1. The threat posed by drones to Europe’s armed forces
Technical Analysis, Regional and Global Implications
Tal Inbar
Head, Space Research Center
The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies, Israel
Brussels, November 20, 2018
FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

2. Disclaimer
This presentation is based exclusively on unclassified open source information
The views presented represent the author and do NOT necessarily represent an official Israeli governmental position;

3. The threat – and some countermeasures needed
The threat of drones and UAV should be understood by the forces on the ground, and lead to changes in the situational awareness and the concept of operations.
To cope with drone and UAV threats, we should switch from “national” (or theater) aerial defense to bringing the countermeasures to the units at the TACTICAL and OPERATIONAL levels. (In a way, back to classic AA capabilities).

4. The threat – and some countermeasures needed
We have to distinct between the threats in peacetime and war.
During peacetime we could work with drone (and UAV) manufacturers – in terms of regulations, technical means to make the vehicles inoperative at specific areas etc., creating UTM database – to name few options.
We should understand the threat and its various tiers – and to tailor a suitable technological solution for each tier.
Counter Drone and UAV capabilities needs unorthodox thinking. One possible solution is to create a dedicated Air-to-Air UAV for the purpose of keeping the sky clean of hostile UAVs and drones.

5. Seized ISIS munitions for quadcopters, Syria (October 2017)
3D printed tail and body
Fragmentations

6. Tail – from badminton ball
From improvisation…..
Tail – from badminton ball
Plastic tube
40 mm grenade

7. Fuse taken from mortar bombs
To serial production
Fuse taken from mortar bombs
Standardization – unified body and tail. Some are 3d printed, some molded

8. Tube for holding bomblet
ISIS operated armed quadcopter
Tube for holding bomblet
Camera

9. ISIS operated armed quadcopter

10. ISIS operated armed quadcopter
Tank
Military vehicle
Bomblet

11. Explosion od the bomblet and a destruction of military vehicle
ISIS operated armed quadcopter
Explosion od the bomblet and a destruction of military vehicle

12. insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018

13. Fuse taken from mortar bomb
insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018
Fuse taken from mortar bomb

14. Fuse (taken from mortar shell) Improvised munition for UAV
insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018
Fuse (taken from mortar shell)
Improvised munition for UAV
3D printed tail and body
Fragmentation
Remains of fuse

15. insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018

16. insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018
Damaged Russian Su-24

17. Armed Quadcopter, Syria
RPG warhead

18. ISIS made armed drone, Iraq
ATGM

19. Original Houthi infographics
The Houthi UAV force
Original Houthi infographics

20. “Qasef” UAV – Iranian Ababil

21. “Qasef” UAV – Iranian Ababil

22. Original Iranian Ababil 2

23. October 2016 display in Tehran
Iran’s advanced UAV
More than 20 types of UAVs could ne identified in Iranian use.
Iran officially admits it copied US and Israeli vehicles that fell in Iran.
October 2016 display in Tehran
Original US MQ-1
Original US RQ 170

24. Iran’s advanced UAV
Note the defying banner – “from US and Israel to Iran”
Original US MQ-1 “Predator” displayed by Iran on October 1, 2016

25. Iran’s advanced UAV
Shahed 109, an Iranian “clone” if Israel’s Hermes 450, operated in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
~24 hours endurance

26. Iran’s advanced UAV
“Stealth” , Armed Iranian UAV, operated from Syria against Israel. One vehicle was shot down over Israel on 2017.

27. This UAV was put in to action on 2018 over targets in Iraq
Iran’s advanced UAV
This UAV was put in to action on 2018 over targets in Iraq

28. Conclusions and Future prospects
The threat is real.
The wide availability and low cost of UAS platforms make them an attractive purchase for terrorists or criminals adding aerial capability to illicit activities.
In their unmodified state, UAS platforms can create a public nuisance, interfere with aircraft or airspace operations, collect information that can be utilized for illicit purposes, and be employed as a kinetic weapons.

29. Conclusions and Future prospects
Moreover, the use of unmanned systems adds a new layer of complication in the investigative process, as automation and increased standoff distances provide perpetrators a shield of anonymity. In the event of a plot failure, this anonymity reduces the risk of capture, leaving terrorists or criminals "free to strike another day.".

30. Counter drones strategies
Identification
Prevention
Mitigation

31. Counter-swarm capabilities: still an unanswered challenge

32. New threat: cheap drones with greater lethality
ATGM
Bombs
A/G missile
40 mm grenade launcher
A/G rockets

33. Are we ready for the challenges?

34. talinbar@fisherinstitute.org.il Tal Inbar @inbarspace
Thank you for your attention!
Tal Inbar
@inbarspace