1. Crisis Politics Objectives: Identify key developments of 1956
Explain the significance of the Hungarian Uprising and the suez crisis
Evaluate the effect each crisis had on the handling of the other

2. The Secret Speech
Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people". This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations.
An excerpt from the Secret Speech
By February 1956, three years after the death of Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev had consolidated his position as leader of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had risen to prominence as a loyal member of Stalin’s government, yet one of his first acts as leader was to denounce the “cult of personality” and brutal repression that had characterised Stalin’s rule in the so- called “Secret Speech” to the 20th Party Congress.
Pause for thought: What could be the results of a Soviet leader announcing such a radical change in tactics?

3. Pushing the Limits
An early test of Khrushchev’s new, more humane communism came with the Polish Crisis of June-October 1956.
This began with riots in the city of Poznan by workers unhappy at new production targets
The communist regime in Poland, the Polish Workers’ Party, attempted to calm the unrest by releasing a popular politician, Wladyslaw Gomulka, from prison and placed him in charge of the government.
Khrushchev did not approve of this move and immediately ordered the Red Army units in Poland to converge on Warsaw to prevent Gomulka’s election.
Gomulka was not intimidated and instead indicated the Polish army was ready to fight. Khrushchev, not wanting to risk such open oppression of a nation in the Warsaw Pact, did not order his troops to attack and Gomulka’s election went ahead.

4. The Soviet Domino Effect
Events in Poland were watched with interest elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but particularly in Hungary where unrest with Soviet “influence” had been growing for years.
Under Stalin’s regime:
Matyas Rakosi had been installed as chairman of the communist party. He was nicknamed “The Bald Butcher” and imprisoned over 387,000 Hungarians during his rule.
Rakosi’s government was fully in league with Stalin, and he was known as one of Stalin’s most devout followers.
The Cominfortheir m instituted a reign of terror, regularly executing popular politicians, supporters and other non-compliant citizens.
Hungary’s valuable production of coal, oil and wheat were largely eaten up in compulsory export to Russia whilst Hungarians went without basic necessities.
Pause for Thought: How did the Secret Speech threaten Rakosi’s position? How might Khrushchev want to handle this?

5. The Man of the People
The man that many Hungarians wanted to lead their country was Imre Nagy.
In many ways, Nagy could have been an appealing solution to Khrushchev – he was a thoroughbred communist, he had even fought for the Bolshevik party in the Russian Revolution.
However, his career in the Hungarian government had been unstable, frequently falling out with Rakosi because of his concern for the conditions of working people. On one occasion he had been expelled from the government and only allowed back in upon swearing allegiance to the USSR.
In 1955, he was once again out of favour. However, with Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinisation, Hungarians became more confident in voicing support for Nagy.
Khrushchev had also allowed the replacement of Rakosi with a more liberal Chairman – Erno Gero. Gero appointed Nagy as Prime Minister. However this did not last, and Rakosi found his way back to power in 1955

6. The Hungarian Uprising
In October 1956, Hungarian dissatisfaction with Soviet influence came to a head. A poor harvest as well as continued shortages of food and fuel led to student riots which were quickly supported by workers and the wider population.
Khrushchev attempted to calm the situation by appointing Nagy as Prime Minister, and then watched in horror as Nagy proposed a series of reforms including:
The holding of “free elections” including representatives of non- communist parties
The declaration of Hungary as a neutral country, and asking for UN recognition of this which would make a Soviet military presence in Hungary illegal
The exit of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s alliance in Europe.

7. The Hungarian Uprising: Results
The Cominform and other agencies advised Khrushchev that should Nagy be allowed to succeed, discontent with Soviet rule in other satellite states would grow.
Despite his commitment to a more humane form of communism, Khrushchev responded with overwhelming force.
200,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks were sent to Hungary and marched on Budapest
The Hungarians held out for two weeks, in which 2,500 were killed, 20,000 were wounded and 200,000 fled to the West.
Nagy sought protection in the Yugoslavian embassy. Tito had been interested in the growth of another “free” communist country, and negotiated with Khrushchev to allow Nagy to leave the embassy safely
However, Nagy was immediately arrested by Soviet troops when he did so. Khrushchev had him tried, and hung, and later stated that his fate was “a lesson to the leaders of all socialist countries.”
Pause for Thought: What can we learn about Khrushchev from the Hungarian Uprising?

8. The Hungarian Uprising in International Context
The Americans had done much to encourage unrest in Hungary, especially though their propaganda radio station, Radio Free Europe. This encouraged Hungarians to believe the US and NATO would intervene to protect them, but in reality Eisenhower knew that to do so risked war with the USSR. Eisenhower went as far as to instruct his Secretary of State, John Dulles, to make a public statement that the US would not look to make military allies out of satellite states. This was essentially a green light for Khrushchev to put down the uprising by almost any force he felt was necessary. The Hungarian Uprising had been a test of both American and Soviet self- limitation and was a dangerous flashpoint. This meant they did not need the complication of an additional international crisis taking place at the same time…

9. The Suez Crisis – October 1956!
As the British and French empires continued to crumble, they came into conflict with nations who had gained independence or had gained independence.
A particularly complicated situation arose in Egypt around access to the strategically important Suez Canal. A new nationalist president, Nasser, wanted to obtain control of the canal for Egypt’s growing economy.
The British and French negotiated an arrangement whereby they would evacuate their bases on the canal, leaving it to be operated by British and Egyptian technicians.
Britain retained the right to return military forces to the canal if it were attacked.
For Nasser, this was a step in the right direction, however it was not enough. On 26 July 1956, he announced total Egyptian nationalisation of the canal.

10. Suez and the Cold War
Nasser was already held in high suspicion by Britain and the West because it had concluded a large arms deal with the USSR, and had cooperated economically with the Soviets over the construction of the Aswan High Dam.
Britain and France, in conjunction with the new state of Israel, Egypt’s regional rival, devised a plan for the invasion of Egypt.
On 5 November, Anglo-French troops landed along the canal. However they had assumed that the Americans would easily support a campaign against Nasser.
Eisenhower, was however, highly unimpressed. He was in the middle of an election campaign and involved in handling the Hungarian Uprising. The US condemned the attack in the United Nations, and put irresistible economic pressure on Britain and France to cease the fighting. Avoiding Soviet provocation, and preventing the spread of communism in the Middle East was so important to the US that it instead humiliated its biggest allies.
However, at the same time, Khrushchev, already feeling under pressure in Europe, saw an opportunity to divide NATO. They threatened a nuclear strike on Britain, France and Israel if they did not stop their attack in Egypt (which they did not have the warheads to carry out). This made it appear that Soviet power had defeated the British and French invasion

11. Conclusions: Were Hungary and Suez related crises?
For Khrushchev, the two crises were certainly related. As he attempted to loosen restraints domestically, and within the Soviet sphere, he faced the threat of increased opposition who may have seen him as a weaker leader than Stalin. His responses to both crises were robust, and led the United States to perceive him as a man willing to take dangerous risks to achieve his aims.
For the United States, it was impossible to intervene in Hungary without risking provocation of the USSR, and impossible to support British and French involvement in the Suez for the same reason.
However, there would also have been an obvious contradiction in supporting revolution in Hungary against Soviet influence, whilst on the other hand helping maintain the British and French empires elsewhere in the world.
Both crises underlined that American and European interests were not always the same. Although the US and Britain restored good relations, in the long run, this was the beginning of an erosion of US control over Western Europe.