1. NDIA / USMC War Game 2006
“Adapting to Change”
Cell 1 Outbrief

2. Distributed Operations
Strong Points
The USMC is formalizing and professionalizing long-standing an operational concept
Have been doing this historically on an ad hoc basis without a formal structure
The formal operational concept of DO will now drive the development of the sustainment elements
DO will better match the MAGTF to the current operational environment (GWOT and irregular foe)
Weak Points
Doubtful that large-scale DO operations can be supported with logistics or fires from existing sea-base capabilities
Further experimentation for the DO concept should be conducted in
urban areas
coalition operations
Current acquisition, training and manpower systems do not support the DO concept
Current DO concept increases the individual’s Marine’s load

3. Distributed Operations (Cont)
Capability Shortfalls
Training for Battalion and Company commanders on how best to employ their DO platoon capabilities
Ground maneuver organic support capability
Small unit maneuver over larger distances and difficult terrain
Ability of organic fires to support the AO
Lack of organic ISR capability
Availability of vertical lift
Assumes air supremacy for the AO
Assumes a persistent sea-base
Weather will have exponential effect on sustainment capabilities

4. Distributed Operations (Cont)
Recommendations
De-couple sustainment from human factors
Unmanned
Para-foils
Determine the detailed requirements for aerial sustainment vehicle
Perform a dedicated look at COTS for DO operational constraints
Perform dedicated look-back at historically similar operations
Incorporate simulation-based training as a way to scale DO training across the USMC
Identify training requirements for Bn and Co commanders who will be employing DO capabilities

5. D. O. Sustainment Strong Points Weak Points
Understand the severity of the problem
Standardized kitting is a good approach
Solving DO sustainment will help drive the LOG Modernization initiative in the USMC
Lots of available technologies “out there” to address re-supply
The USMC can communicate Commander’s Intent very well internally
Logistics footprint is small
Weak Points
Continuity of personnel working the problem
Transition from S&T to acquisition to the Fleet
Lack of awareness of other technologies / solutions being looked at in other services and other agencies (e.g., NASA)
Lack of integration between the various agencies that are looking at solutions (DARPA, ONR)
The USMC is not good at communicating the Commander’s Intent to Industry
The distribution system is not adequate to support operations
Frequency of re-supply operations will compromise OPSEC
OPSEC not addressed adequately in terms of the debris, packaging, etc

6. D. O. Sustainment (Cont) Capability Shortfalls
Battlefield distribution system
Bulk fluids
Water availability
Production
Distribution
Communication
Lack of BLOS communication capabilities for the CSS element who must support the DO platoon
Decision support to understand and de-conflict multiple re-supply requests from multiple DO platoons or squads
Sense and Respond logistics
Automatically notified of supply status
Ability to anticipate re-supply needs
Timely Casualty evacuation
“Platinum 15 min” or the “Golden Hour”

7. D. O. Sustainment (Cont) Recommendations
Identify what part of the T/E can be considered disposable
Need to determine how to get the best use of the multiple air platforms that will be supporting DO ops
Improve knowledge management on sustainment issues and solutions across DOD
USMC needs to talk to the S&T community and other services on a regular basis about how they may be able to support DO ops
DOD-wide websites that publicize the work that is being done across the DOD to address sustainment issues
Design a customizable CSS package

8. Logistics Modernization
Strong Points
Organizing and training the way we fight
Matches up logistics elements directly with their supported unit counterparts
Recognition from the USMC that S&R Logistics is the way forward
Weak Points
Organization / CONOPS not ready to maximize S&R Logistics capability
Cultural gap
Resourcing not available to effect S&R Logistics
The initiative has re-organized the old FSSG structure into the new MLG structure, but it did not do this reorganization from a bottom-up, “what capability is needed” perspective
May inherit the same constraints and problems of the previous structure
The logistics elements may be Force Protection burdens for their supported units

9. Logistics Modernization(Cont)
Capability Shortfalls
The logistics modernization effort has not been resourced
MLG skeleton has to get filled
MLG TO and T/E has to get filled
Connectivity between mission area responsibilities
We are not prepared to use S&RL capabilities

10. Logistics Modernization(Cont)
Recommendations
Integrate all the various log systems currently in use
Understand the capabilities available and be able to use them (e.g., be able to identify a given system and what it can do for you – AFATDS, C2PC, etc)
Properly resource enabling technologies such as S&RL
Analyze and determine the impact of S&RL on doctrine, organization, training and CONOPS
Rapidly evaluate the point solutions being developed at the small-unit levels and determine which of those should be adopted for larger use across the USMC