1. The mass psychology of disasters and emergency evacuations: Implications for the emergency services
Presentation for the BPS annual conference,
Dublin 2/4/2008
Chris Cocking, John Drury & Steve Reicher:
London Metropolitan University, University of Sussex & University of St. Andrews
Funded by ESRC (Ref no: RES )

2. Outline of Presentation
Background and aims of research
Data from interview studies
Implications for emergency planners
1) Mention that theory isn’t covered in detail, but I can elaborate on any points during q.s

3. Development of crowd behaviour theories over time
19th Century- The irrationalist approach (Le Bon, 1895)
1960s - 70s more rationalist approaches Emergent Norm Theory (Turner R., 1974)
From 1980s to present- The Social Identity Model (Reicher, 2001)
we’re not trying to say that all crowds are inherently good- they can do ‘bad’ things, e.g. lynch mobs etc but this is usually reflected by the ID of crowd as a whole, and done in a social context- doesn’t mean that crowds are pathological per se, but they behave in ways or norms that are consistent with their ID
crowds can also be dangerous, but this is more down to physical pressures of large numbers of people who may not be aware of or able to act against dangers to them. When there are injuries or deaths in crowds it is more likely to be due to poor management than any ‘panic’ or irrational behaviour by crowd members e.g. Hillsborough and possibly also the recent Baghdad stampede

4. The ‘Panic’ model
Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology
a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason
b) Collective identity breaks down
c) Selfish behaviours - pushing, trampling
d) Contagion - these behaviours spread to crowd as a whole
This has implications for emergency planning
Critique panic model here;
While there may be fear- people don’t lose all reason
Far from breaking down, collective ID can grow in the face of threat
selfish behaviour is rare and only usually happens when chance to co-operate has gone
Rather than spreading individual distress/ selfishness is usually tempered by others

6. Iroquois fire 1903
‘most of the dead were trampled or smothered, though many jumped or fell to the floor of the foyer. In places on the stairways, particularly where a turn caused a jam, bodies were piled 7 or 8 feet deep. Fireman and Police confronted a sickening task in disentangling them.[ ] The heel prints on the dead faces mutely testified to the cruel fact that human animals stricken by terror are as mad and ruthless as stampeding cattle’
(in Latané & Darley 1970 p. 53)

7. Under-reaction rather than over-reaction
‘When people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely to be the lack of panic’ p.73
Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer, London Fire Rescue Service (in Kemp, 2003)
Supported by evidence of behaviour in fires that people are often unwilling to deviate from familiar activity, leading them to continue with existing behaviours or evacuate along known routes, even in the face of danger (Canter, 1990)

8. Social attachment model (Mawson, 2005)
In emergencies, people seek out attachment figures: social norms rarely break down
But, such ties can have fatal consequences- people escape (or die) in groups
Improves on panic model, and supported by evidence from behaviour during fatal fires (Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain:
a) Implies that panic in a crowd of strangers is more likely
b) Why do strangers co-operate in emergencies?
There is evidence for social attachment model e.g. Cornwell (2001) and Feinberg and Johnson’s studies of BHSC fire

9. The self-categorisation approach (Turner et al., 1987)
Disasters create a common identity or sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002)
This can result in orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat
Increased threat can enhance common identity
Mention that results from interview study supports our findings, but was from a wide range of emergencies, with different levels of real and perceived threat, so could be a lot of variability in data. Therefore we decided to look at 1 event- 7/7

10. Interview studies 21 survivors of 11 different emergencies
Open–ended interviews
Tape-recorded and transcribed
Analysed using Content Analysis and IPA

11. Results from interviews
Common identity quickly emerges
Co-operative rather than selfish behaviour predominates
If selfish behaviour happens, it is usually isolated and rarely spreads

12. Hillsborough survivor
I don’t think people did lose control of their emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of their own emotions and their own physical insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed, you’re beginning to fear for your own personal safety, and yet they were [ ] controlling or tempering their emotions to help try and remedy the situation and help others who were clearly struggling

13. Research into 7/7/2005 Data from Press reports and web-logs
Web based questionnaire study for eye-witnesses of bombings
Interviews with 12 survivors
1) Mention that we were at Royal Soc showing VR prog. when bombs went off
2) Click onto web-link and briefly mention each section of q.s from survivors
3) Interview studies not done yet, cos we’ve only just got ethical clearance

14. Response to 7/7 Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic
Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour
Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole
emphasise point that we’re not trying to say that individuals don’t become scared, distressed, or even panic, but that this v rarely becomes mass panic

15. Panic?
There was no real panic - just an overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly
Almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down
Some accounts of panic, but mixed and doesn't generalise
Liverpool St
King’s Cross

16. Unity
One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary
Both quotes from eye-witnesses of King’s Cross tube bomb
Normal social inhibitions (not talking on the tube) break down, and a physical crowd becomes a psychological crowd

17. The myth of Panic Many accounts of ‘panic’ in emergencies
But what actually is panic, and what is logical flight behaviour?
Need to look at what people actually do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’
More than just semantics, as it could affect emergency evacuation planning
1) Press coverage and eye-witness reports full of mentions of panic
2) We’re not saying that individuals don’t have panic attacks, or that people can fear for their lives, just that the idea of mass, selfish panic is usually a myth
3) Panic model needs improving as it assumes that all crowds will panic in an evac. And doesn’t consider that there will be co-operation, orderly behaviour etc
Explain that you’re gonna show 9/11 photo next to look at panic behaviour

18. Implications for emergency services
More info rather than less can improve evacuation time and efficiency (Proulx & Sime, 1991)
Source of info and whether it’s trusted matters
Appeal to crowd’s co-operative nature - don’t assume they will behave selfishly or panic
Practice evacuations- don’t assume it won’t happen to you!
The panic model suggests that people shouldn’t be informed (communication de-emphasized since people are irrational) and that the emphasis should instead be on the width of exits.

19. Crowds can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem
People may delay own escape to help others
Appeal to the crowd’s common humanity- ‘We’re in this together’
Don’t address commuters as atomised ‘customers’
Influential leader figures may emerge from crowd, who can help rescue effort
Common fate can emerge fairly quickly and encourage co-ordinated co-operative behaviour. PA messages and public information advertising on the tubes/buses could take this into account
Social Psychology research over the years has shown how having groups in conflict can cause strong group in-group identity, but runs risk of generating more conflict- e.g. racism

20. Summary
Crowds in emergencies behave in ways that are consistent with their identities and governed by the social norms of the situation
The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth

21. References:
Blake et al. (2004). Proceedings of Third International Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire
Canter, D. (ed.) (1990) Fires and human behaviour (pp ). London: David Fulton
Cornwell, B. (2001). The Sociological Quarterly, 44,
Kemp R (2003) Homeland Security: best practices for local government.
Le Bon, G. (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular mind. (Originally published 1895)
Mawson, A.R. (2005) Psychiatry, 68, (2)
Proulx, G. & Sime, J.D. (1991). Fire Safety Science: Proceedings of the Third International Symposium,
Reicher, S. (2001). The psychology of crowd dynamics. In M.A. Hogg and R.S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes (pp ). Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Turner J et al (1987) Rediscovering the social group
Turner, R.H. (1974). Collective behavior. In R.E.L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally.