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IP Traceback Problem: How do we determine where malicious packet came from ? It’s a problem because attacker can spoof source IP address If we know where.

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Presentation on theme: "IP Traceback Problem: How do we determine where malicious packet came from ? It’s a problem because attacker can spoof source IP address If we know where."— Presentation transcript:

1 IP Traceback Problem: How do we determine where malicious packet came from ? It’s a problem because attacker can spoof source IP address If we know where packet comes from: May be able to determine attacker May be able to determine bot participating in a DDoS attack Another approach: get rid of spoofed packets with ingress filtering (see “Attack” slides) Introduction

2 Methods for finding source
Manual methods using current IP routing Link testing Logging Marking algorithms Routers mark packets Introduction

3 Link testing Victim recognizes attack signature
Common feature in all attack packets, eg, same source IP address Victim informs network operator Operator installs filter on upstream router Router “input debugging” feature determines responsible ingress link, leading to an upstream router Apply procedure again, until get to border of ISP Result: router at border filters out malicious traffic before reaching target Cons To go beyond an ISP, ISPs need to coordinate Considerable management overhead Introduction

4 Logging: Forensics Key routers log packets
Use data mining to find path Pros Post mortem – works after attack stops Cons High resource demand: need to store and process tons of data Introduction

5 Marking Algorithms Overview
mark packets with router addresses deterministically or probabilistically trace attack using marked packets strengths independent of ISP management little network overhead, traffic trace distributed attacks, attacks post-mortem drawback: need to get routers to mark IP packets Introduction

6 Marking: Assumptions Assumptions Most routers remain uncompromised
Attacker sends many packets Route from attacker to victim remains relatively stable A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R12 V Introduction

7 Marking Algorithms marking procedure path reconstruction procedure
by routers add information to packet path reconstruction procedure by victim use information in marked packets convergence time # of packets to reconstruct the attack path Introduction

8 Node Append original packet router list
append address of each router to the end of the packet complete, ordered list of routers in attack path Problem: Requires space in packet Path can be long No extra fields in current IP format: Changes to packet format are not practical original packet router list Introduction

9 Node Sampling (1) reserve a field in packet header for marking router writes its address in packet with prob p R1 R1 R2 R3 Introduction

10 Node Sampling (2) R1 R1 R2 R3 reserve node field in packet header
router writes its address in node field with probability p R1 R1 R2 R3 Introduction

11 Node Sampling (3) R3 R1 R2 R3 reserve node field in packet header
router writes its address in node field with probability p R3 R1 R2 R3 Introduction

12 Node Sampling (4) Router: additional write, checksum update
Victim receives many attack packets, many with marking Victim attempts to reconstruct path from unordered samples. Observe the router IPs in the marking field Probability that received packet has been marked by router d hops away: p(1-p)d-1 Rank each router IP by the number of marks it has received; router with most marks is likely the closest router Introduction

13 Node sampling (5) Problems
Large number of packets are needed to get markings from upstream routers Multiple attack sources Introduction

14 Edge Sampling store edges instead of router Arriving packet contains
start and end addresses distance from edge to victim Arriving packet contains Address of last marked edge Number of hops edge is from destination Choose edge for marking with prob p If chosen, set counter to 0 Otherwise, increment counter Introduction

15 Edge Sampling: picture
Packet received R1 receives packet from source or another router Packet contains space for start, end, distance packet s e d R1 R2 R3 Introduction

16 Edge Sampling: picture
Begin writing edge R1 chooses to write start of edge Sets distance to 0 packet R1 R1 R2 R3 Introduction

17 Edge Sampling Finish writing edge R2 chooses not to overwrite edge
Distance is 0 Write end of edge, increment distance to 1 packet R1 R2 1 R1 R2 R3 Introduction

18 Edge Sampling Increment distance R3 chooses not to overwrite edge
Increment distance to 2 packet R1 R2 2 R1 R2 R3 Introduction

19 Path reconstruction Extract identifiers from attack packets
Build graph rooted at victim Each (start,end,distance) tuple is an edge Traverse edges from root to find attack paths # packets needed to reconstruct path E(X) < where p is marking probability, d is length of path p = 1/d optimal ln(d) p(1-p)d-1 Introduction

20 Experimental convergence time
Introduction

21 Summary of marking Can determine attack path with a relatively small number of attack packets Need to include addresses, counter in IP datagram Suggestion: compress to 16 bits, include in fragmentation fields (see paper) See “Practical Network Support for IP Traceback” by Savage et al. Introduction


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