1. PKI Services for the Public Sector of the EU Member States
Asst. Prof. Dimitris Gritzalis
Athens, 10 April 2003

2. Objectives of the study
To review the use of electronic signatures for e-government services.
To identify the technologies employed for the exploitation of e-signatures.
To discuss legal issues referring to the use of e-signatures.
To discuss digital certificates management in the public sector.
To provide a set of good-practices on the use of e-signatures in the public sector.

3. eEurope-2005 The underlying strategic framework
Based on two groups of actions:
Services - Applications - Content
Broadband Infrastructure - Security
Action Plan around inter-linked lines:
Policy Measures
Good Practices
Benchmarking
Policies Coordination

4. eGovernment Services General key actions: Key actions for security:
Broadband Connection
Interoperability
Interactive Public Services
Public Procurement
Public Internet Access Points
Culture and Tourism
Key actions for security:
Cyber Security Task Force
Security Culture
Secure Communication between Public Services

5. Our methodology at a glance
1. State-of-practice
Review of state-of-practice on e-signatures use.
2. Legal issues
Review of legal and regulatory issues on e-signatures use.
3. Standards
Review the standardization work on e-signatures.
4. Case studies
Study lessons learnt from relevant situations.
5. Survey
Identify and review relevant experiences from EU
…towards Good Practices

6. 1. State-of-practice on Certification Services
Topics:
Qualified Certificates (QC)
Requirements for issuing QC
Additional requirements for Public Sector

7. Qualified Certificates
Unique identification of CSP
Unique identification of the physical entity
Intended purpose
Signature verification data corresponding to subject
Period of validity
Identity code of the certificate
Electronic signature of the CSP
Usage limitations
Case-relevant extensions

8. Requirements for issuing QS
Demonstrate the appropriate reliability
Ensure appropriate directory/revocation services
Verify physical entity’s identity
Employ properly qualified personnel
Use trustworthy systems
Protect signature creation data
Keep records relevant to qualified certificates
Publish policies, practices, terms, and conditions
Maintain sufficient operation financial resources
Ensure physical security

9. Additional requirements for the Public Sector
Risk Analysis/Assessment
ISO 9000 certification
Personal data protection
Insurance
Repositories for storing signature verification data for long time

10. 3. Standardization work European initiatives and bodies:
ETSI: Europe's contribution to world-wide standardization
CEN/ISSS: Information Society Standardization System
ICTB/EESSI: European Electronic Signature Standardisation Initiative
International initiatives and bodies:
ISO & ITU: World-wide de jure standards
IETF: Widely accepted de facto Internet standards
W3C: Recommendations for structuring web documents
PKCS: Public Key Cryptography Standards
ANSI: The American perspective
ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute
ITU: International Telecommunications Union
IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
W3C: www consortium

11. Existing and emerging standards
Cryptography
Cryptographic algorithms, Hash functions, Random number generators
Secure Hardware
Smart cards, Tokens, Secure devices
Digital Certificates
Formats, Distribution, Certificate Status Information (CSI)
Certification Services
Digital signatures, Key management, Authorization, Time-stamping, Notary
General support
ICT Security, Directory access, Database management, Repositories, Interoperability
Management
IS management, Quality, Policy composition, Audit

12. 4. PKI in third countries Canada USA Australia
A ‘Policy Management Authority’ exists
‘External subscribers’ are allowed
Key management resembles with the EU Directive
USA
Federal PKI is fully functional
Federal Bridge CA assures interoperability
Various ‘assurance levels’ for certificates
Australia
‘Government Public Key Authority’ exists as accreditation body
Various levels of certificates for individuals and non-individuals
Summary of some important findings

13. 5. Survey Means: Questionnaire on: Existing e-services
Legal status of certificates
Use of certificates in the public sector
Requirements from CSP
Use of certificates for G2G and G2C transactions
- Sent to the 15 Member States via CIRCA
- All recipients responded
- Results taken into account and refer to in the deliverable

14. Survey findings All Member States have adopted Directive 1999/93/EC.
In 5 Member States certificates of types other rather than qualified/unqualified are used.
In 14 Member States there is at least 1 CSP offering qualified certificates (except Ireland).
In 13 Member States there is one authority responsible for the accreditation of CSP (except France and Ireland).
In 13 Member States there is one authority responsible for regulating, monitoring and auditing the operation of CSP (except Ireland and UK).
In 9 Member States the two aforementioned procedures are performed by the same entity/authority.

15. …survey findings
In 11 Member States CSP accreditation is voluntary for qualified certificates.
In 7 Member States certificates have been employed in G2G transactions (3 have plans for 2003 and 3 after 2003).
In all Member States the Public Sector obtains services from multiple CSP.
In 14 Member States there is no nation-wide RA, which registers civil servants (except of Belgium).
In 11 Member States each governmental organization may have or operate its own RA.
In 2 Member States (Finland and France) each sector or administration level has its own RA.

16. …survey findings
8 Member States have in place specific provisions, in case a CSP ceases operation.
11 Member States have in place specific provisions, in case a CSP uses its key in a way incompatible with the existing legislation 10
Appropriate skills of CSP staff 11
Compliance with personal data regulations 4
ISO 9000 certification
Security of CSP equipment used for key generation
Security of CSP premises
Risk Analysis/Assessment
Member States
Special requirements a CSP should fulfill

17. …survey findings 6
All CSP should first apply for voluntary accreditation 5
Compatibility of the CPS 4
Interoperability of technology
Member States
Interoperability requirements when more than one CSP is involved 4
Non-repudiation of receipt
Notary 8
Timestamping
Member States
Value Added Services the Public Sector receives from CSP

18. …survey findings
In 6 Member States there exists (or is planned) a central repository, which provides each and every civil servant with a certificate.
In 5 Member States the role of the civil servant is associated with the certificate issuance.
In 4 of the above 5, when a civil servant is transferred to another post, its certificate is revoked or renewed.
In 10 Member States smart cards are used to keep signature-creation-data (e.g. a private key).
In 10 Member States audit records (logs) are kept.
In 9 of the above 10 CSP are responsible for keeping the audit logs.

19. Good-practices Working assumptions:
G2G and G2C transactions are included.
C2G transactions are not included.
Subject to additional sector-related requirements
Focus on authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity.
Compliance with EU Directive 99/93.

20. EU Directive 99/93: Article 3
Outline:
CSP operation
Accreditation and supervision
Certificate characteristics
Signature Creation Devices
Architectural issues
Information dissemination
Value-added Certification Services
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
CSP cease of operation

21. CSP Operation CSP operator
The government is generally considered as the owner of its Public Key Infrastructure.
The operator may be a governmental authority, or the operation may be outsourced to the private sector.
CSP’s cease of operation
Handling differs in Member States
Subject to prior interoperability established, certificates will be managed by another CSP, or
All issued certificates are revoked, or
Purely governmental-operated CSP (they never cease...)

22. Accreditation and Supervision
Voluntary Accreditation
Some Member States ask for compulsory accreditation
Generally desired for qualified certificates issuance
Accreditation is not a requirement for the issuance of unqualified certificates
Supervision
Establishment of national supervisory bodies in most Member States
Supervision, in most cases, is performed by Telecom Authorities
Diversification of supervision and accreditation roles is desired

23. Requirements for certificates
Certificate characteristics
Role-based certificates tend to have heavy administrative cost.
Both qualified and unqualified are needed, each for specific user domain.
An identity certificate is needed for every civil servant. The certificates can be either identity-based, only, or role-based.
Average certificate lifecycle: 1-3 years.
Public sector specific requirements
Signature lifetime is reported to be 30 years.
The signature lifetime should be (considerably) longer.
It is suggested that different keys are used for different functions (e.g. signature, authentication, encryption).

24. Signature creation issues
Key management
Key generation should be performed under the full control of the end-user (for non-repudiation purposes)
No key-recovery must be possible
Signature Creation Devices
Common agreement on the adoption of secure hardware tokens (e.g. smart cards)
Conformance with international standards is recommended.

25. Architectural issues Number of Certification Authorities
Support for multiple CA in each country should be ensured
Web of trust scalability is recommended
Trust architectures
Mixed schemes may exist
Combination of per-sector local hierarchies, local RA, Bridge CA and Cross-certified CA should be ensured
Registration Authorities
Civil servants should be given a security token, according to a standard procedure
Multiple RA per region or user domain should exist
If a central identity repository exists, then national-wide RA should also exist

26. Information dissemination
Key distribution
By personal correspondence (private) and by publicly accessible repositories (public)
Specific provision for the self-signed CA certificates distribution
The maintenance of the Certification Trust Lists (CTL) should be done on a per-sector basis

27. Value-added Certification Services
Time-stamping
Confidentiality
Notary
Audit services
Non-repudiation of receipt
Long-lasting data repositories

28. Certification Practice Statement
Conformance with IETF RFC-2527 is recommended. It should include, at least:
CA and RA obligations
Subscriber and relying party obligations
Addressing community
Certificate classes, formats, and profiles
Procedures description
Liabilities
Value-added services description
Interoperability issues
Information dissemination procedures

29. EU Directive 99/93: Article 8
CSP should comply with data protection legislation
Dissemination of personal PKI information
Regulation of lawful access to personal data available to CSP
Data security measures specification
Data protection authorities should support public authorities to monitor the CSP privacy policies

30. Conclusion The result of our study is… an appropriately balanced
good-practice guidance
for the exploitation
of Public Key Infrastructure
by the Public Sector