1. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations Runway Safety Technical solutions From the Design and Manufacturing Sector By Fabrice Villaumé ICAO European Runway Safety Symposium1

2. Runway Incursions, Confusion and Excursions are a leading cause of Aviation Accidents International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations

3. Focus on Runway Excursions

4. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit4 Main factors of Runway Overrun at landing No approved in-flight realistic operational landing distance Stabilization not achieved at 1000/500 ft Wind shift at low altitude Approach becoming unstable at low altitude Long flare Long derotation Late selection of engine thrust reversers Runway friction coefficient lower than expected Late/weak manual braking (w/o or after AB disc) Failure affecting the landing distances A vast majority of overruns at landing is avoidable Today, main cause of accidents is Runway Excursion

5. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit5 Recommended ICAO Runway End Safety Area (RESA) Airport Infrastructures ATC/Crews Operational Procedures Proactive On- Board Technology FSF/IATA Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Toolkit FAA Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) Like E-GPWS & TCAS, on-board technology will be key to mitigate Runway Excursion Risk But clear different design intents exist Like E-GPWS & TCAS, on-board technology will be key to mitigate Runway Excursion Risk But clear different design intents exist Honeywell SmartLanding TM Honeywell SmartLanding TM Airbus ROPS Airbus ROPS Monitoring of some measured ALA aircraft parameters Monitoring of realistic aircraft landing performance Arresting System (EMAS) Runway Condition Reporting

6. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit6 Smartlanding TM is a Honeywell function of the E-GPWS – Monitoring A/C speed and position vs. runway threshold – Providing visual/aural annunciations to enhance crew awareness of unstabilized approach – Based on tuning defined by Honeywell (speed, glideslope) or set by airlines (long landing distance) Smartlanding TM main monitorings – « TOO FAST » alert, – « TOO HIGH » alert, – « UNSTABLE » alert, – « LONG LANDING » alert,... As considered as a non interferent function, no demonstration is requested by FAA on Smartlanding TM tuning relevance – TSO approval granted in 2009

7. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations A bit more on Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit7 PFD (and HUD) (Below 500 ft) Audio (Below 200 ft) Crew Actions (Below 500 ft) AMM ND line symbols ROW (WET) IF WET: RWY TOO SHORT (amber) None Go-Around if runway is wet / damp or more slippery WET (amber) DRY (magenta) ROW (DRY) RWY TOO SHORT (red) "RWY TOO SHORT !"Go-Around WET (red) DRY (red) ROP MAX BRAKING MAX REVERSE (red) BRAKE… MAX BRAKING MAX BRAKING "MAX REVERSE" "KEEP MAX REVERSE" MAX braking (Auto/Pilot) MAX REV (Pilots) Red STOP bar Red path

8. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations A bit more on Airbus ROPS EASA certification basis In heavy workload / stress most often associated to accidents at landing, the crew focused on the primary objective (landing) is not able to consider the alternative to Go-Around without real time information Need to provide real time high quality data for crew high quality decisions Need to monitor A/C energy and landing distance vs. runway end Runway Excursion Prevention design intent implied the request to demonstrate the relevance of ROPS alerts and protections No Airborne Alert: Continuing landing is safe, no unprotected area Airborne Alert: Without unjustified conservatism and increase of Go-Around rate On-Ground Alert: Apply (and maintain) all deceleration means This was ruled by a new EASA regulation in 2009 covering aircraft performance, HMI, Systems and need for validated runway database Principle – If no ROW alert before decision point Then, thanks to ROP, no runway excursion While no significant increase of go-around rate ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit8

9. International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations Conclusion Despite clear different design intent, easy-to-install flight deck solutions exist and are in operations – Airbus ROPS is in service since 2009 with solid positive feedback from airlines NTSB is recommending to FAA the installation of such solution ( A-11-28, March 29 th 2011) A significant fleet coverage is needed to achieve widespread safety benefit But a harmonized regulation/standardization is requested to achieve this now realistic goal – Current and future airplanes – High quality runway data as AIP are often inaccurate and have to be checked Since May 2011 ICAO GRSS – Airbus ROPS is available to all aircraft manufacturers – Airbus ROPS solution and global deployment approach is supported by IFALPA and IATA ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit9