1. Security capabilities for Light Communications
May 2015
doc.: IEEE /0496r1
November 2017
Security capabilities for Light Communications
Date:
Author:
Name
Company
Address
Phone
Eric Yin
University of Edinburgh
U.K
Prof. Harald Haas
Nikola Serafimovski
pureLiFi Ltd.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)
Edward Au (Marvell Semiconductor)

2. Abstract This presentation discussed the security benefits of LC.
November 2017
Abstract
This presentation discussed the security benefits of LC.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

3. Jamming an entire LC Network?
November 2017
Jamming an entire LC Network?
Jamming a LC AP typically requires the eavesdropper to use a directional beam.
Due to the dense deployment of APs in a LC network, users are likely to roam between different AP frequently.
It is almost impossible for an eavesdropper to point to the ‘right’ AP.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

4. Where can eavesdroppers be?
November 2017
Where can eavesdroppers be?
Wi-Fi: the location of the eavesdropper can be arbitrary
LC: eavesdroppers have to be within the coverage are of the AP (more difficult!)
legitimate user
Wi-Fi eavesdropper
LC eavesdropper
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

5. What is the Secrecy Capacity/Rate?
November 2017
What is the Secrecy Capacity/Rate?
source
legitimate user
eavesdropper
link 1
link 2
S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian Wire-Tap Channel,” in IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 24, no. 4, pp , July 1978.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

6. LC PHY-Security November 2017 Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)
LOS
NLOS
source
legitimate user
eavesdropper
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

7. November 2017
LC PHY-Security
source
legitimate user
eavesdropper
This means if the eavesdropper has twice the link distance than the legitimate user, at least 4 bit/s/Hz secrecy rate can be achieved.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

8. November 2017
LC PHY-Security
Existing power lines offer the possibility for LED cooperation (e.g., MISO, MIMO)
Secrecy performance can be further enhanced through precoding techniques.
source
legitimate user
eavesdropper
A. Mostafa and L. Lampe, “Physical-layer security for MISO visible light communication channels,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 9, pp ,
Sept
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

9. LC PHY-Security November 2017 Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)
source
legitimate user
eavesdropper
Simulation parameters:
transmit power 1 W; Lambertian order 1;
L = 2.15 m; PD area 1 cm^2;
PD responsivity 0.4 A/W.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)

10. Angle Diversity Transmitter
November 2017
Angle Diversity Transmitter
Optical beamforming
Narrower beam -> more secure, also higher rate because of less interference
Z. Chen and H. Haas, “Physical-layer security for optical attocell networks,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, Paris, 2017, pp. 1-6.
Eric Yin (University of Edinburgh)