1. Prior and scientia media
David Jakobsen

2. Arthur Norman Prior
1914 – Born in Masterdon New Zealand – Studied at Otago University in Dunedin 1942 – Crisis of faith 1943 – married to Mary Wilkinson 1942 – Wrote God’s plan and purpose 1956 – John Locke Lectures in Oxford 1959 – 1965 – Professor at Manchester University 1962 – Formalities of Omniscience 1969 Died in Trondheim in Norway.

4. Augustin (354 – 430)
Luther (1483 – 1546)
Calvin (1509 – 1564)
Edwards (1703 – 1758)
”For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly.” - Augustin against Cicero

5. ”The modern controversy over the compatability of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, begun in the 1960s by Nelson Pike and A.N. Prior, has so far failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion.” (Hasker, God Time and Foreknowledge, 1998)

6. ”Jesuits and Arminians, however, taught that there was a third kind of divine knowledge in between these two, a “scientia media” which was neither a knowledge of what was merely possible nor a knowledge of what He himself had decreed, but a knowledge of what was bound to happen because certain other things had happened, or because He had decreed certain other things.” (Prior, Of God’s Plan and Purpose, 2012)

7. At a council for Philosophical Studies Summer Institute (held at Calvin in 1973), I gave a version of the Free Will Defense in which I took it for granted both that there are counterfactuals of freedom and that God's omniscience includes his knowing their truth values. Anthony Kenny was present at the institute and declared that I was a 'Molinist'. I wasn't sure whether that was commendation or condemnation; but as it turned out the whole subject of counterfactuals of freedom and God's knowledge of them had been debated and explored at length in the 16th century. (Tomberlin & Van Inwagen 1985, p. 50)

8. Molinism Natural Knowledge Necessary Independent of God’s free will.
Middle Knowledge
Contingent
Independent of God’s free will.
Free Knowledge
Contingent
Dependent on God’s free will
If Bush had lost the election then Al Gore would have been president in USA on 11/9 2001
George Bush was president in USA on 11/
2 + 2 = 4
No circles have corners
Middle Knowledge is the third kind of Knowledge God has at Creation. He not only knows necessary truth and what kind of world he has actually created. But he also knows what the world would have been like had he choosen to create differently. This kind of third knowledge shares with Gods Natural knowledge its Independentness of God’s free will – due to its dependentsness on Man’s will, but it does not share its modal status – since it is a contingent fact. It shares the contingent status with God’s free knowledge – like that it is a contingent fact whether Bush og Gore had wone the election – determining who would be in charge on 11/ But unlike God’s free knowledge it is independant of God’s free will – it is something that God is not in charge of.

9. Peircean Branching time
There are no truths now (and hence no divine foreknowledge) about future free actions. All propositions about the not yet determined future are false now.

10. (Prior’s) Ockhamistisk branching time
Truth (God’s knowledge) is conditioned upon the course of time. (You can only speak about truth as relative to a certain chronicle)

11. Ockhamistic/Molinistic Branching time
There are truths (and divine foreknowledge) about all future free actions. This includes truths about counterfactual circumstances.

12. Prior on the thin red line
'In these models the course of time (in a rather broad sense of this phrase) is represented by a line which, as it moves from left to right (past to future), continually divides into branches, so that from any given point in the diagram there is a unique route backwards (to the left; to the past) but a variety of routes forwards (to the right; to the future). In each model there is a single designated point, representing the actual present moment; and in an Ockhamist model there is a single designated line (taking one only of the possible forward routes at each fork), which might be picked out in red representing the actual course of events.' (Prior, Postulate Sets for Tense Logic. Prior Collection, Box 1)

13. Priors rejection of scientia media
There are future events that follow from God's decree, which God doesn't have control over, but nonetheless knows.
These events are inevitable consequences of the various circumstances in which God decrees to place them.
Therefore, the freedom of scientia media is guaranteed by an impersonal system of necessary connections outside God's control.
Therefore, it is not freedom from necessity but only the direct designing of God.

14. The theological rejection
Jesuits and Arminians used this doctrine as a means of reconciling predestination and freewill. God, they argued, did not predestine men to believe or not to believe, but foreknew and accepted their belief or unbelief as the inevitable consequences of the various circumstances in which He decreed to place them. The 'freedom' safeguarded by this devise seems a very empty one—it is freedom only from the direct designing of God, but complete slavery to an impersonal system of necessary connections. Calvinists did not fail to point out that the only significant outcome of the scheme was to divert our faith and trust as to our ultimate destiny from God alone to God—plus —necessity. (Prior, 2014)

15. Real freedom in 1942
At a later date the description of the universe as an unbroken system of necessary connections was actually put forward as Calvinism (notably by Jonathan Edwards), its obvious incompatibility with any real freedom being considered sufficient to entitle it to the name; but this is a sort of Calvinism which the Confession of faith rejects, stating in this second section, 'Although God knows whatever may or can come to pass on all supposed conditions; yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions. (Prior 2014a)

16. Real freedom and time
This belief, or prejudice of mine, is bound up with a belief in real freedom. One of the big differences between the past and the future is that once something has become past, it is, as it were, out of our reach—once a thing has happened, nothing we can do can make it not to have happened. But the future is to some extent, even though it is only to a very small extent, something we can make for ourselves. (Prior 2014b)