1. Institutionalising power for land conservation on agro-plantations in Ghana and Kenya 
A UP-TUFS Seminar 13‐14 September University of Pretoria, South Africa   Peter Narh

2. Presentation outline Introduction The concept of power Methods
Situational context in Dormaa and Mumias
Farmer strategies in Dormaa and Mumias
Institutionalising power - linking strategies to property rights system
Conclusions

3. Introduction
Communities and corporates are in a relationship characterized by power differences and dependencies
Farmers adopt strategies to confront this power differences to save their livelihoods
This paper sought to analyse legitimacy for farmers’ political power as means to sustain lands and livelihoods.

4. The concept of power
Power is authority to act for self and/or to influence action of others
Power is conscious rights and structural mechanism that shape decisions affecting a collective (Partzsch 2017)
Power as dominion (power over) is dominant discourse but is only one dimension
Power is integrative with rights (power to) (Shokri 2017)
Power is enabling when it is collective (power with) (Arendt 1970).

5. The concept of power
This work focuses on power as enabler (power with and power to)
Power with and power to are essential for the transition to sustainability (Partzsch 2017)
But power discussions fail to integrate scaler insights - power exists at different scales which can have different implications for legitimacy.

6. Methods Study designed as cross-sectional and case study
Study is normative exploration of political power legitimacies for livelihood and land conservation
Qualitative field work in Dormaa in Ghana (2014, 2016, 2017)
Qualitative field work in Mumias in Kenya (2014, 2017, 2018)
Data analysed through Atlas.ti software.

7. Map of Dormaa, Ghana
Source: Cergis, UG, Legon

8. Teak plantation in Dormaa

9. # # ##
Map of Mumias, Kenya
Source: Netondo et al. (2010)

10. Sugarcane production in Mumias

11. Dormaa contexts Property rights
In Dormaa property rights over land are structured hierarchically
allodial (chief or family)
usufructuary
leasehold
tenancy.

12. Dormaa contexts Community – corporate relations
Teak farmers on customary lands develop teak plantations and sell to private firms but no guaranteed markets
Farmer – firm relation is individual based; not collective
Private firms exhibit power over farmers through product pricing and harvesting
Productivity of land is delayed and getting poorer as farmers and firms invest little in conservation.

13. Mumias contexts Property rights
In Mumias property rights over land are structured hierarchically but less pronounced than in Dormaa
allodial (families)
usufructuary
leasehold
tenancy.

14. Mumias contexts Community – corporate relations
Sugarcane farmers on customary land develop cane plantations and sell to Mumias sugar and private firms
Farmer – firm relation is individual based; not collective
Both state and private firms exhibit power over farmers through product pricing and production control
Productivity of land is delayed and getting poorer as farmers and firms invest little in conservation.

15. Land degraded in Dormaa
Land and river degradation in Mumias

16. Farmer strategies in Dormaa and Mumias
Dormaa teak farmers Cut down teak trees to plant cocoa or food crops Sell off young farms then neglect farms Mumias sugarcane farmers Refuse to sell to Mumias sugar Permit poaching from other firms if they offer better rewards (breach contract with Mumias sugar) Farmers act to save livelihoods and land productivity.

17. Meaning of farmers’ strategies
Power is manifest in agency of farmers to challenge existing structure of poor rewards from sugarcane and teak production (Partzsch 2017)
Dormaa and Mumias farmers exhibit power to challenge control of firms through usufructuary rights over land
But corporates contest the legitimacy of farmers’ power
As individuals, farmers’ power to is limited and contested
As collective, power with can legitimize farmers’ strategies to save livelihoods and lands
Lack of collective power (power with) does not mean farmers do not have strong interest in mobilizing (Dowding 2017).

18. Institutionalising farmers’ political power
Farmers’ actions can be legitmised with a higher scale institution like the communal property rights system than individual agency
Potential to mobilize and institutionalize power with is high since:
most farmers face similar livelihood and land degradation challenges
customary communal institutions already exist as property rights systems to form basis of power.

19. Conclusion
Institutionalising to legitimize power with can promote equity in responsibility to and benefit from environmental conservation in communities
Since farmers only seek to save livelihood and land, institutionalizing to legitmise political power for farmers can be win-win for farmers and corporates
Further research
Power with for community-corporate collective investments in conservation and sustainability of environmental resources.

20. References
Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Dowding, K. (2017). Social and political power. DOI: /acrefore/ Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Politics; USA, Oxford University Press.
Partzsch, L. (2017). ‘Power with’ and ‘power to’ in environmental politics and the transition to sustainability, Environmental Politics, 26:2, , DOI: /
Shokri M (2017). What is political power? (Theory of political consciousness and integrated concept of power). Arts Social Science Journal 8: doi: /

21. Thank you!