1. Learning from Croydon How are Operators Responding?
Safety & Standards Manager - Mark Ashmore

2. Initial Industry Response
Immediately following the tragic incident at Sandilands, UKTram convened a urgent meeting of all UK tram operators in turn establishing Subcommittee 1 (SC1) to coordinate the industry response and take charge of any necessary further investigation and actions.
The first task of the subcommittee was to review the actions taken by Transport for London (TfL) / First Tram Operations (FTOL) to reduce the risk of trams approaching the Sandilands junction at excessive speed.
Factors taken into consideration:
Primary response by TFL & FTOL.
Wider industry implications.
Lessons to be learnt.
Safety improvements to prevent reoccurrence.
Full review of all risk assessments of curvatures on infrastructure and reassessment of risk.

3. Response to Recommendations
To set up a new joint industry body to enable UK-wide cooperation on safety matters, develop tram standards and good practice, and provide authoritative, impartial advice.
UKTram is in the process of setting up a subsidiary company, to be called Light Rail Safety and Standards Board (LRSSB). In order to make immediate progress, it currently exists in shadow form, with a registered company name and a Shadow Board. It has developed a Business Plan setting out the functions of the LRSSB. Sources of funding are being explored, following which UKTram will proceed with electing a substantive Board and recruiting a Chief Executive Officer.
As part of its proposed ongoing current relationship with RSSB UKTram and the Mirror groups that UKTram is involved with is advising the BSI (the organisation responsible for standards) of a complete list of standards that should be supplied to the new standards board for review.

4. LRSSB Objectives
To close gaps in safety performance across the light rail industry.
To reduce operating and risk assessment cost by the application of an industry risk model.
To encourage the use of shared best practise and the learning process.
To support the training and development of Safety and Standards Professionals.
To provide a platform for benchmarking.
To work with UKTram and drive political support in a professional manner.
To improve the profile of light rail in the UK across EU and Worldwide partners.
To develop and maintain standards that will drive down the costs of future schemes, removing bespoke and over engineered design.
To work with custodians of light rail industry standards and the source of guidance that is specific to light rail (BSI, VdV, etc.) to develop UK standards.

5. Response to Recommendations
To review operational risks and control measures associated with the design, maintenance and operation of tramways, and (with ORR) publish updated guidance.
To include the different profiles of on street and segregated running, safety issues of driving at high speeds on line of sight, and safety learning from bus and train sectors.
In order to fulfil the requirements of Recommendation 2, UKTram has defined a programme to develop a Light Rail Risk Analysis Model which can be applied to all UK tramway systems and, where appropriate, to other light rail systems. UKTram has let a contract with consultants Atkins to facilitate both collective and individual operator risk models.
One of the first tasks of the newly established LRSSB will be to take this project forward.

6. Risk Model Deployment RISK MODEL TAIR SMS RM3
Safety management systems of operators and owners/ authorities.
Templated evidence based governance/SMS health-check system.
Incident, accident and near miss reporting.
Risk and precursor identification, prevention and mitigation.
RISK MODEL
TAIR
SMS
RM3

7. How it works ! Risk Model RM3 SMS Self Assessment Peer Review
LRSSB Support
Bench Marking
Shared Learning
Best Practice

8. Response to Recommendations
To review, develop and then install speed control measures.
To review, develop and then install driver vigilance devices.
UKTram (SC1) appointed Ian Rowe Associates Ltd (IRAL) to review and test currently available technical solutions which might be applicable to the tram-driving task in the fields of both driver inattention and speed control, specifically in relation to recommendations 3 & 4. A challenge to the market to provide a bespoke solution was set, potentially using a hybrid of current options or a completely new system.
Driver inattention and speed control systems could be used independently, but more uniquely there is the opportunity of combining more than one option, or using an existing piece of equipment with bespoke digital technology to provide a ground-breaking safeguard for all concerned.

9. Response to Recommendations
To review signage
Objective: to provide tramcar drivers operating on line of sight with signage and visual cues comparable to those of bus drivers, recognising that tram driving has similarities to driving a bus on public roads.
Immediately following the Sandilands accident, TfL/FTOL reviewed all bends and curves on the system, and introduced “count-down” speed restrictions and chevron signs on the approach to Sandilands junction and some other tight bends on the system. Other UK tramway operators also reviewed their systems and took similar action where appropriate.
UKTram is actively reviewing its relationship with DFT Road Signs department to ensure the industry is advised of any changes and innovations in standard highway signage.

10. Response to Recommendations
To review passenger containment in the event of an accident.
Objective: to reduce the likelihood of injury/death from passengers being ejected through tram doors or windows, but passengers must not be prevented from using doors in an emergency.
Industry review undertaken with vehicle manufacturers indicating that improved windows could be fitted, at extra cost and weight penalty in addition to affecting vehicle performance to a degree although this is fleet dependent.
Regarding doors, most UK tramway systems have more modern vehicles with doors of fully welded construction, which offers far more structural integrity that in turn aids containment. Only the earlier second generation Croydon trams and the Sheffield Siemens vehicles still have the older style doors.
It is considered that this recommendation should also be aimed at manufacturers and the relevant standards bodies, including LRSSB. The need for containment in the event of overturning needs to be balanced by the need for means of rapid escape in other eventualities, such as fire, collision or terrorist attack.

11. Response to Recommendations
To provide back-up emergency lighting that operates if the current emergency lighting fails.
Initial information received from vehicle manufacturers indicates that the provision of additional emergency back up lighting is feasible.
Details from operators regarding activities they have undertaken on their review of their vehicle lighting systems is currently being requested by UKTram.
In addition IRAL who are undertaking the work on Recommendations 3 and 4, will also be conducting research visits to all systems, to enable collation of information and form the basis of an industry ‘Best Practice’.

12. Response to Recommendations
To consider the provision of escape hatches in the roof or floors of tramcars
Following industry consultation in addition to liaison with our European colleagues, the response from both the industry and manufacturers to this proposal is overwhelmingly negative and deemed impractical.
It is considered that the introduction of escape hatches imports more risk than it is likely to mitigate due to exposing passengers to hazards from equipment on the roof or below the floor of vehicles in addition to compromising the strength of the vehicle body.

13. Response to Recommendations
Recommendations 9 and 10:
Recommendation 9 (addressed to ORR): ORR to do more safety assessment.
Recommendation 10 (addressed to): To review TfL/FTOL risk assessment procedures.
These Recommendations relate to safety and risk assessments and are addressed to ORR, TfL and FTOL. UKTram considerers that the need for risk analysis in the industry as a whole is addressed under Recommendation 2.

14. Response to Recommendations
Recommendation 11: (mainly addressed to TfL and FTOL)
To review management of staff fatigue.
Although RAIB found no evidence that shift patterns contributed to the accident, operators clearly have an obligation to ensure that drivers and safety-critical staff are not fatigued.
Through its industry questionnaire, UKTram has undertaken a review of common best practice in fatigue management throughout the industry. In turn identifying existing fatigue management systems already in place and their levels of effectiveness.
Additionally UKTram is also reviewing technical aids to fatigue management, which is currently ongoing. Upon completion the results of this work will be shared throughout the industry.

15. Response to Recommendations
Recommendations 12 and 13: (addressed to TfL and FTOL)
To review TfL/FTOL procedures for dealing with safety concerns arising from staff, passenger or public reports.
This Recommendation was mainly addressed to TfL and FTOL with Liaison with other operators facilitated through Light Rail Operators Committee (LROC), Light Rail Engineers Group (LREG) and Heads of Safety Group (HoSG).
At present this work is currently ongoing.

16. Response to Recommendations
Recommendation 14: (mainly addressed to TfL and FTOL)
To consider in-cab CCTV and ensure that all CCTV on tramcars is operational and recording at all times.
This Recommendation arises from the RAIB findings that CCTV on the tram involved in the Sandilands accident was not functioning correctly.
UKTram has undertaken a review of CCTV usage throughout the industry via industry questionnaire. At present several operators are installing CCTV equipment to record data for use in the event of an accident.
Additionally it has been ascertained that number of modern tram fleets utilise CCTV as a direct replacement for rear view mirrors, with Operators withdrawing tramcars from service if CCTV is not working. Some older style systems are not easily downloadable or potentially create other recording issues.
At present this issue is being reviewed.

17. Response to Recommendations
Recommendation 15: (addressed to TfL and FTOL)
To review and revise maintenance and testing documentation and ensure it is kept up-to- date
This Recommendation was mainly addressed to TfL and FTOL. At present it is an on-going topic for Light Rail Operators Committee (LROC), Light Rail Engineers Group (LREG) and Heads of Safety Group (HoSG).
UKTram are currently considering introducing a process of self review and audit within Operators systems, this would additionally feed into the RM3 and Risk Model work streams.

18. Summary A professional safety and standards body.
Improved compliance, general and operational safety by ensuring a common, professional approach.
Greater availability and accuracy of industry risk levels, safety data and analytics.
Stronger representation for UK systems at home and abroad.
More resilient approach for operators/owners/authorities.
Improved Governance.
Reduced cost of operation and development.
The development of UK, light rail specific, industry standards.
In summary the collective output of all activities will produce the following:

19. End of Presentation