1. Still Want to Leave the EU?
Voters’ Perceptions of Brexit Two Years On
John Curtice, Senior Research Fellow, NatCen Social Research
Senior Fellow, ‘The UK in a Changing Europe’
whatukthinks.org/eu @whatukthinks

2. Five NatCen Brexit Surveys
September 2016 (1,391)
February 2017 (2,322)
July (2,184)
October 2017 (2,168)
7 June – 8 July 2018
2,048 members of NatCen’s mixed mode random probability panel = 56% response.
Data weighted to known demographic characteristics and pattern of response to original BSA interview.

3. Two Key Questions
Have voters’ expectations and evaluations changed at all during the Brexit process?
What impact are these expectations and evaluations having on people’s support for Leave or Remain?

4. Attitudes towards Free Trade with the EU
Base: All respondents

5. Attitudes towards Treating EU Migrants like non-EU Migrants
Base: All respondents

6. The Possible Trade-Off
It has been argued that when Britain leaves the EU, British firms will only be allowed to continue to sell goods and services freely to people in the EU if people from the EU are still free to come here to live and work. 
Do you think Britain should or should not allow people from the EU to freely come here to live and work in return for allowing British firms to sell goods and services freely in the EU. 
Definitely should allow people from the EU to come here to live and work
Probably should allow people from the EU to come here to live and work
Probably should not allow people from the EU to come here to live and work
Definitely should not allow people from the EU to come here to live and work

7. How Attitudes towards the Trade-Off Have Changed
Base: All respondents

8. Anticipated Consequences of Brexit for Immigration
Base: All respondents

9. Anticipated Consequences of Brexit for The Economy
Base: All respondents

10. Will the UK Get a Good or a Bad Deal?
Base: All respondents

11. The Turnover of ‘Votes’
Vote Now/Vote 2016
Remain
(%)
Leave
Did Not Vote 90 12 49 6 81 23
Would Not Vote 4 27

12. How Perceptions of the Economic Consequences Matter
Base: All respondents

13. Including For Those Who Did Not Vote in 2016
Base: All respondents

14. The Distribution of Economic Perceptions
Base: All respondents

15. Views on ‘Soft’ vs. ‘Hard’ Brexit Matter Rather Less
Base: All respondents

16. And Again For Those Who Did Not Vote in 2016
Base: All respondents

17. How Opinion Divides on ‘Soft’ vs. ‘Hard’ Brexit
Base: All respondents

18. Perceptions Of The Likely Deal Are Relatively Unimportant
Base: All respondents

19. Including For Those Who Did Not Vote in 2016
Base: All respondents

20. How Opinions Divide On The Likely Deal
Base: All respondents

21. Laying The Blame
Base: All respondents

22. Conclusion
Voters’ expectations and evaluations have changed somewhat during the last two years
Less concerned about control of EU migration
Less likely to think we will get a good deal
More critical of how Brexit is being handled
But turnover of support since 2016 related above all to perceptions of the economics of Brexit.
The pessimism of Remain voters about those economics outweighs the optimism of Leave voters.
Helps explain why the Leave vote is seemingly a little softer – and why abstainers are inclined towards Remain.

23. Contact John Curtice Senior Research Fellow
Visit us online, natcen.ac.uk