1. Egocentric spatial information
Currie: “With ordinary seeing, we get information about the spatial and temporal relations between the object seen and ourselves….Photographs on the other hand do not convey egocentric information.”([Currie, 1995], 66)
Carroll: “I submit that we do not speak literally of seeing objects unless I can perspicuously relate myself spatially to them--i.e., unless I know (roughly) where they are in the space I inhabit.”([Carroll, 1996], 62)

2. The doxastic requirement
Currie: “kinds of judgments we make in cases of ordinary seeing…which have no counterparts in the case of seeing photographs.”([Currie, 1995], 66)
X sees Y only if X possesses a belief about the spatial relations between X and Y.

3. Walton’s counterexamples
Sequence of Mirrors Case
Hall of Mirrors Case

4. Weakening the doxastic requirement?
X sees Y only if X believes Y is in the same general space as X
Problem: Possible counterexamples to the weakened doxastic requirement.

5. An alternative approach? (The orientation condition)
Carroll: “I can orient my body spatially to what I see…But when I see a photograph I cannot orient my body to the photographed objects.”([Carroll, 1995], 71)
X sees Y only if X can orient its body with respect to Y.
Problem: Seeing with locked-in syndrome.

6. The fundamental problem with the doxastic approach
Belief is fragile with respect to perturbations that leave seeing intact, so no particular doxastic state can be necessary for seeing.
For example, skepticism can undermine almost any belief. But skeptics see.
Cf. Dretske Seeing and Knowing

7. Another unpalatable aspect of the doxastic approach
The approach links the question of non-human seeing to non-human cognition.