1. Opportunities and Limitations for the INF Treaty
Abigail Stowe-Thurston
Program Assistant for Nuclear Disarmament and Pentagon Spending
Friends Committee on National Legislation

2. What is the value of a treaty if one party is in violation?

3. Russia’s Noncompliance
US first suspected noncompliance in 2008
Two violations
RS-26—IRBM, Russia has tested to ranges below 5,500 km
SSC-8—GLCM, NYT reported on deployment in Feb. 2017
SSC-8 Cruise Missile. Popular Mechanics. 2017

4. Obama administration’s response
Muted, measured, and out of the public eye
Accumulated information over time
Managed through interactions with high level Russian officials
Called meeting of the Special Verification Commission (2016)

5. Cotton amendment to the NDAA
Establishes program of record for DOD to develop Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GCLMs)
Authorizes $65 million
INF Treaty doesn’t prohibit research and development, but testing would violate the treaty

6. The Logic: Dual Track Decision 2.0
Develop new capabilities to pressure Russia into compliance
Credits US Pershing deployments for encouraging Soviet leadership to negotiate INF Treaty

7. Turning points in INF negotiation were diplomatic
Negotiations stalled for years after 1979 Dual Track Decision
1986-Gorbachev agrees to unlink negotiations on French and British forces from INF negotiations
Scaled reductions—gradually remove INF from Europe, allow deployments in Asia in the meantime, ultimately agreed to double zero option
NDAA provision lacks sustained diplomatic strategy

8. A “win” for Russia is political
Challenge NATO unity
Raise the stakes for US to aid allies
US GLCM could exacerbate tensions among NATO allies

9. “tough on Russia” policy only fans flames
Russia exploits threats (real or perceived) for political gain
US/Western policies that may be perceived as threatening to Russia will be used to further justify Russian behavior
Therefore, unlikely to change Russian behavior
Example: Russian adventurism as a response to NATO expansion

10. The treaty is still relevant
If the treaty cannot be preserved, politically valuable from US perspective for Russia to be the spoiler
US compliance is political leverage
Diplomacy is a necessity, not a reward
Impulse to “do something” risks engineering policy in a strategic void

11. Policy Recommendations
Ally-centric, treaty-compliant military response
US is already equipped to manage threat posed by Russian INF systems
Messaging campaign
Discuss details of Russian INF violations with NATO allies and their publics
Multi-lateralize the problem and raise political and diplomatic costs to Moscow
Continue diplomatic engagement with Russia on this issue and broader arms control objectives

12. A “win” for Russia will be political rather than strategic
Takeaways
Logic of the Cotton Amendment is based in flawed understanding of INF Treaty negotiation
A “win” for Russia will be political rather than strategic
An effective US response to violation will be political rather than military
The value of a treaty extends beyond its normative functions