1. Human Security Principle focusing on prevention
GROUP 3
Fukasawa, Michiko / LEE, Chae won / CHOI, Seungyeon

2. 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami
Prevention: the comparison of
Okirai and Okawa Elementary School
2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami
・Near the river
・Had a large mountain behind the school buildings
・During class
→ Prevention determined whether children could survive or not.

3. Case1: Okirai Elementary School
・located on lower place than the municipal road
→ Parents complained to the school
→ Built a large emergency staircase
→ All children and teachers survived.

4. Case2: Okawa Elementary School

5. 14:16 Earthquake convulsed the whole city
15:00 Teachers called the roll of students
Started to discuss where they should take refuge at
15:25 Municipality bulletin warned of Tsunami
The discussion finished
15:37 The river flooded
Students were carried away while evacuating

6. Lessons: ① Assuming “the worst” is effective
② The administration should listen to
what people are anxious about

7. Hurricane Katrina Prevention: Superdome and FEMA
Focusing on New Orleans,
Main causes those led to failure
Timeline
Evaluation

8. Hurricane Katrina -One of the most dangerous hurricanes in American history Yet New Orleans was not ready
New Orleans
Poor city
NO personal transportation (20%)
Levees
Can endure up to Category 3
→ Katrina: Category 5
Worn-out
1st Cause

9. Timeline: August, 2005 Category 4→5 Category 4→3 8.27
Katrina: Category 3
Recommends Evacuation
Category 4→5
8.28
Mandatory Evacuation
Opens Superdome
Category 4→3
8.29
Louisiana loses electricity
Levees caved in
8.30
Noticed ppl in Convention Center
Full Evacuation to Houston
Timeline: August, 2005

10. FEMA(Federal Emergency Management Agency)
Until 9/11
After 9/11
Result
2nd Cause
Originally belonged to the White House
Went under Homeland Security Department
(by Congress)
Lack of communication
Low Efficiency
Blame Game

11. Lack of Consensus within Local Government
3rd Cause
Conflict between Mayor and Governor
Passive evacuation enforcement
Did not connect itself firmly to FEMA and central government

12. Evaluation Prevention: Less than 50%
Authorities did not tried their best on evacuation plan 3/5
Lack of communications between authorities 1/5
Levees: terribly mismanaged 2/5
Shelter: Superdome was nice try, but was not enough 3/5
Prevention: Less than 50%

13. 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami
Prevention:
Buffer Zone Policy of Sri Lanka
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami

14. Timeline Earthquake Buffer Zone Revised Buffer Zone March 2005
26 December 2004
Buffer Zone
March 2005
Buffer Zone Revised
February 2006
100M landwards from the mean high water line in South coast
200M landwards from the mean high water line in East coast
Vary from 35M to 125M
standards from the 1997 Coastal Zone Management Plan

15. Tsunami Impact

16. Bigger confusion and uncertainty created
Buffer Zone Policy
Fishing communities forced to be displaced and livelihoods of the most vulnerable being threatened
Reconstruction and relocation scheme delayed until policy revision
Poorly assessed damages and arbitrary compensation
Bigger confusion and uncertainty created

17. Prevention policy threatening human security
Buffer Zone Policy
Arbitrary policy without consultation with the victims and professionals
Local and village level officers (Grama Sevakas) ill informed of the policy
Lacking considerations on deep-rooted ethno-national tensions, intensifying security threats
Prevention policy threatening human security

18. Conclusion Lessons for future preventive measures
Prevention - ALWAYS IMPORTANT
Assuming the worst case scenario
Promoting cooperation among government sectors / between authority and people
Understanding and considering vulnerability created by social, political, economic and cultural forces
Not a simple work to go through

19. Thank you 