1. Critical Infrastructure: the chemical industry
Martijn Ligthart
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
Directorate of External Safety

2. Introduction
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment VROM (3500 p)
Directorate External Safety (30 p)
linked to
Directorate General Environment (400p)
Directorate General Spatial Planning (300p)

3. Global characteristics: the chemical industry
Global characteristics of the industry in the NL
16.3 million inhabitants
square km
companies
300 Seveso II sites
160 Seveso reporting sites
1000 storages of chemicals and pesticides
2200 LPG filling stations

4. Authorities and parties involved
Authorities and parties involved with the risks of the chemical industry
Central Government: Policy and Legislation
Implementation EU directives
Provinces (12) and Municipalities (450):
Environmental Management Act & Land-use Act
Regional Fire brigades:
Disaster and Major accidents Act; prevention, emergency
planning, rescue operations
Inspectorates of the ministries

5. Project ‘Vitaal’: Critical Infrastructure, the chemical industry
April 2002: Start project Critical (Vital) Infrastructure
Main objectives:
Development of a coherent set of measures to protect the critical infrastructure (incl. ICT)
Establishment of these measures within the normal operations of the companies and the authorities
At first the chemical industry was not selected as a critical sector, but it was added to the project in 2004
Reason: potentially vulnerable sector in terms of victims and societal disruption

6. VROM Coördination: the chemical industry
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment:
(VROM) responsible for:
Drinking water sector
Nuclear sector
(Chemical) industry (dangerous substances)
3 different directorates involved; coordination by the
VROM-Inspectorate

7. Objectives September 2004: start project:
“Dangerous substances and deliberate violation”
Objectives:
Inventory of possible effects of terrorist attacks
(chemical sites and storages dangerous substances)
Inventory of the vulnerability of the Dutch industry for such
attacks
(stationary installations and transport of dangerous goods)
Ranking of vulnerabilities and if necessary development of
extra measures for companies and on policy level

8. Project outline The project is executed by VROM in cooperation with
Other ministries
security/intelligence experts of the AIVD,
the provinces
The Association of Dutch Enterprises (VNO/NCW)
A (limited) international benchmark is also part of the project
In September 2005 a report shall be sent to Parliament

9. Results so far Results of the project so far are: (mid-February 2005)
A ranking of the most important establishments based on
potential casualties has been drawn up
About 40 establishments are on the list
The maximum possible effects of potential deliberate violations
during the transport of dangerous goods by rail, road and
ship have been calculated
Vulnerability analysis chemical sector and transport dangerous
goods has been performed with assistance of security experts

10. ‘Intended disturbance’: what to analyse?
Vulnerability analysis:
terrorist, employee, criminal, hooligan, anti-globalists and
other activists, hacker
type of weapon (explosive device, bomb car, RPG, ICT...)
type of industry or other vulnerable objects
(many people in the neighbourhood of dangerous substances)
possibilities for protection (resistance)

11. A possible approach Quick scan should give information on:
Amount of casualties (deaths and wounded)
Infrastructural damage
Evacuations/displaced persons
Contamination
Economic impact
Potential for multiple events
Recovery time
From geographical considerations and event dynamics one should focus on:
Prevention/deterrence/protection
Emergency Assesment/Diagnosis
Emergency Management/Response
Incident/Hazard Mitigation
Public protection
Victim care
Investigation/Apprehension
Recovery/Remediation

12. USA examples of ‘Quick wins’
2002 Chicago: fencing supposed to keep intruders away from Otto & Sons' Chicago warehouse and its lethal anhydrous ammonia.
2002 Houston Clorox factory: after 1 mln USD security investment still easy access to clorine gas pens due to gates left open.
2002 Westmoreland County Sony Technology Center: an unsecured gate gives access to ponds of chlorine gas.

13. Activities in the next three months
Quick-scan inventory and evaluation of existing security measures for (most of) the 40 selected establishments
Quick scan of situations of hazardous substances with large public events
International benchmark of security measures in the chemical industry
Discussion with companies and transport organisations about estimated effect levels and existing/necessary security levels
Report to the Parliament

14. Benchmark
The Netherlands has little to no experience with terrorisme in relation to the chemical industry. Therefore we need to learn from other countries and their experiences: UK
USA
France
Germany

15. Questions
responsability for the protection of critical infrastructure: state, district, (province), municipalities
the balance between private companies – authorities
security measures in chemical sites:
quality control
role of authorities, inspectorates

16. Dilemma: need to know or need to share?
What about the confidential information versus the “community right to know”

17. Information on risks
Information to the public about risks in the Netherlands
Seveso directive (Major Accidents Hazards Decree, 1999)
Two initiatives after fireworks explosion in Enschedé
Ministry of Interior: risk mapping
Ministry of HSP& the Environment: risk register

19. Discussion Safety reports do not give all the information we need
( information from emergency planning is also necessary)
Experience from USA (ACC/SOCMA-methodology and of
Port Authorities (IMO) can be used for assessment of security
UK experience and approach can be useful for NL
EC has taken initiatives (CCA and CIP committees)

20. More Information For further information: VROM: Cees.Braams@minvrom.nl
VROM:
BZK: