1. 2017 annual ACE conference November 16th 2017
A competition case in the Spanish rail freight transport market: S/DC/0511/14 RENFE OPERADORA
2017 annual ACE conference
November 16th 2017
Francisco Roig

2. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
collusion between RENFE and DB
abuse of dominance by RENFE
SOME LESSONS LEARNED

3. INTRODUCTION context:
liberalization of traction services used in rail freight becomes effective in in Spain;
TRANSFESA is the main competitor of RENFE in the Spanish market for rail freight, a situation which predates the liberalization;
in April 2008 DB completes the acquisition of a controlling stake of TRANSFESA (announcement of the agreement in July 2007)
infringements:
market sharing (preservation of the statu quo prior to the liberalization),
discrimination to third operators who demanded rail traction services with respect to the commercial conditions that RENFE offered to DEUTSCHE BAHN
origin of the case: complaint by a trade association (AEFP) in March 2014

4. provision of traction services used in rail freight within Spain,
RELEVANT MARKETS
provision of traction services used in rail freight within Spain,
rail freight services in Spain, domestic and international, and
rental of open-air storage depots for automobiles with railway access

5. COLLUSION Background information
cross-shareholdings between RENFE and the TRANSFESA group;
steps taken by TRANSFESA in order to develop its own traction capacity before being under the control of DB;
agreements between RENFE and DB shortly after completing the acquisition of a controlling stake in TRANSFESA:
cooperation agreement between RENFE and DB SR DEUTSCHLAND;
agreement between RENFE and the TRANSFESA group;
contract according to which TRANSFESA rented 5 of its recently leased locomotives to RENFE; and
contract according to which TRANSFESA rented its other 5 leased locomotives to EWSI.

6. COLLUSION Effects-based analysis of the agreements
the four agreements should be viewed as a whole
anticompetitive effects arising from the agreements:
delay by TRANSFESA in using its locomotives
preferential treatment
the extension of the rental of two open-air storage depots for automobiles by RENFE to DB
counterfactual
quid pro quo
no objective justification

7. ABUSE Dominant position market share: 99,9 % (2008) - 85,5% (2013)
barriers to entry/exit:
high fixed costs and ensuing economies of scale
Network effects
Discrimination
preferential treatment to DB
lack of penalty in case of cancellation
practical difficulties in obtaining proofs

8. failure of settlement talks in order to close the investigation
SOME LESSONS LEARNED
rail is steadily losing ground as a means of transport in the overall Spanish market for freight transport
failure of settlement talks in order to close the investigation
the need for a structural and regulatory solution where competition does not work
first instance of cooperation in a formal competition investigation dealing with the railway sector since the merging of the CA and the regulatory bodies under the CNMC
relevance of the case in the wake of the liberalisation of passenger rail services at country level in the EU (monitoring by the European Commission): access to the rolling stock of the former legal monopoly

9. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
the full text of the decision (only in Spanish)
pdf
brief summary of the decision in English:
nidos/Notas%20de%20prensa/2017/ _En glish%20Summary%20S %20RENFE.pdf