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Structure of course Quiz next Thursday – practice i>clickers today

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Presentation on theme: "Structure of course Quiz next Thursday – practice i>clickers today"— Presentation transcript:

1 Structure of course Quiz next Thursday – practice i>clickers today
Problem structure Weeks 2, and 3 Institutional formation and design Weeks 4, 5, and 6 Institutional effects Weeks 7, 8, and 9

2 Pre-Test My response All answers were thoughtful. Well done!
Some better informed than others. How I plan to use pre-tests in course: keep til end of term, re-do as post-test, give you back your pre- and post-test and let you see if you think you have made progress. What I think I can offer you: How to make USEFUL categories How to think SYSTEMATICALLY

3 i>clicker Practice Question #1 In regards to i>clickers:
I am using a real i>clicker I am using the i>clicker App What’s an i>clicker?

4 i>clicker Practice Question #2 I am taking this course because:
I am interested in international organization It fit my course schedule quite nicely I heard the course is an “easy A”

5 i>clicker Practice Question #3 I am most interested in:
International security issues International trade issues Human rights International environmental issues

6 Structure Design/Formation Effectiveness Theory Security Trade
Structure Design/Formation Effectiveness Theory Young, Ch. 3 Koremenos, et al. 2001 Stein 1982 Rittberger & Zürn 1990 Underdal 2002 Young, Ch. 2 Young/Osherenko 1993 Young, Ch. 4 & Ch. 5 Downs, et al. 1996 Mitchell 2009 Jacobson/Brown-Weiss 1998 Security Müller 2013 Hemmer/Katzenstein 2002 Syria chemical weapon articles Trade Milner 2013 Garrett 1992 Parsons 2010 Kucik & Reinhardt 2008 Goldstein 2007 Human Rights Schmitz & Sikkink 2013 Carpenter 2007 Lahav and Lavenex 2013 Environment Mitchell & Keilbach 2001 Bernauer & Siegfried 2008

7 Puzzles of International Organization
Institutional formation: Why do states form international institutions? Institutional design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them as they do? Institutional influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do, do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states? Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?

8 Shanks et al. review Number of IOs increasing IOs vary by function
Membership in IOs varies over time Less competition and more coordination among IOs since end of Cold War “Five snapshots”: typical academic approach of looking for correlations Major points of reading

9 Krasner reading

10 Problem structure Conflict/Harmony/Cooperation: Is there conflict (that cooperation may correct)? Actors: Who are the important actors? Capacities/Power: What can they do? Incentives/Preferences: What do they want? Information/Knowledge: What do they know? Norms/Values: What do they care about? Linking hypotheses: what makes a problem “hard” to resolve?

11 Problem structure: Eight (8) key questions
Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony? Is there conflict (that cooperation may correct)? Q2: Who are important actors? Q3: Capacities and power: What can they do? Q4: Incentives/preferences: What do they want? Q5: Information/knowledge: What do they know? Q6: Norms: What do they value? Q7: Inherent transparency: Are violations known? Q8: Response incentives: Do violations matter a lot? Will states respond to violations?

12 Institutional formation and design
Institutional “type”: regulatory, procedural, programmatic, generative Membership: who should be in it? Primary rule system: what should we require? Information system: what do we need to know? Response system: how should we respond?

13 Main causal questions on institutional formation/design
When (under what conditions) do states form institutions? What prompts states to form institutions and what factors make it easier/harder (more likely/less likely) to form institutions? What type of institution gets formed? How do states design institutions to address problems?

14 Goal is linking hypotheses Examples
Coordination problem --> no monitoring OR response system Upstream/downstream problem --> response system requires rewards not sanctions

15 Institutional effects
Major criteria: Goal achievement and/or Counterfactual Counterfactual evidence: member/non, before/after, regulated/non Two major questions: Did it work? Why did it work? Broader consequences of institutions Linking hypotheses

16 Main causal questions on institutional effectiveness
Can you show behaviors influenced by agreement? counterfactual goal-achievement sense WHY did agreement work? What causal mechanism? Why do some institutions work and not others? Characteristics of problem Characteristics of agreement Effects that are not effectiveness: equity, non-targeted realms (labor v. environment v. economic growth)

17 Goal is linking hypotheses
Coordination problems --> no compliance problems Institutions addressing upstream/downstream less effective than coordination problems Institutions with sanctions more effective than those without

18 Influence on Institutional Design Influence on Institutional Effects
Structure of Class Nine Questions Definition Influence on Institutional Design Influence on Institutional Effects Q1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation Q2: Actors Q3: Capacities/power Q4: Incentives/preferences Q5: Information/knowledge Q6: Norms/values Q7: Inherent transparency Q8: Response incentives

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