1. Boethius on the Problem of Freedom & Determinism
Boethius ( AD; Roman Official)
Fluent in both Latin and Greek
Familiar with works of both Plato & Aristotle
Translated some of Aristotle’s logical works into Latin
Thereby transmits Aristotle’s logical works to early medieval western Europe
Aristotle’s other works remain unknown in western Europe until 1100+

2. Appointed to the office of Consul by the Roman Emperor Theodoric
Christian, opposed to Arian heresy, which denied the full divinity of Christ and which was espoused by Theodoric
Accused of treason, imprisoned & executed
While imprisoned composed The Consolation of Philosophy, which includes an analysis of the problem of freedom and determinism

3. Freedom & Determinism
Is Human Freedom Compatible with God’s omniscience?
If God already knows with complete certainty whatever you will ever do, how could your future be up to you to determine?
How could you be genuinely free in planning your life and enacting your plans if God already knows what you will plan and what you will do?

4. The Incompatibilist Argument
An Incompatibilist argues as follows that God’s omniscience is incompatible with human freedom:
God foreknows everything that will happen
So, God foreknows my future in full detail
What God foreknows necessarily happens exactly as it does happen
Hence, my future necessarily happens exactly as it does
If my future necessarily happens exactly as it does, then I am not free
Consequently, I am not free!

5. Boethius Rejects the Incompatibilist Argument
The Incompatibilist Argument conceals a mistake pertaining to how the concept of necessity appears in the argument
It is true that if my future is necessary, then I am not free
But the argument fails to prove that my future is necessary because the argument mistakenly asserts:
(3.a) What God foreknows necessarily happens exactly as it does happen

6. Boethius Rejects the Incompatibilist Argument
Rather, the following is true:
(4.a) Necessarily, what God foreknows happens exactly as it does.
(4.a) merely and trivially implies
(5.a) What God foreknows happens exactly as it does.
God’s foreknowledge does imply that everything happens exactly as it does
Hence, everything I do happens exactly as it does
But since (7) does not refer to the necessity of anything that I do, we may maintain that the Incompatibilist has failed to demonstrate that God’s omniscience is incompatible with human freedom

7. Omniscience as “Vision” of the Future
Your vision of the present, does not in itself impose any necessity on the present
You see that the ball is red
Your so seeing does not in itself make it necessary that the ball is red
Your knowledge of the present, like vision of the present, does not in itself impose any necessity on the present
You know that the ball is red
Your so knowing does not in itself make it necessary that the ball is red
God’s omniscience is merely knowledge of all time.
God’s knowledge of all time, like your knowledge of the present, does not it itself impose any necessity on the past, present or future