1. INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures

2. WEEKLY READING Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6
Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes)

4. NEWSFLASH! CHILEAN ELECTIONS
Round One (12/13/09)
Sebastián Piñera (Alianza por Chile)
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación)
Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Independent) 20.14
Jorge Arrate (Juntos Podemos Más)
Round Two (01/17/10)
Piñera (Alianza)
Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación)

7. BACKGROUND 1970 election: 1964 election: Salvador Allende 36.6
Jorge Alessandri
Radomiro Tomic
1964 election:
Eduardo Frei Montalva 56.1
Salvador Allende
Julio Durán

8. OUTLINE Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation
Presidentialism or parliamentarism?
Proposals for reform
The legislative arena
The plight of political parties
Sources of disenchantment

9. DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES
Survival and consolidation of democracy
Avoidance of the past (and military coups)
Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?

10. THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM”
Individuals seek to maximize gain
Institutions (rules) shape incentives
And can therefore determine behavior
Ergo, institutional design can affect the collective behavior of political actors

11. PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?
Head of government (president) is directly elected
Fixed term in office
Cannot be removed by legislature (except through impeachment)
Selects cabinet ministers
Head of government is also head of state
Separation of legislative-executive powers

12. Parliamentarism:
Voters elect MPs
MPs select head of government (PM)
MPs approve cabinet appointments
PM (and cabinet officers) dependent on continuing confidence of parliament
Head of government (PM) is not head of state
Fusion of legislative-executive powers

13. PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS
Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime
Avoid polarization from zero-sum game
Avoid paralyzing deadlock
Thus superior durability of parliamentary regimes

14. PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS
Clarity of fixed time horizon
Checks and balances
Democratic election of head of government
Not the cause of immobilism (PR the cause)
Empirical findings result from “selection bias”

15. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM Brazil Argentina Chile Why not?
Insistence on election of chief executive
Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty
Low esteem for congress, parties
Politics of nostalgia

16. ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS
Electing presidents:
Plurality vs. MRO [reflections on Chile, ]
Reelection or not?
Power domains:
Constitutional or partisan?
Bureaucracy, judiciary, military
Decree authority

17. THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA Electoral Systems: SMDs and two-party politics
PR and multi-party politics
Effects of district magnitude
Closed-list vs. open-list ballots
The problem of term limits
Institutional Performance:
Essentially “reactive” legislatures
Removing presidents?

18. THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Diversity of party systems
Levels of popular confidence

20. Counting Political Parties:
N = 1 / (Σ pi2)
Where pi is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)

22. THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT
Weakness of representative institutions
Constraints on modern-day democracy
Inadequate policy performance
Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal” democracy
Thus 55% would support authoritarian government if it could improve economic situation (2004)