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Alessandra Scafuro Practical UC security Black-box protocols

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Presentation on theme: "Alessandra Scafuro Practical UC security Black-box protocols"— Presentation transcript:

1 Alessandra Scafuro Practical UC security Black-box protocols
fellow talk

2 intro Practical UC security Practical UC security Black-box protocols
University of Salerno Ivan Visconti PhD UCLA Rafail Ostrovsky Jan 2015 BU & NEU Canetti & Wichs Practical UC security Practical UC security Black-box protocols

3 Black-box protocols

4 Black-box protocols semi-honest P1 P2

5 Black-box protocols malicious P1 P2

6 Black-box protocols malicious P1 P2 Specific Assumption proof
correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness

7 Black-box protocols P1 P2 Specific Assumption proof proof correctness

8 Black-box protocols General Assumption P1 P2 Specific Assumption proof
correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness

9 instantiate with several hardness assumptions
General Assumptions instantiate with several hardness assumptions minimal assumptions? rounds [Katz Ostrovsky 04] minimal round complexity?

10 Black-box protocols General Assumption P1 P2 P1 P2
Specific Assumption General Assumption NP-reduction Theoretical insights Inherently inefficient P1 P2 P1 P2 proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness

11 Black-box protocols Black-box General Assumption P1 P2 P1 P2
Specific Assumption General Assumption General Assumption f NP-reduction P1 P2 P1 P2 proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness

12 ? Black-box General Assumptions more no need of circuit, NP reduction
instantiate with several hardness assumptions no need of circuit, NP reduction primitives can be instantiated with hardware/oracles more General Assumption Black-box ?

13 Black-box protocols cut & choose Black-box General Assumption P1 P2 P1
Specific Assumption General Assumption General Assumption f NP-reduction proof? P1 P2 P1 P2 [Ishai-Kushilevitz-Lindell-Petrank06, IK Ostrovsky-Sahai07, IKOPS11 Haitner08, Pass-Wee09, Choi-Dachman-Soled-Malkin-Wee09] cut & choose proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness

14 Black-box protocols π1 π2 π3 π4 π5 Black-box General Assumption P1 P2
Specific Assumption General Assumption General Assumption f P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 π1 π2 π3 π4 π5 proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness check P1 proof correctness proof correctness

15 Black-box protocols π1 π2 π3 π4 π5 π5 Black-box General Assumption P1
Specific Assumption General Assumption General Assumption f P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 π1 π2 π3 π4 π5 π5 proof correctness proof correctness proof correctness check P1 proof correctness check P2 proof correctness recombine compute

16 General Assumption Yes 4 rounds? rounds Black-box General Assumption
cut & choose techniques Black-box General Assumption General Assumption Yes [Kil88, IPS08, IKLP11,IKOS07, PW09,CDMW09,..] minimal assumptions (feasibility of MPC) minimal rounds 4 rounds? rounds [Katz Ostrovsky 04] succinctness

17 4 rounds?? P1 P2 P1 P2 π1 π2 π3 π4 π5 Black-box General Assumption
recombine compute 4. 5. 1. Com P1 2. Com P2 3. Checks P1 P2 π1 π2 π3 π4 π5 check P1 check P2 recombine compute

18 General Assumption Yes Yes Black-box General Assumption cut & choose
techniques Black-box General Assumption General Assumption minimal assumptions (feasibility of MPC) Yes [IKLP11,IKOS07, PW09,CDMW09] CRYPTO 2015 Ostrovsky, Scafuro, Richelson minimal rounds Yes STOC 2014 Goyal, Ostrovsky, Scafuro, Visconti Succinctness

19 Goyal, Ostrovsky, Scafuro, Visconti
more ? Black-box General Assumption General Assumption WI Universal Arguments and public coin ZK from black-box Hash Function STOC 2014 Goyal, Ostrovsky, Scafuro, Visconti RO Information theoretically secure public coin ZK in NPRO

20 ? Black-box Open problem protocols Closing the gap
General Assumption Black-box ? Application of developed techniques Physical Zero-Knowledge PUFs Oracle Oracle

21 Practical UC-security
Other topics Practical UC-security CCS 2014 Canetti, Jain, Scafuro We introduce the Global Random Oracle Model Garbled RAM Analog of garbled circuits for RAM programs STOC 2015 Garg, Lu, Ostrovsky, Scafuro We show how to construct garbled RAM from OWFs UC security with PUFs/ stateless tokens [OSVW13, SD13] Concurrency/ [SV12] Simultaneous Resettability [COSV12] SOA-security [ORSV13]

22 thanks.

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