you to anchor it in some of the other work that you have done.
Directives
Requests for support
Queries
Reports
Efforts to consult
Information (data in context)
Was it put together appropriately? (correlation, context)
Were the decision and
driving factors
shared?
Data (representation)
Was the right data collected?
Synchronization
Physical Domain
Objects/events
Was the plan executed effectively?
Actions

8. Conclusions (1 of 3)
For most cases examined, Sensemaking failure is more often caused by
Misperceptions
Misinterpretations
Misunderstandings
Miscalculations
Miscommunications
Misorientation
Miscorrelation
Maldistribution …
rather than lack of data or information
And these are in the situations and mission areas we know best

9. Conclusions (2 of 3) For emerging situations and mission areas:
We lack fundamental data and mental models
We lack the institutional insights necessary to understand and make sense in these arenas
We lack relevant education and training
Suited to these situations and mission areas
Focused on important elements of the operating environment (cultures, languages, countries, regional dynamics…)
And these are situations and mission areas
where we are most likely to be engaged

10. Conclusions (3 of 3)
Sensemaking is the essential link to information and decision superiority, but remains a weak link in the C2 value chain
Our current investment strategy is focused on our strengths, not our weaknesses
Without changing the way we invest, train, and do business, we will continue to be vulnerable to mission failure

11. Recommendations Sensemaking Vision Exploit Existing Knowledge
Research, Analysis, and Experimentation
Education and Training

12. Sensemaking Vision
Need to increase people’s awareness of the critical role of Sensemaking
Currently our investments are focused on data, information, and systems
…We need to shift some of the focus of our investments from data, information, and systems to Sensemaking in support of more effective C2

13. Exploit Existing Knowledge
Create an “experts group” to identify exploitable knowledge and methodologies
Cognitive psychology
Cognitive neuroscience
Area studies
Social anthropology
Create a “practitioners group” to identify exploitable applications and technologies
New economy
Defense Industry
Military practitioners
Media
Create interdisciplinary teams to:
Review mission areas to identify weak links
Review existing methodologies, approaches, and tools
Human Computer Interface
Human factors
Decision science
Political/Organizational science

14. Research, Analysis, and Experimentation
Establish a new, major research thrust focused on the cognitive aspect of Sensemaking
Areas of research emphasis should include
Perception and learning
Creating awareness
Sharing awareness
Developing “deep understanding”
Distributive and collaborative processes in C2
Sensemaking at the individual, group, and organizational level
Analytic initiatives
Create/retrofit new models that represent Sensemaking capabilities, processes, and impacts on mission effectiveness
Formulate measures of merit for Sensemaking
Design a campaign of experimentation (multi-year/multi-objective) :
Heavy emphasis on discovery experiments
Some hypothesis refinement efforts (Limited Objective Experiments)

15. Education and Training
Broaden educational experience (within DoD and between DoD and outside institutions)
Social sciences
Area studies and cultures
Languages
Involvement in research and experimentation
Internships in external organizations
Create a family of discovery/experiential/learning centers focused on Sensemaking and problem solving in:
New World Disorder missions
Traditional missions in the Information Age
Conduct “Listen and Network” symposia and workshops
Bringing the outside in--industry and academia
Interdisciplinary/inter-agency
Cross-educational

16. Way Ahead Workshop Series
Workshop One: The Foundation (March, 2001)
Output: Conceptual framework and way ahead
Mini- Symposium/Workshop: Reach out to Industry and Academia
(23-25 October, 2001)
Output: Creation of a community of interest
Workshop Three: A DoD Research Road Map
Output: Research road map
Workshop Four: Putting It All Together - Recommendations for DOTML-PF)
Output: Creation of a community of practice
Book: Sensemaking in the Military: The Essential Path to Information and Decision Superiority
Symposium: Sensemaking in Military Operations

17. Symposium Objectives Discuss the operational forms of Sensemaking:
– Individual
– Organizational
– Industrial
– Military
Define research needs and opportunities.
Identify target areas for increased Sensemaking education and training initiatives.
Raise awareness of Sensemaking and its potential contributions within DoD.
First of all, as Dave’s said the workshop had fairly modest objectives. Most important to try and figure out what we meant by this phrase sensemaking and so writing down and generating a notion of a conceptual framework, and what that in fact would imply in terms of an analytic framework. We also wanted to be sure that we tried to think through diagnostically how would we tell whether it was going well or badly. Moving towards measurement. Also trying to look at some of the experience. There was some background work done on cases like Vincennes and Stark and the Blackhawk Shoot down, trying to make sure that we could in fact diagnose what was going right and what was going wrong inside this concept. And finally, to work out a roadmap. We recognized that we were very early in the process, we recognized that it was going to take a lot of heavy lifting beyond where we could take this in a 3 day workshop. And so the question, what might that look like if we in fact are serious, about not only treating this as an academic subject, but actually bringing it into the practical realm so that we can deal with the .mil pf issues and come up with actionable recommendations where we not only would have people aware of the sensemaking issues, but actually have some things to offer in terms of how we can improve sensemaking. So that was in some sense a very simple and limited agenda, in another sense, a very complex and rich one.