1. Perspectives on Space and Cyber Yadunath Zambre, Ph. D
Perspectives on Space and Cyber Yadunath Zambre, Ph.D. Chief Scientist and Senior Fellow Advanced Technology Center Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company

2. Traditional Warfare and Cyber Warfare
Cyber can/will be an additional domain in warfare
Space, Air, Sea, Land, Cyber
Used prior to physical engagement or presence to
Degrade adversary command and control, ISR, national infrastructure
Conduct psychological operations (spread propaganda, reduce confidence in government, organize and coordinate opposition)
Potential standalone approach to warfare
Could inflict significant harm to an adversary country
Electronic Warfare – sub-domain of cyber (sometimes overlapping)
Cyber Warfare Crosses All Domains: Space – Air – Sea – Land

3. Cyber Operations I Span an enormous range of scale, impact, complexity
Unilateral attack to achieve military or political goal
Active response to an attack (defense as offense)
Preparations for or operations during kinetic war
Outcomes are highly contingent
Identifying what targets to strike
Collateral damage, cascading effects hard to limit or predict
Battle damage assessment – how do you know what you did?
Success depends on
How adversary systems are interconnected
Adversary security measures that are in place and operational
Available advance intelligence to guide attack planning or defense
Required private sector involvement may be significant:
Base computer and networking technologies or services are often based on commercial products or services

4. Cyber operations II
Two categories of cyber operations (offensive and defensive):
Attack: destroy, degrade, disrupt technology or information
Exploitation: obtain information from adversary systems
Legal constructs (US Title 50 vs. Title 10 …)
Attack and exploitation both require a mix of:
Social operations: Trick, bribe, extort, comprise an insider
Technical operations: virus, DoS attack, supply chain compromise, …
Military and IC objectives include:
Denial of operations or services
Compromise of battle plans, intelligence, or commands
Modification of battle plans, intelligence, commands
Inherently deniable – easy to conduct with plausible deniability
Require long lead times to set up

5. Space Based Capabilities
Communications
Narrow Band (e.g. MUOS)
Protected (e.g. AEHF)
Wideband (e.g. WGS)
Relay
Position, Navigation, Timing
GPS
Remote Sensing
SIGINT
IMINT
OPIR (e.g. SBIRS)
Weather
etc.
Space based capabilities are critical to many missions

6. Our focus is on assuring the mission(s)
Mission Assurance
Enterprise level perspective critical to mission assurance
Cyber and Physical worlds not separable
Cyber attacks can result in physical effects
Physical attacks can result in cyber effects
“Domains” (Land, Sea, Air, Space) are not separable
Integrated, cross-domain analysis is required
Our focus is on assuring the mission(s)

7. Space Environment and Hazards
Extreme temperatures
Radiation
Electric fields
Magnetic fields
Charged particles
Solar flares
Micrometeoroids
Orbital debris
Space vehicles
Human
Acquisition delays
Radiofrequency interference
Launch failure
Terrestrial
Severe storms (hurricanes, blizzards, tornados,…)
Floods
Wildfires
Landslides
Earthquakes
Tsunamis
Volcanic eruptions

8. Threats to Space “Cyber” Probing, intrusion Denial of service
Malicious software
Tamper, embed
Insertion, manipulation
Takeover
Electronic
Brute force jamming
Smart jamming
Spoofing
Meaconing
Directed Energy
Laser dazzling
High energy laser
Physical
Sabotage, terrorism, special ops
Air strike, missile strike
Direct ascent ASAT (LEO, MEO, or GEO)
Rendezvous & Proximity Operations
Cyber
Electronic
Radiofrequency
Directed Energy
Kinetic Energy
Nuclear
Prompt (blast, heat, SEU), Total dose RF
High power microwave

9. Program Lifecycle: Attack Opportunities
Attacks Can Occur During Every Phase in a Program’s Lifecycle

10. Improving Mission Assurance
Reduce number of attack surfaces and minimize each surface
Attack surfaces arise from…
People and their behaviors: users, operators, administrators…
Flaws in architecture and/or design
Defects in software and hardware
Misconfigured systems and/or subsystems
Supply chain and supplier base
Improve architecture “resilience”
Improve compliance (to processes, established best practice, required configurations…)
Addresses ~80% of current attack vectors in use
Focus needs to be on assuring the mission(s)