Chapter 14 Strategy.

Chapter 14 Strategy

Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game
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Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry

Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat

Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria

Table 14.2 Entrant’s Best Response and Profit

Figure 14.4 Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria

Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large Quantity to Deter Entry

Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss if it Deters Entry

Figure 14.7 Investment Game Tree

Figure 14.8 Raising-Costs Game Tree

Application (Page 503) Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence

Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising

Table 14.3 Advertising Game

Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515) Magazine Subscriptions

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