1. Political Economy of Electricity
Have Regulators failed to introduce competition in power sector?
Can Regulators realistically chart a trajectory to reduce cross-subsidy?
Is the Indian open access model deeply flawed?
Will Regulators be held responsible for non-working of ‘Uday’?
Pramod Deo, Former Chairman, CERC

2. % Contribution of Total Revenue
Illustration Case-1: Maharashtra DISCOM
Source: MERC Tariff order for MSEDCL
(Note : ABR : Average Billing Rate (derived) and ACoS : Average Cost of Supply)
Consumer Type
Grouping
No of consumers
(No.)
Revenue Contribution
(‘000 Rs Crore)
% Contribution of Total Revenue
(%)
*ABR/ ACoS
Ratio (ABR/ ACoS) %
HT Industrial / HT Commercial
(a)
16,000 23
42%
8.10 / 6.03
134%
1 MW above (est.)
incl. HT Ind/Comms
(b)
includes (a)
79,000 29
53%
8.04 / 6.03
133%
All Remaining consumers
(c)
23 million 26
47%
4.62 / 6.03
77%
Agriculture
(d)
3.8 million
6.9
13%
3.11 / 6.03
52%
All Remaining excl.
(e)=(c)-(d)
19.2 million
19.1
34%
5.61 / 6.03
93%
All Consumers
(f)=(b)+(c)
23.1 million 55
100%
6.03/ 6.03

3. % Contribution of Total Revenue.
Illustration Case-2: Gujarat DISCOM
Source: GERC Tariff order for Discoms
(Note : ABR : Average Billing Rate (derived) and ACoS : Average Cost of Supply)
Consumer Type
Grouping
No of consumers
(No.)
Revenue Contribution
(‘000 Rs Crore)
% Contribution of Total Revenue
(%)
*ABR/ ACoS
Ratio (ABR/ ACoS) %
HT Industrial / HT Commercial
(a)
12,580 13
43%
7.00 / 5.46
128%
1 MW above (est.)
incl. HT Ind/Comms
(b)
includes (a) NA 20
67%
6.73 / 5.46
123%
All Remaining consumers
(c)
13.50 million 10
33%
3.53 / 5.46
65%
Agriculture
(d)
1.19 million
3.9
13%
2.46 / 5.46
45%
All Remaining excl.
(e)=(c)-(d)
12.30 million
6.1
20%
4.86 / 5.46
89%
All Consumers
(f)=(b)+(c)
13.52 million 30
5.18/5.46
95%
Pramod Deo, Former Chairman, CERC