1. NDIA-AIAA Interoperability and Systems Integration Conference Joint Battle Management, Command & Control (JBMC2) Overview
Brig Gen Marc “Buck”Rogers
USJFCOM, J8
UNCLASSIFIED

2. TEAMWORK - The KEY to US Military Capability
One thing about the DOD-Industry Team…
Somebody is always ready to support your efforts with a pat on the back…
…And the best intentions may not produce desired results…
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3. The Truth About Transformation
Been happening – and is happening
Acceleration is the difference
Doesn’t happen with the flip of a switch
More about minds than things & technology
Coherent roadmap to the future is key to transforming the force
Must be orderly…
Yet accommodate disrupting advances…
Must organize for it, lead it, and sustain it
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4. JBMC2 Responsibilities
Management Initiative Decision (MID 912)
Expands USJFCOM responsibility for:
Leading Combatant Commanders in development of joint doctrine, concepts, mission/capability requirements for Joint BMC2
Strengthening Department’s fielding of Joint Battle Management Command & Control (JBMC2) capabilities
Coordinating JBMC2 capabilities for Joint integration & interoperability with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
Oversight & directive authorities for selected DoD programs & initiatives
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5. MID912 Authorities vs C2 FCB MID 912 JCIDS
A set of responsibilities and authorities
A capability & requirements mechanism
JROC
SECDEF
MID 912
JCIDS
JCB
(COCOMS/SERVICES /AGENCIES)
Commander
USJFCOM
C2 FCB
Gap and Solution analysis
JBMC2
BOD
GATEKEEPER
JBMC2 Shortfall Prioritization;
DOTMLPF Solutions (Service Lead Decisions; Programmatic issues etc); ACTD applicability
and prioritization; JBMC2 Concepts; Experimentation; Integrated Architectures; JBMC2 Roadmaps; JBMC2 Prototyping; JCIDS Documents
Initial Capability Documents (ICD)
Capability Development Documents (CDD)
Capability Production Documents (CPD)
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6. Joint Command and Control
People and Processes
Communication Capabilities
Enables
Joint
Planning
Deciding
Coordinating
Directing
Assessing
ALL are too slow and inefficient
Service elements today can deploy, employ, create effects quicker than Joint Force Commander can “command and control” them!
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7. Joint Command and Control Issues
The need for JTF Readiness
Combat Units Train the Way They will Fight
They are ready
JTF HQ’s rarely train the Way They Will Fight
Service HQ’s challenged to sustain readiness
Shortfalls in decision-making, execution and assessment throughout the battlespace
Technology is available now to enable more rapid, effective planning, decision-making and execution
Collaborative environment drives both C2 processes and organizational changes
Net-centric OPS require a new level of proficiency
But, increases HQ personnel readiness requirement
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8. Problem Set Failure to view C2 as an integrated weapon system
Interoperability shortfalls hamper C2 and Joint Fires
Lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Lack of standard tactics, techniques, & procedures (TTPs)
Ad Hoc JTF activation and augmentation
No standards for JTF leadership or C2 personnel
No standard deployable JTF C2 facilities
Situation awareness shortfall across battlespace
Missing decision support & info management tools
Requires improvements in Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) – (What IS That…?)
(From: JTF C2 Operational Concept Study)
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9. Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Definition
JBMC2 consists of the processes, architectures, systems, standards, and command and control operational concepts employed by the Joint Force Commander. The Joint Force Commander executes joint operations by employing joint and component BMC2 capabilities during the planning, coordinating, directing, controlling, and assessing of joint force operations from interface with the strategic level through the tactical level.
Unifying construct -- Allows us to approach C2 from an integrated “weapon system” perspective
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10. Vision for JBMC2 Capabilities
JBMC2 aims at providing an integrated, interoperable, and networked joint force that will:
Ensure common shared situational awareness
Provide fused, precise and actionable intelligence
Support coherent distributed and dispersed operations, including forced entry into anti-access or area-denial environments
Ensure decision superiority enabling more agile, more lethal, and survivable joint operations
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11. Fundamental Battlespace Process = The Kill Chain
JBMC2 Components
Joint C2
Joint
ISR
Joint
Fires
Interagency
Coalition
Joint Battle Management Command and Control spans the continuum of Joint C2, Joint Intelligence (ISR), Joint Fires, Interagency, and Coalition
Fundamental Battlespace Process = The Kill Chain
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12. Command and Control Landscape Unified Command Structure
National C2
GIG
National
STRATEGIC
C4ISR SUPPORT
Combatant
Commanders
Strategic
Command &
Control for
Joint
Warfighting
STRATCOM C2 for Strategic Missions
Unified Command Structure
JBMC2
ARENA
Operational
Tactical
JOINT C2
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13. Common Capability Requirements Drive JBMC2 Focus
For any crisis, all Combatant Commanders must:
Execute command and control functions
Plan and execute using the same forces provided
Coordinate with the same national agencies
Rely on the same ISR forces/sources/agencies
Receive guidance from same national authorities
Perform crisis action planning
Perform assessment functions
Execute force deployment/redeployment
Employ the same national strategic capabilities
Execute Information Operations
Employ same SOF forces / “special” capabilities
Coordinate with / employ multinational forces
Rely on same supporting commands
Be ready to execute Joint C2 (Train)
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14. Implications of Net-Centric Warfare
New level of Interdependence & Mutual Dependence
Speed of Command – but only if we adapt
Organize, Train & Equip – vert & horiz
Quality of decisions – the importance of:
Shared Awareness
Large scale vert & horiz collaboration
Linking sensors to decision makers
Tactics, Techniques & Procedures - important as ever
Both a Capability and an Operational Concept
Means to an end – Effects Based C2
Knowledge Management will be key
Implications of Net-Centric Warfare
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15. Challenges
Exploiting new ways of doing business enabled by technical capabilities
We tend to adapt new technologies to old ways of doing business – inability to see
The science of decision-making
Peaking decision-making via info superiority
Linking activities in an Information Age Environment
The Virtual and the Live
A coherent roadmap for transforming the force
Migration & integration of legacy & net-centric
Ensuring capability as we transform
Training
Still the key to dominance in an IT “equalized” world
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16. JBMC2 Must Embrace Knowledge Management Concept!
Data Overload means Information Camouflaged
War in 2010:
1.5 trillion wpm
Wideband Datalinks
We can transmit the entire
Library of Congress each minute
Gulf War:
192,000 wpm
Networked
Computers
World War I:
30 wpm
Field Phone
World War II:
60 wpm
Radio
Vietnam:
100 wpm
SATCOM
wpm - words per minute
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17. “Objects In Mirror May Be Closer Than They Appear”
JBMC2 : What We Have to Do
Enable decision-making throughout the battlespace
(It’s a thing human beings do…)
(Decision aids do not make judgments)
Advance Effects Based Operations (EBO)
Deter/defeat wide range of adversaries
Master Knowledge Management
Exploit new ways of doing business enabled by technical capabilities
GIG provides options for JBMC2 – must exploit
Strike balance of net-enabled & autonomous capabilities
Accelerate interoperability efforts
“Objects In Mirror May Be Closer Than They Appear”
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18. Legacy C2 will not meet this challenge
Near Term Operational Arena
Legacy C2 will not meet this challenge
Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)
Decision Superiority
Effects-Based Operations (EBO)
Information Operations (IO)
Force Projection
Joint Tactical Actions (JTA)
Thinking
Differently
Fully
Networked
Coherently
Joint
Knowledge
Centric
Effects
Based
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)
Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)
Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)
Commanders are moving out – building CIEs, altering C2 CONOPs, writing SOPs – attempting to solve shortfalls and already employing some concepts
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19. Transformation Leaders in JBMC2
Standing Joint Force Headquarters
Collaborative Information Environments
Deployable Joint Command and Control
Netted Joint Forces
Integrated Joint Fires
Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
Advanced Concepts
Effects Based Operations (EBO),
Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
Etc.
UNCLASSIFIED

20. JBMC2 Value Added
More efficient and effective application of military power through a unified and interoperable command and control structure.
More info…To more users…In less time…at all levels
Better planning, situational awareness and decisions
Better info sharing with coalition partners (MNIS)…
Improved TST (joint fires)……more accurate BDA…..
Improved employment of capabilities… to deliver appropriate force on the right targets, at will, the first time, every time, and reduce fratricide … at all levels
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21. SUMMARY
Humans and their processes are still the driving factors in warfighting capability
Key to Interoperability of Forces is C2
Net-Centric C Net-Centric Warfare
Coherent Roadmap to the Future is Key to Transforming the Force
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22. Back Up

23. Command and Control Shortfalls
(Legacy)
People and Processes
Communication Capabilities
Ad hoc Joint Task Force HQ establishment
Lack of readiness - untrained HQ personnel
Individual
Collective – JFC/JTF/CTF/CC HQ staff level
Takes too long to stand up
Takes too long to organize
Nonstandard or nonexistent procedures
Too long to “gel” as a team
Too long to learn to use equip, software tools, rules, how a headquarters works
Too long to gain situational awareness
Lack of expertise in joint force planning
Too long to begin planning, produce COAs
Lack of doctrinal expertise / skills employing warfighting concepts in operations
Insufficient joint/multinational interoperability
Non-standard tools
Incoherent architectures
Legacy technology mixed with new
Modern C4I too complex to employ on “walk-in” basis
Lack of decision tools for Info Age
Varying standards
Incompatibility
Information stovepipes
Lack of ‘business rules”
Lack of database visibility
Non-responsive environment
Limited horiz & vert integration
(From Regional Combatant Command Survey)
UNCLASSIFIED

24. JBMC2 Programs, Concepts & Initiatives Portfolio
ISR
Joint Fires
Interagency
Coalition
DJC2
SIAP SE
SIGP/SIMP
PE/TST
CIE
ONA
JISR/BISR
FIOP Systems Engineering Coordination
JFI
JIACG
This represents the developing portfolio on JBMC2 activity coming under USJFCOM via MID912.
Significant to note that in the absence of MID912, these activities would press ahead, on their own, some funded, some not, some with joint requirements, …..but all with no common coordination, reference point (concepts/integrated architectures) or management to ensure the “collective” efforts achieve desire joint capabilities.
DCTS
GCCS/JC2
GCSS
DCGS
GIG ES
Programs/Initiatives directed by MID 912
Programs/Initiatives currently being developed by USJFCOM
Programs/Initiatives proposed for expansion by MID 912
Programs/Initiatives recommended for inclusion as JBMC2 programs
UNCLASSIFIED

25. Achieving Future Joint Force Integration
Continuously work with Combatant Commanders, Services, and Agencies to identify joint interoperability requirements and standards
Enforce interoperability through validation of DoD requirements documents for information exchange requirements and interoperability key performance parameters consistent with approved Joint Requirements Oversight Council joint operational concepts and integrated architectures
INTEROPERABILITY AND INTEGRATION CHALLENGE
Equipment and TTP is not nearly as interoperable as we need
-      Our focus in JI&I is two fold. First, we look to the future to transform the forces and make sure new concepts and systems are all born joint and synchronized with doctrine, organizations, training, leadership development and personnel
And then we look to the present to make some key areas and systems are more interoperable
Our future focus is on well defined and testable interoperable requirements defined to a level of specificity that a builder can build to it and a tester can test to it
  Our legacy focus is on finding an interoperable solution and then working through all the aspects of the DOTMLPF construct and transitioning it into a service POM
UNCLASSIFIED

26. Addressing Legacy Joint Force Interoperability and Integration
UCP 2002 & DoD Directive &.8 established USJFCOM Joint Interoperability & Integration (JI&I)
Identify and prioritize Combatant Commanders warfighting shortfalls from operational to tactical level
Develop comprehensive Doctrinal, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) mission capability strategies
Provide rapid fielding of mission capable solutions via transition funds - bridge Service, Agency Program Objective Memorandum cycles
UNCLASSIFIED

27. Joint Capabilities Development Process
Inputs
COCOM Capabilities Rqmts
outcomes
Lessons Learned
Real World Operations
Capabilities Gap
Joint Training & Exercises
Feedback
Warfighter Shortfalls
Experimentation
findings
Priorities
New Concepts
(e.g. EBO, ONA)
S & T
Acquisition
Experimentation
PPBS
Future
Req’ts
(TCPs)
Battlespace awareness
Analysis
&
Requirements
Development
JCIDS
FCBs
Integration
&
Packaging
Force application
Policy, guidance
& transformational
issues
- TPG, DPG
JCS
- Services
- Allied Cmd Trans
- COCOMs
- Transformation
Roadmap Owners
Commander
JFCOM
Command & control
Protection
JFCOM Orgs
- JI&I
- Trainer
- CD&E
- JBC
- etc.
Services
Coalition
Analysis
Classification,
Correlation,
&
Requirements
Development
Logistics
- Near Term
Capabilities for
COCOMs
Limited Objective
Experiments
Joint Training
Initiatives
Direct
Action
Policy, guidance &
Transformational issues
Feedback
UNCLASSIFIED

28. Joint Capabilities Development Process J8 J8
Inputs
COCOM Capabilities Rqmts
outcomes
Lessons Learned
Real World Operations
Capabilities Gap
Joint Training & Exercises
Feedback
Warfighter Shortfalls
Experimentation
findings
Priorities
New Concepts
(e.g. EBO, ONA)
S & T
Acquisition
Experimentation
PPBS
Future
Req’ts
(TCPs)
Battlespace awareness
Analysis
&
Requirements
Development
JCIDS
FCBs
Integration
&
Packaging
Force application
Policy, guidance
& transformational
issues
- TPG, DPG
JCS
- Services
- Allied Cmd Trans
- COCOMs
- Transformation
Roadmap Owners
Commander
JFCOM
Command & control J8 J8
PDITs ?
Protection
JFCOM Orgs
- JI&I
- Trainer
- CD&E
- JBC
- etc.
Services
Coalition
Analysis
Classification,
Correlation,
&
Requirements
Development
Logistics
- Near Term
Capabilities for
COCOMs
Limited Objective
Experiments
Joint Training
Initiatives
Direct
Action
Policy, guidance &
Transformational issues
PDITs
Feedback
UNCLASSIFIED

29. JBMC2 Mandate
Secretary of Defense directed expanded responsibilities for USJFCOM to improve the Department of Defense ability to field Joint Battle Management Command and Control capabilities (MID 912)
“Strengthens the Department’s fielding of Joint Battle Management Command and Control capabilities by improving the Department’s ability to organize, train, and equip joint forces.”
UNCLASSIFIED

30. “Transformational” Vocabulary
Effects Based Operations (EBO) - A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
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31. “Transformational” Vocabulary
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - Intended to provide each warfighting joint theater Commander with a trained and equipped standing, Joint Command and Control (C2) capability specifically organized to reduce the lag time involved in setting up a JTF headquarters ready to rapidly and decisively conduct operations in small-scale contingencies.
Weapon(s) system - A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.
UNCLASSIFIED