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Campbell R. Harvey Duke University and NBER
Innovation and Cryptoventures Digital Signatures Campbell R. Harvey Duke University and NBER February 3, 2018
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Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Definition Cryptography is the science of communication in the presence of an adversary. Part of the field of cryptology. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Goals of Adversary Alice sends message to Bob Eve is the adversary
Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Goals of Adversary Eve’s goals could be: Eavesdrop
Steal secret key so that all future messages can be intercepted Change Alice’s message to Bob Masquerade as Alice in communicating to Bob Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Symmetric Keys Early algorithms were based on symmetric keys.
This meant a common key encrypted and decrypted the message You needed to share the common key and this proved difficult Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Symmetric Keys Early methods relied on a shared key or code
A message would be encrypted and sent but the receiver needed to decode with a key or a special machine Example: The “Lektor” in James Bond, From Russia with Love. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Symmetric Keys However, you needed to securely share the key or decoder. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Symmetric Keys The “adversary”
However, you needed to securely share the key or decoder. The “adversary” Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Symmetric Keys Nazi Enigma Machine is an earlier version of the “Lektor” Campbell R. Harvey 2018 Recommended videos!
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Secret Keys Symmetric key
DES (Data Encryption Standard) was a popular symmetric key method, initially used in SET (first on-line credit card protocol) DES has been replaced by AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Diffee-Hellman Key Exchange
Breakthrough in 1976 with Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange There is public information that everyone can see. Each person, say Alice and Bob, have secret information. The public and secret information is combined in a way to reveal a single secret key that only they know Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Diffee-Hellman Key Exchange
Will use prime numbers and modulo arithmetic We already encountered one example of modular arithmetic simple ciphers (also the SHA-256 which uses mod=232 or 4,294,967,296) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Numerical example “5 mod 2” = 1
Divide 5 by 2 the maximum number of times (2) 2 is the modulus The remainder is 1 Remainders never larger than (mod-1) so for mod 12 (clock) you would never see remainders greater than 11. EXCEL function = mod(number, divisor) e.g., mod(329, 17) = 6 “mod” Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Alice and Bob decide on two public pieces for information
A modulus (say 17) A generator (or the base for an exponent) (say 3) Alice has a private key (15) Bob has a private key (13) Is it possible for them to share a common secret that is unlikely to be intercepted? Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Alice: Calculates 315 mod 17 = 6 (i.e., =mod(3^(15), 17))
Alice send the message “6” to Bob Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Alice: Calculates 315 mod 17 = 6 (i.e., =mod(3^(15), 17))
Alice send the message “6” to Bob Eve intercepts the message! Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Bob: Calculates 313 mod 17 = 12 (i.e., =mod(3^(13), 17))
Bob send the message “12” to Alice Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Bob: Calculates 313 mod 17 = 12 (i.e., =mod(3^(13), 17))
Bob send the message “12” to Alice Eve intercepts the message! Now Eve has the 6 and the 12. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Alice: She takes Bob’s message of 12 and raises it to the power of her private key. Calculates 1215 mod 17 = 10 (i.e., =mod(12^(15), 17))* This is their common secret Campbell R. Harvey 2018 *EXCEL only does 15 digits so this will not work
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Key Exchange Bob: He takes Alice’s message of 6 and raises it to the power of his private key. Calculates 613 mod 17 = 10 (i.e., =mod(6^(13), 17)) This is their common secret Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Eve She has intercepted their message. However, without the common secret key, there is little chance she can recover the shared secret. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange Common secret
Alice can now encrypt a message with the common secret and Bob can decrypt it with the common secret. Notice this is a common secret. Next we will talk private/public keys. That is, both and Alice have separate public keys and separate private keys. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange (Optional slide)
Why does this work They are solving the same problem. Alice sent Bob 315 mod 17 = 6. Bob raises the to power of 13. This is the same as 613 mod 17 = [315]^(13) mod 17 =10 Alice’s original calculation Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange (Optional slide)
Why does this work They are solving the same problem. Bob sent Alice 313 mod 17 = 12. Alice raises the to power of 15. This is the same as 1215 mod 17 = [313]^(15) mod 17 =10 Bob’s original calculation Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange (Optional slide)
Why does this work They are solving the same problem. The modular arithmetic is crucial. See! [313]^(15) = [315]^(13) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Key Exchange RSA and ECC Now we will introduce key pairs.
The basic idea of modular arithmetic provides the foundation for RSA private/public key cryptography. The prime numbers that are used are huge. Private keys are mathematically linked to public keys. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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RSA: High Level Overview
See my Cryptography 101 deck for much more detail. Two prime numbers are chosen and they are secret (say 7 and 13, called p, q). Multiply them together. The product (N=91) is public but people don’t know the prime numbers used to get it. A public key is chosen (say 5). Given the two prime numbers, 7 and 13, and the public key, we can derive the private key, which is 29. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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RSA Issues with RSA RSA relies on factoring
N is public (our example was 91) If you can guess the factors, p, q, then you can discover the private key Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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RSA Issues with RSA Factoring algorithms have become very efficient
To make things worse, the algorithms become more efficient as the size of the N increases Hence, larger and larger numbers are needed for N This creates issues for mobile and low power devices that lack the computational power Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Mathematics of elliptic curves Does not rely on factoring Curve takes the form of y2 = x3 + ax + b Note that diagram is “continuous” but we will be using discrete versions of this arithmetic Note: 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0 Bitcoin uses a=0 and b=7 Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Properties Symmetric in x-axis Any non-vertical line intersects in three points Algebraic representation Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Properties: Addition Define a system of “addition”. To add “P” and “Q” pass a line through and intersect at third point “R”. Drop a vertical line down to symmetric part. This defines P+Q (usually denoted 𝑃⊕𝑄) R P Q P+Q Denote Elliptic Curve as E Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Properties: Doubling Define a system of “addition”. To add “P” and “P” use a tangent line and intersect at third point. Drop a vertical line down to symmetric part. This definite 2P (usually denoted 𝑃⊕𝑃) P Denote Elliptic Curve as E 2P Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Properties: Other P + O = O + P = P for all P ∈ E. (existence of identity) (b) P + (−P) = O for all P ∈ E. (existence of inverse) (c) P + (Q + R) = (P + Q) + R for all P, Q, R ∈ E. (associative) (d) P + Q = Q + P for all P, Q ∈ E (communativity) Denote Elliptic Curve as E Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Why use in cryptography? Suggested by Koblitz and Miller in 1985 Implemented in 2005 Key insight: Adding and doubling on the elliptic curve is easy but undoing the adding is very difficult Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Modulo arithmetic on EC Example of modulo 67 (means only points are between 0 and 66 Notice the symmetry Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Modulo arithmetic on EC Notice the symmetry (reflection in the red line) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Modulo arithmetic on EC Example of modulo 67 Addition of (2,22) and (6,25) Note (2,22) called the “base point” The dashed blue line wraps around and intersects at (47,39) and the reflection is (47,28) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Modulo arithmetic on EC Example of modulo 67 Addition of (2,22) and (6,25) Note (2,22) called the “base point” The dashed blue line wraps around and intersects at (47,39) and the reflection is (47,28) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Four choices: Form of elliptic curve Prime modulo Base point Order Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
Four choices: Form of elliptic curve: y2 = x3 + 7 Prime modulo: 2256 – 232 – 29 – 28 – 27 – 26 – 24 - 1 = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F Base point: 04 79BE667E F9DCBBAC 55A06295 CE870B07 029BFCDB 2DCE28D9 59F2815B 16F81798 483ADA77 26A3C465 5DA4FBFC 0E1108A8 FD17B448 A 9C47D08F FB10D4B8 Order: FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE BAAEDCE6 AF48A03B BFD25E8C D Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
How it works: Private key is a random number chosen between 1 and the order Public key = private key*base point Maximum number of private keys (and bitcoin addresses) is equal to the order. It is straightforward to go from private key to a public key – but brutally difficult to go from public key to private key. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
How it works: 1. Choose private key and derive public key Let prime modulus = m Let base point (x,y) = G Let order = n Let private key = d (which is just a number) Public key Q(x,y) = d*G [operations on the elliptic curve with prime modulus m] Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
How it works: 2. Sign Let data = z (which could be a SHA-256 of the data you are signing) Generate a random number k Calculate k*G which leads to particular coordinates (x,y)* Calculate r = x mod n [Note n=order] Calculate s = (z + r*d)/k mod n Digital Signature (DS) = (r, s) is just a set of coordinates Private key Campbell R. Harvey 2018 *I am not sure what modulus is used for this EC operation.
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
How it works: 3. Verify Calculate w = s-1 mod n Calculate u = z*w mod n Calculate v = r*w mod n Calculate the point (x’, y’) = uG + vQ Verify that r = x’ mod n If yes, verified. Remember DS = (r, s) Base point Public key Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Optional slide)
How it works: 4. Intuition Anyone can encrypt something with a public key The digital signature algorithm uses the data, a random number, and both the private and public keys Verification shows that only the owner of both the private and public key could have signed. Verification is a “yes” or a “no”. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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ECDSA Private key is a number called “signing key” (SK). It is secret.
Public key is the “verification key” and is mathematically linked to the private key EC SK VK Private key: (number) Elliptic curve operations: Need base point, modulus, order Public key: coordinate (x, y) Note: Easy to generate a public key with a private key. Not easy to go the other way. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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ECDSA Digital signature EC DS SK Private key: (number)
Nonce: (random number) Nonce EC Message DS SK Private key: (number) Elliptic curve operations: Need base point, modulus, order (n) Digital signature: coordinate (r, s) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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ECDSA Verification s EC (x’, y’) VK Elliptic curve operations:
coordinates r Yes (verified) s EC (x’, y’) r = x’ mod n ? Message No (rejected) VK Elliptic curve operations: Need base point, order (n) Derive new point on elliptic curve Check x coordinate of new point and DS Public key: (x, y) Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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How DSAs Work Notice Proves that the person with the private key (that generated the public key) signed the message. Interestingly, digital signature is different from a usual signature in that it depends on the message, i.e., the signature is different for each different message. In practice, we do not sign the message, we sign a cryptographic hash of the message. This means that the size of the input is the same no matter how long the message is. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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ECDSA in Action https://kjur.github.io/jsrsasign/sample-ecdsa.html
Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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ECDSA in Action OP_CHECKSIG uses Public Key + Digital Signature + Hash of Transaction Verifies whether this transaction has been signed by the owner of the Private Key Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Application: PGP Email
My public key for secure You can encrypt an to me with my public key and only I can decrypt with my private key. Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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Application: PGP Email
Steps Message compressed Random session key (based on mouse movements and keystrokes) is generated. Message encrypted with session key Session key is encrypted with receiver’s public key Encrypted message + encrypted session key sent via Recipient uses their private key to decrypt the session key Session key is used to decrypt the message Message decompressed Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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References The Math Behind Bitcoin [recommended]
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (Bitcoin) What does the curve used in Bitcoin, secp256k1, look like? Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (Wikipedia) Elliptic Curve Cryptography (UCSB) Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Digital Rights Management (Purdue) Zero to ECC in 30 minutes (Entrust) The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem Goldwasser, Shaffi and Mihir Bellare, 2008, Lecture Notes on Cryptography Dan Boneh, Stanford University, Introduction to Cryptography Dan Boneh, Stanford University, Cryptography II Campbell R. Harvey 2018
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