1. Zones of Peace, Zones of Chaos Regional Trends in World Politics

2. A. Peace and Conflict 1. War and Peace Clusters Conflicts in June 2012

3. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1900-1925

4. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1925-1950

5. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1950-1975

6. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1975-2000

7. 3. Global Peace Index: 2008

8. 3. Global Peace Index: 2010

9. 3. Global Peace Index: 2012

10. 4. Key Points a. Certain areas are conflict-prone (clusters) b. Others are peace-prone c. Location of clusters changes over time Therefore, cause must also be something that changes over time

11. B. Economics 1. Poverty and Prosperity: GDP Per Capita

12. 2. Social Welfare a. Hunger

13. b. Infant Mortality

14. 3. Economic System a. Today: Clustering of Property Rights (Capitalism)

15. b. Clusters Over Time: Communism Communism

16. 4. Key points a. Clusters on major economic indicators b. Location changes over time: expansion and contraction around edges of clusters c. Overlap between Economic / War clusters Related?

17. C. Government 1. Democracy: Map of Freedom, 2012:

18. 3. Corruption: Corruption Perceptions Index (2011)

19. D. Political Regions 1. Zones of Chaos – War-prone, poor, authoritarian, unstable, deadly 2. Zones of Stability – Peaceful, wealthy, healthy, democratic 3. Questions: How do these zones form and change?

20. A Clash of Civilizations? The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Samuel P. Huntington

21. A. Assumptions 1. Conflict over values not power or resources! 2. Key value divide changes over time a.Colonialism and Nationalism: West vs. the Rest b.20 th Century Ideologies: Fascism vs. Democracy, Communism vs. Capitalism c.Post Cold War: Cultural Identities 3. Key actors = civilizations, not states 4. Culture Clash Internal / External Conflict a.Religion = Indivisible Stakes b.Identity trumps other concerns

22. 5. The Map of Civilizations

23. a. Religion determines some civilizational borders

24. b. Identity determines the rest West – Latin America divide: ethnicity? Sinic civilization: Originally called Confucian. What is the basis for this bloc? African civilization: Essentially what was left after drawing other civilizations

25. 6. Alignments shape civilizational conflicts

26. 7. Universalism = Conflict a. There are no universal political desires b. Modernization Westernization

27. B. Implication: Internal Unity = Strength 1. Dont be multicultural a.Enemies will try to foment intra-societal conflict b.Beware immigration from other civilizations b.Beware immigration from other civilizations

28. 2. Test: Does Immigration Cause Internal Violence? a. Europe Does High % foreign- born cause more conflict?

29. b. US: Patterns of Immigration i. 1966-1970 period of riots: unrelated

30. ii. Social Strife and Immigration, 1880-1914: relationship

31. c. Immigration by Region: Compare to Conflict Maps

32. d. Areas of inter-civilizational migration: Which civilizations should be weak?

33. C. Implication: Pushing Democracy and Capitalism = Civilizational Conflict 1. Democracy is Western value system: Separation of church and state, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, individualism 2. Market capitalism is Western: Competition, property rights

34. 3. Test: Is Democracy Western? a. World Values Survey – Questions about democracy, human rights, politics, religion, etc. Key Dimensions Democratic Performance: Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling Democracies arent good at maintaining order Democratic Ideals: Democracy may have its problems but it is better than any other form of government I approve of having a democratic political system

35. b. Results – i. Democratic Performance/Ideals: No Difference!

36. ii. Other surveys reveal… Important differences do exist within Islamic civilization

37. c. What about Asian Values?

38. Asia vs. US/Canada: Support for Free Market Democracy

39. D. Implication: Fault Lines and Culture Clashes Predict Conflict

40. 1. Islam Has Bloody Borders and Bloody Innards

41. a. Interstate War (Bloody Borders) Middle East is unusually prone to war Region is a better predictor than religion: non- Islamic ME states fight as much as Islamic ME states, and Islamic non-ME states fight as much as non-Islamic non-ME states Interstate wars within civilizations (since 1950): –Sinic and Buddhist have more than expected by chance –West has fewer than expected by chance –Islam and other civilizations are about average

42. Which civilizations fight the most? Islamic civilization has plenty of conflicts…. …but other civilizations have more civilizational conflicts!

43. b. Internal War (Bloody Innards) ME region is more likely to experience political terror and human rights violations BUT region again outperforms religion –Exception: Catholic countries experience higher levels of repression than non-Catholic neighbors Oil wealth correlates with both repression and civil war around the world Some majority-Muslim countries are democracies (Turkey, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Lebanon) – but most are poor and poor countries tend to experience violence and repression

44. c. Demographics of Islam What percentage of Arabs are Muslim? What percentage of Arabs are Muslim? About 90%About 90% What percentage of Muslims are Arab? What percentage of Muslims are Arab? About 20%About 20% The largest Muslim country is… The largest Muslim country is… IndonesiaIndonesia Where do Muslims live? Where do Muslims live? Only 33% live in the Middle EastOnly 33% live in the Middle East 25% in South Asia, 20% in Africa25% in South Asia, 20% in Africa

45. d. Does Islam Teach Violence? i. Violence not a necessary part of faith: i. Violence not a necessary part of faith: Universal Brotherhood [49:13] No Forced Conversion [2:256] Peaceful Co-existence [60:8-9] Jihad = multiple meanings ii. Religion used to justify political actions Iranian clergy vs. elected officials Osama bin Ladens declaration of jihad

46. 2. Statistical evidence on Fault Lines a. Little evidence of cultural wars 1819-1989 b. Post-1989: i. States of different civilizations LESS likely to fight than states of same civilizations Controls for contiguity, power, democracy ii. Ethnic diversity civil war Controls for economic growth c. Did the end of the Cold War mark a new era of conflict?

47. i. Decrease in conflicts

48. ii. No change in ratio of civilizational to non-civilizational conflicts – and both have declined

49. d. Are inter-civilizational conflicts worse?

50. E. Implication: Balance of Power Shifting a. West will decline: Demographics and Development (recall Power Transition predictions) b. Beware an Islamic-Sinic alliance

51. F. Do people in different civilizations have important value differences?

52. 1. West vs. Islam: Gender/Sexuality = Division, Not Religious Leadership!

53. 2. Gender: West vs. the Rest

54. 3. Categorizing major values a. Tradition vs. Secularism and Survival vs. Self-Expression

55. b. Regional value differences exist…

56. c. …But Country Trumps Religion!

57. d. Simplest explanation: Income!

58. Contagion How Local Problems Go Regional

59. A. Processes of Contagion in World Politics 1. Diffusion: Affinity, Alliances, or Spill-Over 2. Emulation: Modeling or Harmonization 3. Opportunism: Altered decision calculus

60. B. Contagious Conflicts 1. Diffusion a. Affinity: Ethnicity and War i. Irredentism: Unite group in one state ii. Secessionism: Separate group from state iii. Examples: Greece and Crete Revolts – enosisGreece and Crete Revolts – enosis Turkey and Kurds – Mountain TurksTurkey and Kurds – Mountain Turks Macedonia and Kosovo – Greater AlbaniaMacedonia and Kosovo – Greater Albania

61. In Detail: Diffusion of War in Africas Great Lakes Region

62. In Depth: Diffusion of War in Africas Great Lakes Region 1950s-1970s: Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi: Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire 1980s: Civil war in Uganda – Tutsi exiles aid Ugandan rebels victory Early 1990s: Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with help from Uganda 1993: Arusha Accords – Agreement to share power between Hutu and Tutsi 1993: Massacres in Burundi – Hutu rebellion begins

63. 1988: Tutsis Kill 20,000 Hutus 1972: Tutsis Kill 100,000 Hutu Elites 1993: 50,000 Civilians Killed 1963: Invasion: 10,000 Tutsis Killed 1959: Hutu Revolt Displaces Tutsis 1980-1988: Civil War: Tutsi Exiles Aid Rebels 1994: Genocide: Civil War Resumes 1990-1993: Exile Invasion Civil War Cease-Fire

64. 1994: Genocide in Rwanda

65. April 1994: - Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi presidents (probably by Hutu extremists) - Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in Rwanda, seize power, and systematically exterminate 80% of Tutsis (about 800,000 people) - Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war, take control of country - Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to camps in Zaire

66. 1994: Flight of the Interahamwe

67. Security Issues - Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis: Control camp resources - Zaires Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the Interahamwe - Burundi Hutu rebels ally with Interahamwe - Zaire leader (Mobutu) sees an opportunity: preserve power by using Interahamwe against enemies classifies Banyamulenge as refugees and revokes citizenship

68. 1996-1997: The Zaire War September 1996: South Kivu province orders all Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave or be sent to camps Rwanda sees opportunity: defend Tutsi in Zaire AND eliminate Interahamwe October 1996: ADFL revolt Rebels attack Hutu camps, force refugees back to Rwanda. Zaire army melts away. May 1997: ADFL seizes power – factional infighting begins

69. 1996-1997: The Zaire War

70. DRC War: 1998 – 2000 Africas World War - 1997: Power struggle among ADFL elements Emergence of Kabila - Early 1998: Kabila seeks independence from sponsors (Rwanda, Uganda) - Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge Rebellion in Kivu (again) - Pro-rebel intervention: Uganda, Rwanda, and later Burundi (pro-Tutsi) - Pro-government intervention: Angola (aiding its own civil war), Zimbabwe (preventing new regional power), Namibia, Sudan (anti-Uganda), Hutu rebels in Burundi, Interahamwe - Other involvement: Both sides in Congo Republic war, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Sudan Ethiopia Eritrea), Chad

71. Africas World War

72. 2000: Stalemate and the Rwanda- Uganda Conflict

73. Affinity and the DRC War Kinship matters: Uganda Tutsi exiles – Rwanda Tutsi – Banyamulenge – Burundi Tutsi government VS Rwanda Hutu government – Burundi Hutu rebels – Hutu Banyarwanda in Zaire/DRC BUT... There are other reasons the war spread (Banyamulenge massacre by Rwandan and Ugandan forces in 2002)

74. b. Alliances and War Escalation Allies much more likely to intervene, though probability < 25% Angola allied with Kabila against both sides enemies (UNITA and Rwanda-Uganda) War occurs… Allied Not Allied Intervene, YES 25%2% Intervene, NO 75%98%

75. c. Spill-Over Refugees and Negative Externalities Bases and Safe Havens: Remember the Interahamwe?

76. 2. Emulation a. Institutions: Fear of new government systems b. Learning: Wars as training grounds Examples: Liberation movements (Cuba- Bolivia, China-Vietnam), Metternichs Holy Alliance, Fear of Red Spread

77. 3. Opportunism Examples: Spanish Succession, Austrian Succession, French Revolution Loot-seeking: Why did Rwanda and Uganda fight each other in the DRC? In Detail: Iran-Iraq War –1979: Iranian Revolution –Late 1979: Moderate Iranians lose power struggle –Spring 1980: Attempted assassination of Aziz –September 1980: Iraq abrogates 1975 treaty –September-November 1980: Iraqi blitzkrieg offensive vs. Iranians –November 1980: Iraq offensive stalls

78. November 1980-August 1988: Stalemate Stalemate

79. August 1988 War ends with cease-fire Up to 1 Million dead

80. C. Economic Contagion (and a Brief Introduction to International Economics) 1. Diffusion a.Affinity: Tourism, Remittances, Immigration b.Alliances: Incentive to trade more with allies than enemies c.Spill-over: Alter economy of one state alter economies of neighbors

81. In Detail: East Asian Crisis (see also pp. 376-379) May – July 1997: Bahtulism in Thailand –Thai businesses begin to default on debts

82. Side Note: Crony Capitalism in the Mid-1990s in East Asia Early entrepreneurs and politicians dominate financial policy in emerging market countries –Crony capitalism bad loans (not made by reasonable risk assessment) –Crony interests wish to protect dollar value of assets pressure on central banks and Ministries of Finance to maintain overvalued exchange rates US/Japanese investment in East Asia in mid-1990s flood of cheap capital strengthens crony capitalism –Makes it easy to borrow dollars to defend currency if needed (crony policy) –Banks run out of safe investments and seek to increase profits by making riskier one (crony policy) –Corruption no real check on risks taken by local banks

83. In Detail: East Asian Crisis (see also pp. 376-379) May – July 1997: Bahtulism in Thailand –Thai businesses begin to default on debts –Government promises to buy the bad loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under

84. Side Note: Banks and the Economy Banks –Take in deposits. Required by law to keep some in the vault to cover withdrawals (reserve ratio), free to invest/loan the rest for profit –Create and destroy money. Banks loan more than they have in reserves. These loans are then spent by borrowers, which increases the total supply of money. Customers and other lenders will tolerate the behavior only as long as they believe that the bank is reputable in this activity Easy access to credit needed for consumer spending, investment in new enterprises, and profits for bankers Credit crunch = money sucked out of economy, banks threatened by customer withdrawals/insufficient reserves no one invests or spends less economic output (recession or depression)

85. In Detail: East Asian Crisis (see also pp. 376-379) May – July 1997: Bahtulism in Thailand –Thai businesses begin to default on debts –Government promises to buy the bad loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under; –Fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued

86. Side Note: Currency Devaluation Moneys value determined by supply and demand Some states choose fixed exchange rates and defend them to reassure investors and domestic elites Fear of recession pressure to devalue Devalue Increased exports, decreased imports, inflation more employment (Phillips Curve)

87. In Detail: East Asian Crisis (see also pp. 376-379) May – July 1997: Bahtulism in Thailand –Thai businesses begin to default on debts –Government promises to buy the bad loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under –Fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued –Attack on the baht: Foreign speculators exchange baht for dollars, betting they will get more baht for their dollars later.

88. Side Note: Currency Attacks Take out loans in target currency, backed by dollars (secured loans) Demand dollars from government until it begins to run out (if currency actually overvalued) government forced to devalue Now exchange dollars for baht at the new, better rate Pay back loan in baht and keep the profit (in dollars or baht)

89. In Detail: East Asian Crisis (see also pp. 376-379) May – July 1997: Bahtulism in Thailand –Thai businesses begin to default on debts –Government promises to buy the bad loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under –Fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued –Attack on the baht: Foreign speculators exchange baht for dollars, betting they will get more baht for their dollars later. –June 19: We will never devalue the baht. Repeated June 30. –July 2: Devaluation of the baht

90. July 1997: Devaluation Spreads Investor fears (similar problems in neighbors economies) and competitive pressure (need to devalue to save export industries) Investor fears (similar problems in neighbors economies) and competitive pressure (need to devalue to save export industries) 2 nd : Attack on the Philippine peso devaluation on 11 th 2 nd : Attack on the Philippine peso devaluation on 11 th 8 th : Attack on Malaysian ringgit devaluation on 14 th 8 th : Attack on Malaysian ringgit devaluation on 14 th 11 th : Attack on Indonesian rupiah devaluation August 14 th 11 th : Attack on Indonesian rupiah devaluation August 14 th 14 th : Singaporean dollar devalued 14 th : Singaporean dollar devalued 24 th : Currency meltdown. 24 th : Currency meltdown.

91. From Devaluation to Recession August-September 1997: Fears of recession Actual slowdowns August-September 1997: Fears of recession Actual slowdowns October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue Hong Kong stock market crashes global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended) October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue Hong Kong stock market crashes global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended)

92. From Devaluation to Recession August-September 1997: Fears of recession Actual slowdowns August-September 1997: Fears of recession Actual slowdowns October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue Hong Kong stock market crashes global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended) October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue Hong Kong stock market crashes global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended) November: South Korean won and Japanese yen depreciate vs. US dollars new round of stock market crashes as investors pull out of South Korea and Japan November: South Korean won and Japanese yen depreciate vs. US dollars new round of stock market crashes as investors pull out of South Korea and Japan Crashes Banks call in loans Failing businesses, unemployment recessions in East Asia Crashes Banks call in loans Failing businesses, unemployment recessions in East Asia

93. Exporting Recession

94. 2. Emulation a. Institutions: Dollarization, Euros, WTO/IMF standards, convergence theory b. Learning: Copy success stories

95. 3. Opportunism Beggar Thy Neighbor and the Great Depression

96. 3. Opportunism Beggar Thy Neighbor and the Great Depression Free-Riding

97. 3. Opportunism Beggar Thy Neighbor and the Great Depression Free-Riding Race to the Bottom

98. D. Problems with Contagion 1. Why some regions rather than others? 2. Modeling, Opportunism or Diffusion? 3. Uncertain regional boundaries 4. Few specific predictions

99. Security Communities A Recipe for Regional Transformation?

100. A. Requirements of a Security Community 1. Expectation of Nonviolence: Trust, Predictability, Knowledge 2. We-feeling 3. Shared long-term interests Reciprocity 4. Security Communities Institutions, not the other way around

101. B. Emergence 1. Democratic Peace? No democracy vs. democracy wars expectation of peaceful interaction 2. Interdependence? Creates common interests incentives for reciprocity 3. Regime stability? Creates predictability 4. Interaction? Creates we-feeling?

102. C. Evidence: Regional Economic Organizations 1. ASEAN: Attempt to build a security community – only minimal political conflict

103. 2. European Union: Expansion of a Security Community

104. 3. APEC: Too big? Very little authority

105. 4. Mercosur Little real coordination, but regular interaction

106. 5. Major Trade Blocs

107. 6. US FTAs: Trade Policy or Security Policy? YearCountry % US Exp % US Imp 1985Israel11 1989Canada2318 1994 Mexico (NAFTA) + 14 + 12 2001Jordantrivialtrivial 2003Chile < 1 2003Singapore21 2004Moroccotrivialtrivial 2005Australia21 2006 Central America (DR-CAFTA) 21 2006Bahraintrivialtrivial 2007Peru < 1 2010? South Korea, Colombia, Panama variesvaries

108. D. Evidence: Alliance Networks 1. Must be focused on external threat 2. Collective security provisions a plus 3. Examples: NATO, ANZUS, ???

109. E. Problems with Security Communities 1. Causality not established 2. Eurocentric: projects other regions will follow path of Europe 3. 19 th -Century European Peace: security community was absent 4. Parsimony: The Liberal Peace thesis (democracy/trade/IOs peace) explains war better, and peace trade