1. Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy
EUROPOS SÀJUNGA
Europos socialinis fondas
MYKOLO ROMERIO
UNIVERSITETAS
Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy
Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier

2. Who is this person? Richard Sherman
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now
Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs,
Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996
What I do
International Relations
Political Economy
Empirical Political Science
Comparative Politics
Where I publish
The World Economy
Comparative Political Studies
Journal of Conflict Resolution
International Interactions
Economics Letters
Social Science Quarterly
International Politics
Current Politics and Economics of Europe

3. My research
Intersection of domestic politics and international relations
International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues
Connections:
The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter?
The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik)
International regimes & organizations
Political markets vs. political contests

4. Privatizing commercial diplomacy
Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors:
petition for the initiation of trade disputes
consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues
attend WTO talks with government officials
negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform
EU Trade Barriers Regulation
US Section 301
US: Private Sector Advisory Committees EU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues
Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations

5. Institutional innovation
Nihil nove sub sole?
Industry influence on government
Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.)
Government organizing industry (corporatism)
But...
Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations
Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure
International industry groups are being organized by states
Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access

6. Why is this interesting?
The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level
Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games
An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally?
Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions
Normative issues

7. Research questions Positive: Normative:
What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy?
Which industries & groups are most active, influential?
What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups?
What are the differences across institutions and polities?
Normative:
Is “the cart leading the horse”?
Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ?
Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade regime?
Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they lend ammunition to its critics?

8. Quantitative analysis
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis

9. Quantitative analysis
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US
• Political-economy analysis:
--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301
--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)
• Institutional analysis
--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes
• Cross-polity analysis
--compare patterns in US with those in EU

10. Quantitative analysis
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US
• Political-economy analysis:
--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301
--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)
• Institutional analysis
--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes
• Cross-polity analysis
--compare patterns in US with those in EU
• Interviews and analysis of documents
• Information / opinion from industry, government, and civil-society groups
• Emphases:
--implementation and politics / process
--extent of business-government cooperation
--connection to global trade regime
--normative questions

11. Conclusions The petition processes are relatively successful
still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry
“International corporatism” has proved difficult
Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation
The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases
It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful
Explaining origins:
institutional causes
political/electoral causes
hegemony/state-power causes
Normative issues:
“nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy
petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized retaliatory measures
Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction