1. IEEE 802.21 MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER
DCN:
Title: MIIS and Its Higher Layer Transport Requirements
Date Submitted: February 23, 2006
Authors or Source(s): IS Team
Abstract: This document describes brief summary of IETF draft on MIIS and Its Higher Layer Transport requirements

2. IEEE 802.21 presentation release statements
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3. Outline of the Draft Introduction Information Service Reference Model
Scenarios for IS Transport over IP
Information Service Reference Model and Interfaces
3.1 Transport Layer Issues
3.2 Information Service Discovery Issues
3.3 Reliability Issues
3.4 Congestion Control Issues
3.5 Security Issues
Requirements for Transport over IP
Security Considerations

4. Information Service (IS) Reference Model (Section 2)
IS-Server
IS-Client
R1/R3
Single hop Model
IS-Proxy
IS-Server
IS-Client
R4/R5
R1/R3
Multi hop Model

5. Use-Cases (Section 3) Case 1: IS-Server on the Access Point
Case 2: IS-Server on the Access Router
Case 3: IS-Server on the Core Network (Home)
Case 4: IS-Server on the Core Network (Visited)

6. Case 1: IS-Server on Access Point
IS-Client
Access Point
Access Router
Host
Core Network
Access Router

7. Case 2: IS-Server on Access Router
IS-Client
Access Point
Access Router
Host
IS-Server
Core Network
Access Router

8. Case 3: IS-Server on Core Network (Home)
IS-Client
IS-Server
Access Point
Access Router
Host
Core Network (Home)
Access Point
Access Router
Visited Network (Core)

9. Case 4: IS-Server on Core Network (Visited)
IS-Client
Access Point
Access Router
Host
Core Network (Home)
IS-Server
Access Router
Access Point
Core Network (Visited)

10. Requirements for Transport Over IP (Section 4)
The IS transport MUST work both for IPv4 and IPv6 networks
The choice of transport mechanism should work with both IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
The IS protocol requires that security MUST be provided at the transport layer
The MIIS message exchanges are critical to handover decision process. Therefore it has to be trusted. However, IS protocol framework does not add security at every message level. Thus it relies upon the underlying security. In such cases, the transport mechanism MUST support the necessary security.
The IS transport MUST provide peer authentication
The IS transport MUST provide message authentication and may provide confidentiality
The IS transport MUST provide replay protection

11. Requirements for Transport Over IP (Section 4)
The IS transport MUST support the NAT traversal
The transport protocol should allow the communication between MIHFs if they are behind the NAT box.
The IS transport MUST support the firewall traversal
The transport protocol should allow the communication between MIHFs if they are behind the firewall.
Changes to the header fields, IEs and structure messages should not affect the security mechanisms defined for underlying transmission.
MIIS defines the IE and MIH protocol formats that are processed by only MIHF peer entities. Any changes to these formats and fields MUST not require modifying the underlying security mechanisms in future.