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Note: The top and bottom payoffs belong to the principal and agent, respectively.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure 2. Send and Divide Decisions by Treatment.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure 3. Francs Earned per Period by Role and Treatment.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure 4. Relative Frequency of Send, by Treatment and Period.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure 5. Send and Divide Decision by Treatment, Conditional on Agent Having Bad Reputation.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure 6. Send and Divide Decision by Treatment, Conditional on Agent Having Good Reputation.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure D.1. Relative Frequency of Send Conditional on Bad Reputation by Treatment and Period.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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Figure E.1. The Distribution of Choices in the Risk Preference Elicitation Task.
From: Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty J Law Econ Organ. Published online January 09, doi: /jleo/ewy026 J Law Econ Organ | © The Author(s) Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (
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