1. Knowledge as a Duty Lorenzo Magnani A New Philosophical Responsibility
Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section and Computational Philosophy Laboratory
University of Pavia, Italy

2. New Cognitive and Ethical Importance Acquired by External Things
The new cognitive and ethical importance acquired by many external things (both natural and artificial) has been mainly caused by modern technology achievements. I think this fact implies two philosophical consequences.

3. TWO PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES
We need to appropriately re-project onto people moral values we have already attributed to external things (I say we have to “respect people as things” )
A new role of knowledge (scientific and ethical) is being delineating. I suggest that in our technological world, aiming both at “respecting people as things” and “treating people as ends” involves a massive and skillful exploitation of knowledge.

4. Knowledge as a Duty A New Philosophical Responsibility
The “neighbor ethics” of justice, charity, honesty, etc., is not sufficient anymore, because this local sphere of ethical action is overcome by the domain of collective action (there is an invisible moral hand) where effects are frequently not, from both spatial and temporal point of view, in a proximate sphere. I contend that new tasks of human behavior require the assumption of a long-range responsibility, coextensive with the range of our power.
In Ethics
If we want knowledge to be considered as a duty in the perspective of that supernational knowledge society I consider the only real Popperian “open society”, the aim should be on the generation, distribution, and use of knowledge in favor of social and economic development.
Modern technology has brought about consequences of such magnitude on external things (both natural and artificial) that the framework of older ethics and policies can no longer contain them. For example, modern technology has made nature an object of human responsibility with the consequence that we must approach her not only with cleverness but also with ethics. The idea of moral knowledge as something simple and readily available to all men of good will is not sufficient anymore. Contrary to Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ,1785), who maintained that “there is not need of science or philosophy for knowing what man has to do in order to be honest and good, and indeed to be wise and virtuous” , ethics and decision making behavior should be continually and carefully accompanied by knowledge related to an understanding of the various problems and situations.
KANT

5. Knowledge as a Duty A New Philosophical Responsibility
From this perspective human beings are “natural things” whose behavior is a priori difficult to be tracked and predicted. For instance, how can we track human intentions? Indeed when we “morally” aim at the ownership of our own destinies we expect to be able to reach objectives chosen through consciousness, free will, and intentionality. Unfortunately we can obtain results only if we can “count” on some regularity of the behavior of other human agents.
In Science
I think it is through the everyday, philosophical, and – especially -scientific knowledge about phenomena of the natural and artificial world (and through the related technologies), that human beings have been able to give themselves that wide range of possibilities for choosing and acting they currently have. Mankind has developed consciousness and everyday and scientific knowledge about phenomena of the natural and artificial world in such a way that “better brains” (and thus better degrees of consciousness) have in turn made possible better levels of knowledge. So consciousness, with the help of its stronger endowments of intentionality and free will, have nourished, enhanced, produced, and also “externalized” knowledge. Everyday and scientific knowledge – through “tracking the natural and artificial world” – have provided the “elbow room” (Dennett) necessary to build a deliberative agent.
But one of the main obstacles to “fruitfully” exercise free will is the behavior of other human beings.
LAPLACE

6. Dissemination and Distribution of Knolwedge Interdisciplinary Issues
If knowledge has to be considered a duty the problem of its dissemination and distribution is central. I am at introducing some transdisciplinary issues related to this problem, that only a philosophical reflection that adopts a new responsibility can clarify.
creative, model-based and manipulative thinking (problem of rational ethical argumentations)
external cognitive structures and moral mediators
interplay between unexpressed and superexpressed
knowledge, knowledge management, knowledge communities
They are able to reshape ethical worth of human beings and collectives.

7. The Moral Significance of the Interest in Knowledge
The lack of appropriate and situated knowledge content is a negative bias in concrete moral deliberations and an obstacle in undertaking a responsible behavior. In this light I also aim at emphasizing the role of the so-called new “knowledge communities” and the privileged status of humans beings as “knowledge carriers”.
flourishing life (bad faith)
enhancing freedom, autonomy, free choice
enhancing human beings as cognitive carriers (cognitive capacities)
does all knowledge have intrinsic value?
ownership of our destinies
knowledge and information retention (cyberprivacy, free choice, ownership of our destinies)
I contend that, if a lot of knowledge is incorporated in external artificial things (and we need knowledge to deal with external things - both natural and artificial), human beings are so intertwined with those external things that their "visibility" can be excessive and dangerous.

8. Intrinsic Value MORAL AGENTS MORAL PATIENTS DISPOSSESSED PEOPLE
MEANS PEOPLE
THING PEOPLE
Intrinsic Value
Thinking in terms of cognitive capacities, a human being could be likened to an artificial “thing” that is the bearer of information, knowledge, or cultural traditions, etc., and thought of in the same way we might regard objects worth moral consideration: a book, a PC, or a work of art, for example.
MORAL PATIENTS

9. Moral Mediators BEING MORAL THROUGH DOING
- THEY GRANT NEW ETHICAL
INFORMATION AND VALUES
MORALLY AFFECT HUMAN AGENTS
- REDISTRIBUTE MORAL EFFORT
BEING MORAL THROUGH DOING
Moral Action (also making artifacts)
moral mediators represent a kind of redistribution of the moral effort through managing objects and information in such a way that we can overcome the poverty and the unsatisfactory character of the moral options immediately represented or found internally
MIMETIC MORAL AGENTS
Machine Ethics
COMPUTATIONAL DECISION MAKING
CYBERPRIVACY
Invisible Moral Hand
Moral Mediators
ENDANGEREES SPECIES WANNABEES
Instrinsic Values