1. BALANCED FIRE PROTECTION:
ARE SMOKE/HEAT (ROOF) VENTS NECESSARY FOR OCCUPANT AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY IN ONE-STORY INDUSTRIAL AND STORAGE BUILDINGS PROTECTED BY STANDARD SPRAY SPRINKLERS?
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2. IBC/IFC REQUIREMENTS FOR ROOF VENTS
Single story industrial and storage buildings with undivided floor areas > 50,000 SF.
High-piled storage areas > 12,000 SF in single-story buildings protected by a sprinkler system.
High-piled storage areas > 2,500 SF in single-story buildings not protected by a sprinkler system.
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3. ROOF VENT/DRAFT CURTAIN THEORY
Automatic roof vents are heat-activated devices.
Each vent is individually activated by either a fusible link or shrinks and falls out when exposed to heat from a fire.
In theory, roof vents automatically open to allow heat and smoke to be vented from the building.
Draft curtains are provided to prevent the spread of heat and smoke across the ceiling allowing a deeper layer of heat and smoke to develop within the curtained area.
Roof vents and draft curtains are a “team”. (The effectiveness of venting is adversely affected if draft curtains are not provided.)
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4. ROOF VENT THEORY
The rate of smoke/heat venting provided by roof vents is determined by:
The number of vents which open and
The size of the vents which open and
The depth of the heat/smoke layer which forms under the ceiling and
The temperature of the heat/smoke layer.
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5. TYPES OF SPRINKLERS Control Mode Sprinklers:
Standard Spray Sprinklers
Suppression Mode Sprinklers:
Early Suppression Fast Response (ESFR) Sprinklers
Note: The IBC/IFC does not require roof vents or draft curtains in portions of buildings pro-tected by ESFR sprinklers.
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6. PREVIOUS IBC/IFC CODE CHANGE PROPOSALS-ROOF VENTS
Code Change F79-00
Code Change F164-04/05
Code Change F124-06/07
Code Change Proponent (All Three Changes): Richard Schulte, Schulte & Associates
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7. PURPOSE OF 2007/2008 CODE CHANGE PROPOSALS
Incorporate the results of roof vent/sprinkler interaction testing conducted at Underwriters Laboratories (UL) in 1997/1998 into the code.
Reflect changes in firefighting tactics recom- mended by NIOSH and the FEMA Firefighter Life Safety Summit.
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8. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1979 Edition of the UFC required a manually activated mechanical smoke removal system in sprinklered buildings containing high-piled storage.
The UFC (1979 edition) prohibited the installation of automatic roof vents in sprinklered buildings con-taining high-piled storage.
In the early 1980's, the UFC ad hoc committee on Article 81 (high-piled storage) recommended that automatic roof vents and draft curtains be required in sprinklered buildings.
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9. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In 1994, testing conducted by Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC) determined that draft curtains may have an adverse effect on the operation of sprinkler sys-tems.
In 1997/1998, testing at UL sponsored by the National Fire Protection Research Foundation (NFPRF) confirmed FMRC’s conclusion that draft curtains may have an adverse effect on the operation of sprinkler systems.
The NFPRF tests also determined that automatic roof vents are unlikely to operate in buildings protected by standard spray sprinklers.
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10. NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
“It had become clear by this time in the project that the vents were unlikely to open when the fire was ignited more than about 4.6 m (15 ft) away.” (Page 54, NISTIR )
“ it appears from the data below that the sprinkler spray influenced the thermal response characteristics of this particular vent, and it is believed that sprinklers could have a similar in-fluence on similar vent designs.” (Page 64, NISTIR )
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11. NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
“Six other tests were performed with the fire at this distance from the vent when the vent was e-quipped with a fusible link, and in none of these tests did the vent open Examination of the near-ceiling temperatures from all the tests indi-cates that sprinklers of this type [standard spray sprinklers] have a significant cooling effect, and this will certainly have an effect on thermally-responsive, independently-controlled vents.”
(Page 64, NISTIR )
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12. NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
“In Plastic Test P-2, the fire was ignited di-rectly under a vent. In the experiment, flames reached the top of the central array at about 65 s and the vent cavity at about 70 s. The first sprinkler activated at 100 s. The vent did not open at any time during the 30 min test even though another vent 6 m (20 ft) to the west of the unopened vent opened at 6:04.” (Page 64, NISTIR )
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13. NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
“This data, along with the plunge tunnel mea-surements reported in Section 3.1.4, suggests that the fusible link reached its activation tem-perature before or at about the same time as the first sprinkler activated, but the link did not fuse. It is not clear whether the link did not fuse be-cause it was cooled directly by water drawn up-wards into the vent cavity, or whether the sprinkler spray simply cooled the rising smoke plume enough to prevent the link from fusing. In any event, this phenomenon deserves further study.” (Page 64, NISTIR )
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14. NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
“The mass flow rates [through the vents] for Test I-10 and P-5 are relatively low compared with the theoretical maximum because the near-ceiling gas temperatures are greatly re-duced by the [standard spray] sprinklers.” (Page 100, NISTIR )
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15. NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
“The significant cooling effect of sprinkler sprays on the near-ceiling gas flow often prevented the automatic operation of vents. This conclusion is based on thermocouple measurements within the vent cavity, the presence of drips of solder on the fusible links recovered from unopened vents, and several tests where vents remote from the fire and the sprinkler spray activated. In one cartoned plastic commodity experiment, a vent did not open when the fire was ignited directly beneath it.” (Page 101, NISTIR )
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16. DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
“The experimental studies have shown that cur-rent design practices are likely to limit the number of vents operated to one and vents may in fact not op-erate at all in very successful sprinkler operations.” (Page 1, “Interaction of Sprinklers with Smoke and Heat Vents, February, 1999”)
“Eliminates Need for Manual Venting? No” (Page 42, “Sprinkler/Vent Interactions-What people think, what we know, and what we don’t.”)
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17. DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
“Not only is the fear of early operation not founded, current design practice will likely lead to 0-1 vents operating” (Page 61, “Sprinkler/ Vent Interactions-What people think, what we know, and what we don’t.”)
“Revised design methods for early operation of vents are needed” (Page 61, “Sprinkler/Vent Interactions-What people think, what we know, and what we don’t.”)
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18. DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
“In tests where the vents were opened by fusible link a number of the vents failed to open, attributed to either the cooling effects of the sprinklers on the smoke layer or direct spray cooling of the fusible links.” (NFPA Log #21, NFPA 204, 2007 edition)
“The effect of sprinkler cooling may limit the number of vents opening if control is only by fusible link or if drop out panels are used. If the fusible link or drop out panel oper-ating temperature is equal to or higher than the sprinkler bulb operating temperature then vents outside the outer ring of operating sprinklers are unlikely to open. This could significantly limit the effectiveness of the smoke vent sys-tem.” (NFPA Log #21, NFPA 204, 2007 edition)
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19. DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
Q. “The effectiveness of the system depends to some extent on the depth of the draft curtain, the size of the compartment that is created by the draft curtain?”
A. “Well, the two things that are important are the depth of the draft curtains and the number of smoke and heat vents that will operate within the curtained area.” (Beyler deposition, Ian David McAuslin, et. al. v. Grinnell Corporation, et. al. [McFrugal’s Warehouse Fire-1996], 1999)
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20. DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
Q. “But the effectiveness of smoke and heat vents in conjunction with draft curtains depends upon the sprinkler system at some point con-trolling the fire.[?]”
A. “It depend[s] on the fire being controlled By manual and/or automated methods.” (Beyler deposition, Ian David McAuslin, et. al. v. Grinnell Corporation, et. al. [McFrugal’s Warehouse Fire-1996] , 1999)
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21. TEMPE, ARIZONA FIRE MARCH 19,1998
100,000 SF building; foot ceiling height
Sprinkler design: 29 high temperature (286F) large orifice standard spray sprinklers assumed to operate
66 sprinklers actually operated
29 roof vents (4 x 8 feet) provided; 165F fusible links
Only 3 roof vents and one skylight open
Building filled with smoke from floor to roof at the time the fire department arrives
Zero visibility at the floor at the time fire department arrives
(NFPA Fire Investigation Report)
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22. NIOSH
“Fire fighters should be discouraged from risking their lives solely for property protec-tion activities.” (Page 7)
“Lives will continue to be lost unless fire de-partments make appropriate fundamental changes in fire-fighting tactics involving truss-es.” (Page 8)
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23. NIOSH
“NIOSH recommends that fire departments, fire fighters, building owners, and managers take steps to minimize the risk of injury and death to fire fighters during fire fighting operations involving structures with truss floor and roof systems ” (Page 8)
“Use defensive strategies whenever trusses have been exposed to fire or structural integrity cannot be veri-fied. Unless life-saving operations are under way, evacuate fire fighters and use an exterior attack.” (Page 9)
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24. NIOSH
“Ensure that firefighters performing firefight-ing operations under or above trusses are e-vacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire (not according to a time limit).” (Page 9)
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25. FEMA FIREFIGHTER LIFE SAFETY SUMMIT
“The willingness of firefighters to risk their own lives to save others must never be used as an excuse to take unnecessary risks. Firefighters are highly respected for being willing to risk their own lives to save others, but that cannot justify taking unnecessary risks in situa-tions where there is no one to save and nothing to be gained. In too many cases firefighters lose their lives while trying to save property that is already lost or to rescue victims who are already dead. While these efforts are valiant, they are also futile.” (FEMA Fire-fighter Life Safety Summit, April 14, 2004)
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26. FIRE DEPARTMENT CAPABILITIES
“Sufficient resources required to provide safe manual fire suppression activities are not cur-rently available in most municipalities de-fended by full time firefighting personnel.” (Code Change Proposal RB4-06/07, Joseph Finnegan, representing the Firemen’s Associa-tion of the State of New York)
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27. FIRE DEPARTMENT CAPABILITIES
“In ideal circumstances, the best trained and equipped fire departments arrive at fires ap-proximately seven minutes after ignition of the fire. Most departments do not operate under ideal conditions.” (Code Change Pro-posal G99-06/07, National Association of State Fire Marshals)
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28. SPRINKLER SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
“Sprinkler protection installed as required in this standard is expected to protect the building occu-pancy without supplemental fire department ac-tivity.” (NFPA 13)
“During the [rack storage] testing program, the installed automatic extinguishing system was ca-pable of controlling the fire and reducing all temperatures to ambient within 30 minutes of ignition.” (NFPA 13)
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29. SUMMARY
Standard spray sprinklers are capable of con-trolling and extinguishing a fire within 30 min-utes without supplemental fire department activity. (NFPA 13)
Automatic roof vents will likely not operate in buildings protected by standard spray sprink-lers. (NISTIR ; Dr. Craig Beyler; NFPA 204)
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30. SUMMARY
Interior manual firefighting is not recommended in buildings with non-rated roof construction if the sprinkler system fails to control the fire. (NIOSH ; Firefighter Life Safety Summit)
Most paid fire departments in the US do not have adequate resources to safely fight building fires in large buildings in the event that the sprinkler system fails to control the fire. (Code Change Proposal RB4-06/07)
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31. CONCLUSIONS
Firefighters should not go on the roof to manually open roof vents which do not open automatically until the fire is extinguished by operation of the sprinkler system.
Providing automatic roof vents in buildings pro-tected by standard spray sprinklers provides no additional protection for a building (because the roof vents will not automatically operate if the sprinkler system successfully controls the fire).
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32. CONCLUSIONS
Providing automatic roof vents in buildings protected by standard spray sprinklers will not assist manual firefighting (because the roof vents will not automatically operate if the sprinkler system successfully controls the fire).
Since most paid fire departments in the U.S. lack sufficient resources to safely conduct interior manual firefighting oper-ations, providing automatic (or manually operated) roof vents will not assist interior manual firefighting operations in the event of sprinkler system failure.
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33. CODE CHANGE F124-06/07 DISAPPROVAL REASON
“There was no definitive information pre-sented that smoke and heat vents do not con-tribute to fire control.” (NISTIR ; Dr. Craig Beyler; NFPA 204)
“In cases where the sprinkler system does not suppress the fire but, rather, controls it, smoke continues to be generated.” (NFPA 13; NISTIR ; Dr. Craig Beyler; NFPA 204)
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34. CODE CHANGE F124-06/07 DISAPPROVAL REASON
“The discussions have focused on everything but the safety of the occupants, including firefighters.” (NIOSH ; Firefighter Life Safety Summit)
“Smoke and heat vents provide the fire department with an important tool to remove the smoke for occupant safety and enhanced fire attack access, especially in very large area buildings where access from the exterior is limited at best.” (NIOSH ; Firefighter Life Safety Summit)
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35. CODE CHANGE F124-06/07 DISAPPROVAL REASON
“Firefighter safety is also improved by providing a faster, safer method of fire ventilation than cutting one or more holes in the roof.” (NIOSH ; Firefighter Life Safety Summit; NFPA 13)
“The current text presents a balanced approach between firefighter safety and building safety.” (NFPA 13; NIOSH ; Firefighter Life Safe-ty Summit)
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36. CODE CHANGE PROPOSAL
Five alternative methods of providing smoke removal for sprinklered buildings proposed:
Automatic smoke/heat vents
Manual smoke/heat vents
Manually activated mechanical smoke removal system
Manually openable louvers in exterior wall
Manually openable exterior doors and windows
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37. CODE CHANGE PROPOSAL
Purpose of the smoke removal methods listed on the previous slide is to provide a means of providing ventilation for the building after the fire has been controlled and extinguished by the sprinkler system.
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38. TRAVEL DISTANCE INCREASE FOR VENTS
Travel distance permitted to be increased from 250 feet to 400 feet when automatic roof vents are provided in an industrial or storage building protected by a sprinkler system.
NFPRF tests demonstrated that automatic roof vents will likely not operate in a sprinklered build-ing. Hence, the automatic roof vents do not pro-vide any additional protection for building occu-pants.
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39. TRAVEL DISTANCE INCREASE FOR VENTS
Code change proposes to delete the provi-sions which permits the increase in travel dis-tance when sprinkler protection and auto-matic roof vents are provided.
Code change proposes to allow a travel dis-tance of 400 feet in single-story industrial and storage buildings (without roof vents) pro-tected by a sprinkler system.
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40. RESUME RICHARD C. SCHULTE
Bachelor of Science Degree, Fire Protection Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT), 1976.
Registered professional engineer in fire protection engineering, State of California, May (Registration no longer maintained.)
Fire protection engineer, San Jose Fire Department,
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41. RESUME RICHARD C. SCHULTE
Member of UFC Ad Hoc Committee on Article 81 (high-piled storage) representing the Northern California Fire Prevention Officers,
ENR Top 25 Newsmakers of 2004 award (World Trade Center towers collapse).
AISC Special Achievement Award, 2006 (World Trade Center towers collapse).
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42. © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Richard C. Schulte Fire Code Consultant After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that destroyed New York City’s World Trade Center and killed 2,700 occupants, the building design and construction community was besieged by criticism that the buildings themselves were at fault. While aware that totally de-fensible buildings are an impossible dream, industry professionals feared responding because some critics are family members of 9/11 victims. Fire code consultant Richard C. Schulte used his profession-al training, experience and logic to advocate that the public was being misled into believing that tall buildings could, and should, be made terrorist-proof. His words have resonated with the industry, and Schulte, who runs a one-man operation near Chicago, has come to symbolize the frustration and concern of professionals coming to terms with the attack’s impact on future building design and construction
© 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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