1. Nagel on sexual perversion (1)
Phil 250—Making Moral decisions
Irfan Khawaja
October 8, 2018

2. Why Nagel? Why perversion?
So far, we’ve been looking at highly particular controversies in contemporary focus.
And we’ve sort of been nibbling at the sexual edges of those issues.
We looked at porn primarily as though it posed an issue of business ethics.
We looked at hook-ups by asking whether or not the cons outweigh the pros.
But someone might legitimately say that this misses the point.

3. What point?
If you’re going to talk about sex, either there is such a thing as sexual normality or not.
If not, there’s nothing sexual left to discuss.
If so, that’s the sexual thing to discuss.
So that’s what we have to discuss. Is there such a thing as sexual normality as there is for other bodily functions?
The Catholic Church has always thought so, and I alternate between the Catechism of the CC and Nagel’s article.

4. Normality and perversion
The traditional argument against pornography is that it’s perverted: it takes something intimate and makes it public.
The traditional argument against hook-ups is that they’re perverted: sex is supposed to be an expression of love, but they turn sex against love.
The basic idea of a perversion is turning something normal against itself so as to wreck or destroy it.

5. Is anything perverted?
It’s tempting to think that nothing is really perverted, but no one really believes this.
Bestiality, necrophilia, incest, pedophilia, and rape are usually at the top of any list of perversions.
Of course, masturbation, homosexuality, bisexuality, oral sex, and the use of sex toys used to be there, but aren’t there any more.
So is there a clear criterion for sexual perversion?
Or do we just make it up at random?

6. Why Nagel
Nagel thinks that there’s a fairly clear (but very complex) criterion.
His article is dated, but I regard that as a plus.
It’s both ahead of his time, and behind our times.
The argument is very clear, at least for the topic.
The argument is very well worked out.
The argument is totally secular.

7. The preliminaries Sexual desires are unnatural desires
There are clear cases of perversions such that if these aren’t perversions, nothing is.
Nagel’s list: fetishes, bestiality, sadism
Perversions are sexual inclinations, not features of acts that are not part of sexual desire. Thus the “use of contraception” cannot be a sexual perversion.
Sex and reproduction are two different issues. So reproductive failure cannot explain perversion.

8. “Sex is just a drive”
Nagel takes on a common argument against the existence of perversions on pp. 6-7 (in quotes).
We need to work through this to get it right.
Obviously, he’s setting this argument up to reject it, not accept it.
Nagel’s point is that the “sex is just a drive” argument is not only not true of sex, but not even true of hunger. Even hunger is more complicated than this argument suggests. And sex is more complicated than hunger.

9. Even hunger is not just a drive
On pp. 7-8, Nagel argues that there can be gastronomical perversions.
A gastronomical perversion isn’t just an unhealthy appetite, but something more psychologically complicated.
If there are gastronomical perversions, hunger is not merely a biological drive. It’s a psychological attitude that can be perverted.
If true of hunger, more true of sex.