1. Non-Naturalism Recap
What does it mean to call morality non-naturalist?
What arguments does Moore give for this position?

2. What do we mean by Intuitions?
Not worked out inductively from evidence (as Mill believes moral judgements are).
Worked out just by rationally considering a moral claim i.e. not known empirically or analytically: but using reason alone
Incapable of proof.
However self-evidently true not ‘6th sense’ – more like maths / logic.
Moore seemingly thinks they are examples of synthetic, a priori knowledge.
NB: For Moore knowing morality through intuition means morality is self-evident. ‘Self-evident’ does not mean obvious – but that we grasp the evidence of truth directly, without relying on senses, or definitions of words. We still need to develop our ability to do this: our reasoning skills.

3. Criticism - Intuitions?
If there is no way of proving intuitions, how can we tell which are true?
Which intuitions of ‘the good’ are the right and correct ones?
E.g. The commander of Auschwitz wrote in his memoirs that he felt what he had done was ‘right’
Mill (naturalist) can argue that this intuition was wrong – by pointing out the suffering caused.
But all Moore can say is ‘his intuitions clash with other people’s intuitions’
Moore’s ‘intuitions’ are just ways of avoiding the question of what good actually is.

4. Recap Key-Terms Cognitivism Non-Cognitivism Realism Anti-Realism
Can you define what is meant by the following terms:
Cognitivism
Non-Cognitivism
Realism
Anti-Realism

5. Why might people have a problem with this approach?
Moral Realism
The different forms of moral realism argue that there are moral truths, and we can discover these truths by using reason. This reasoning may be:
Empirical, so the origin of moral principles is somewhat similar to the origin of scientific beliefs in rational investigation of the natural world.
Rational intuition, so the origin of moral principles is somewhat similar to the origin of mathematical beliefs in a priori reasoning.
But the thing in common is that there are definitive truths to be discovered about morality and therefore by extension we can say that certain moral claims are true or false (cognitive).
Why might people have a problem with this approach?

6. Hume’s Criticisms of Cognitivism / Realism
Hume’s Fork
Moral Motivation
Is / Ought Gap

7. What can you remember about Hume’s Fork?

8. What can you remember about Hume’s Fork?
Relations of Ideas
Analytic propositions
Known a priori
Necessarily true
Matters of Fact
Synthetic propositions
Known a posteriori
Contingently true
Why do you think this is important in Meta-Ethics?

9. So, what would Hume have to say about ethical knowledge / reasoning?
1. Hume’s Fork
All knowledge is one of these two types.
Synthetic propositions can’t be known a priori.
All a priori knowledge is analytic.
“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning* concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning* concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.” – Hume
*For Hume, the faculty of ‘knowledge’ is also called ‘reason’.
So, what would Hume have to say about ethical knowledge / reasoning?

10. 1. Hume’s Fork Applied to Ethics
Once we understand Hume’s fork, we can then examine his criticism of realism: P1. There are only two types of judgements of reason, relations of ideas and matters of fact. P2. Moral judgements are not relations of ideas. P3. Moral judgements are not matters of fact. C. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason.
This raises an issue for cognitivism / realism. If morality is neither a relation of ideas or a matter of fact (i.e. judgement of reason), then according to Hume’s fork, it is not something we can know.
To be more specific, if Hume is right then the realist claim that there are moral truths out there in the external world, or intuitively, that we can know is wrong.
It also means we can’t say moral statements are cognitive – they are neither true nor false as we cannot know for sure.

11. Breaking it Down…
What is Hume’s reasoning behind the argument? P1. There are only two types of judgements of reason, relations of ideas and matters of fact. P2. Moral judgements are not relations of ideas. P3. Moral judgements are not matters of fact. C1. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason.

12. Breaking it Down…
What is Hume’s reasoning behind the argument? P1. There are only two types of judgements of reason, relations of ideas and matters of fact. P2. Moral judgements are not relations of ideas. P3. Moral judgements are not matters of fact. C1. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason.
Relations of ideas are supposed to be certain and necessary. We cannot deny them without self-contradiction, but this doesn’t seem to be the case for moral judgements. We CAN deny something like ‘Murder is wrong’ without forming a contradiction (it’s all of applied ethics!). Moral judgements don’t seem to be like any analytic or a priori truth we’ve looked at.
“Take any action that is agreed to be vicious—wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find the matter of fact… that you call ‘vice’. However you look at it, all you’ll find are certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts; those are the only matters of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you as long as you focus on the object…” - Hume

13. Emphasising the Problem
Once we understand Hume’s fork, we can then examine his criticism of realism: P1. There are only two types of judgements of reason, relations of ideas and matters of fact. P2. Moral judgements are not relations of ideas. P3. Moral judgements are not matters of fact. C. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason.
This raises an issue for cognitivism / realism. If morality is neither a relation of ideas or a matter of fact (i.e. judgement of reason), then according to Hume’s fork, it is not something we can know.
To be more specific, if Hume is right then the realist claim that there are moral truths out there in the external world, or intuitively, that we can know is wrong.
It also means we can’t say moral statements are cognitive – they are neither true nor false as we cannot know for sure.

14. How might naturalists and non-naturalists respond?
Responses…
How might naturalists and non-naturalists respond?

15. Responses…
Non-naturalists will likely deny Hume’s fork, arguing that moral intuitions are not relations of ideas in Hume’s sense because they are not analytic truths. They are synthetic propositions that are self-evident and so aren’t established the way that other, empirical matters of fact are. But Hume’s objection puts pressure on intuitionists to say more about how this is possible.
Naturalists (both reductive and, in some form, non- reductive) will argue that moral judgments are matters of fact. However, it will take philosophical reasoning to show which matters of fact they are.

16. Why is Hume’s fork an issue for ethical realism?

17. 2. A Matter of Motivation
Might any of these things motivate you to act? If so, why?
The fact that this ice is cold
The fact that this car is expensive
The fact this man has robbed a bank
The fact this tomato is red

18. 2. A Matter of Motivation
The second argument from Hume builds on the distinction highlighted by the Fork we mentioned earlier: P1. Moral judgements can motivate actions. P2. Reason* cannot motivate action. C1. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason. *Once again in P2 by reason (or judgements of reason) Hume means our knowledge faculty – matters of fact and relations of ideas.

19. Let’s Break it Down
P1. Moral judgements can motivate actions. P2. Reason cannot motivate action. C1. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason.

20. Desires and Emotions
Hume argues that we are motivated by our emotions and desires. But, he claims, emotions and desires are not judgements of reason. They simply dictate what we want at any given point:
For example:
My desire for fame might motivate me to go and train as an actor.
My desire for money might motivate me to get a good paying job.
My emotion of happiness might make me want to continue doing whatever caused that emotion.
None of these things tell us anything factual about the world, nor are they analytic a priori truths. They just help guide our actions.

21. Reason
By contrast, judgements of relations of ideas and matters of fact do show us how the world is. But on their own they don’t actually carry any motivation:
Simply understanding that some relation holds between two ideas doesn’t entail that we should act one way rather than another. Knowing that 3 x 5 = 30/2 doesn’t motivate us.
Similarly knowing facts about the world might well tell us what exists, and how to achieve what we want. This might in turn guide our desires. But the fact itself doesn’t motivate us. The desire does.

22. Emphasising the Issue
P1. Moral judgements can motivate actions. P2. Reason cannot motivate action. C1. Therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason.
For the moral realist, moral judgements refer to something ‘out there’ in the world, independently of our minds.
But Hume’s theory of motivation seems to show something different. Instead moral judgements (since they have motivational force) seem to stem from our passions and desires, our emotions: they do not reflect any truths / reality in the world.
So Hume’s theory eats away at the foundation of moral realism.

23. How might we respond to this problem?
Responses
How might we respond to this problem?

24. Responses
One way of escaping Hume’s argument is to claim that (P1) – that moral judgements can motivate actions – is false. To do good actions, we have to have the desire to be good as well. Just knowing something is right or wrong is not enough to motivate us on it’s own. This response (for this specific argument) would allow moral judgements to remain judgements of reason and therefore the realist view could stand (assuming for the moment you can answer the other issues Hume has raised).

25. Responses
A second response would be to deny (P2) and argue that there are some judgments of reason that can motivate us. But this would require some clear examples and philosophical arguments to show how, it’s not something that is clear on first sight.

26. What is the argument from motivation and why is it a problem for moral realism?

27. 3. What is Hume saying here?
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
Hume’s law: It is invalid to derive an evaluative conclusion (ought) from premises that are purely descriptive (is)

28. P: Women can get pregnant. C: Therefore women should get pregnant.
P: Humans in general eat meat
C: Therefore humans ought to eat meat
P: It is bedtime
C: Therefore you ought to brush your teeth
P: You borrowed that £5
C: Therefore you ought to pay me back that £5
Are any of these arguments valid? Why/why not? What would we need to add in to make them valid?

29. Is / Ought Gap
Hume presents a famous argument against cognitivism, and by extension moral realism by distinguishing between sentences that talk about what is the case (i.e. expressing judgements of reason) and what ought to be the case (moral judgements). He argues there is a clear difference between matters of fact and matters of value. The problem, for Hume, is when people attempt to go from one to the other in an argument. Drawing a moral conclusion from purely factual premises.
Hume’s law: It is invalid to derive an evaluative conclusion (ought) from premises that are purely descriptive (is)

30. Let’s look again…
Do any of these facts about the world also infer / tell us what ought to be the case?
Women can get pregnant.
Humans in general eat meat.
It is bedtime.
Your borrowed that £5.
You killed that man.
It does not seem that they do. Mere facts about the world do not give us grounds for making moral judgements. Morality appears to be an entirely separate sort of thing than simple factual observations.

31. Is / Ought Gap
Hume would argue that in all these cases – there is a gap. Something missing between the fact about the world and the action we ought to carry out.
Essentially, we need the bit that tells us why we should / shouldn’t do something. Why care?
How is this an objection to realism? Well in the realist theories we’ve seen so far (naturalism and non-naturalism) the supporters seem to argue you can draw moral facts from simple facts about the world: Utilitarianism: Stealing causes pain, therefore I ought to avoid stealing. Virtue Ethics: Cowardice is a negative character trait, therefore I should avoid it. Intuitionism: This action furthers my own personal ideals, therefore I ought to carry it out.

32. Clarification But this argument would be fine:
It’s worth pointing out here that Hume isn’t attacking realism specifically as much as he is attacking bad arguments in general. He does not think it is good practice to conclude something that isn’t backed up in the premises. This goes for all areas of Philosophy.
But this argument would be fine:
Stealing causes suffering.
Suffering is something we wish to avoid.
Therefore we shouldn’t steal.
What this means in practice is this argument is invalid:
Stealing causes suffering.
Therefore we shouldn’t steal.

33. P: Women can get pregnant.
C: Therefore women should get pregnant.
P: Humans in general eat meat
C: Therefore humans ought to eat meat
P: It is bedtime
C: Therefore you ought to brush your teeth
P: You borrowed that £5
C: Therefore you ought to pay me back that £5
Can you add in a premise to each of these arguments that would make them valid in Hume’s eyes? Do any of the arguments remain realist?

34. Emphasising the Issue
Hume is taking issue here with how moral arguments work. Suppose I say ‘Eating meat causes animal suffering. Therefore, you shouldn’t eat meat.’ According to realism (and cognitivism), the conclusion states a truth about the world, and this truth can be inferred from the premise. But this doesn’t make sense. The premise tells me how the world is; the conclusion tells me how the world ought to be. I can’t infer one from the other as they are two entirely different types of statement.
Hume’s law (again): It is invalid to derive an evaluative conclusion (ought) from premises that are purely descriptive (is)

35. What does the Is / Ought gap show about realist moral arguments?

36. Is Hume correct in his criticisms? What does it mean if he is?

37. Hume’s Arguments – Due Monday
Outline the three criticisms Hume gives of Moral Realism and explain why they are an issue.
Hume’s Fork
Moral Motivation
Is / Ought Gap
Extension: Are there are any responses to these issues? Are they valid?