1. “They shouldn´t” or “Thou shalt not”: The impact of minimal or maximal goal-type on explicit negative intergroup behaviour
Bastian Lücke, Thomas Kessler,
Amélie Mummendey, Anne Berthold

2. Introduction Aims of the research:
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Introduction
Aims of the research:
1. Distinction between minimal and maximal goals (goal-type)
as factor affecting explicit negative behavior towards outgroups.
2. Experimental study of explicit negative behavior towards
outgroups (research paradigm).

3. Theory: Minimal and maximal goals
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Theory: Minimal and maximal goals
The distinction between minimal and maximal goals:
(Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert & Waldzus,
submitted; Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey & Neumann, 2009;
Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler & Lücke, submitted)
Example
Groups: Economists and Social Psychologists
Goal: No deception in experimental studies
(e.g. Cook & Yamagishi, 2008; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2002)
Minimal goal: NO DECEPTION whatsoever (dichotomous evaluation).
Maximal goal: As little deception as possible (graded evaluation).

4. Deception Example: Minimal goal Maximal goal additional information
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Deception Example:
Minimal goal
Maximal goal
additional
information
no deception
some
deception
massive
deception

5. Definition goal-types
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Definition goal-types
Maximal goal: Goal that should be achieved as much as possible
→ graded evaluation.
Minimal goal: Goal that can either be achieved or not
→ dichotomous evaluation.
Minmax Hypothesis (H1)
More explicit negative behavior is shown by members of an IG if a
goal is violated by the OG that is represented by a members of the
IG as a minimal goal, less negative behavior is shown if the
violated goal is represented as a maximal goal.
Moral Outrage Hypothesis (H2)
The impact of goal-type on negative behavior by members of an IG
towards the deviant OG is mediated by moral outrage towards the
OG.

6. Manipulation of goal-type
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Manipulation of goal-type
Public Good Game
Contribution rate
Minimal goal
Maximal goal
100 %
60 %
50 %
0 %

7. Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I
Goal: Making money by contributing a share of the initial endowment
Maximal goal condition: Gradual Public Good Game
Contribute as much as possible.
Minimal goal condition: Step level Public Good Game
Threshold: 60 %. IG OG
- Minimal groups:
Other 2 IG players
contribute more
than 60 %
Entire OG
contributes less
than 60 %
- Exact amount of the initial endowment uncertain
- Exact same contributions of other 5 co-players in both conditions!

8. Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 62 %; SD=22,98
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I
Contributions:
Minimal goal condition: 62 %; SD=22,98
Maximal goal condition: 77 %; SD=14,26
New DV: The „lottery item“
→ Generalized social exclusion
Identification: M=5.29; SD=1.03 (Cronbachs α=.94)
Monetary punishment / identification r=.233, n.s.
Moral outrage / identification: r=.360, p=.012
Exclusion (lottery item) / identification r=.394, p=.006

9. Study I: Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.92)
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I: Results
Moral outrage towards OG
(Cronbachs α=.92)
Monetary punishment of OG-members
Minimal goal
M = 3.19
SD = 2.06
Maximal goal
M = 2.15
SD = 1.84
Minimal goal
M = 4.46
SD = 2.00
Maximal goal
M = 3.45
SD = 1.92
F (1, 46) = 4.055, p = .025,
η2 = .08
F (1, 46) = 3.124, p = .042,
η2 = 0.06

10. Study I: Results Exclusion (from future rounds)
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I: Results
Exclusion (from future rounds)
Social Exclusion (lottery-item)
Minimal goal
M = 4.54
SD = 2.34
Maximal goal
M = 3.09
SD = 1.90
Minimal goal
M = 5.69
SD = 1.67
Maximal goal
M = 4.86
SD = 1.55
F (1, 46) = 5.411, p = .012,
η2 = .11
F (1, 46) = 3.133, p = .042,
η2 = .06
Monetary punishment / exclusion (future rounds): r=.692, p<.001
Monetary punishment / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026
Exclusion (future rounds) / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026

11. Study I: Criticism Conceptual differences between payoff matrices in a
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I: Criticism
Conceptual differences between payoff matrices in a
gradual public good game and a step-level public good game
Payoffs from Public Good
Individual
payoff
Individual
payoff
step-level
gradual
Δ p1
Δ p1
Δ p2
average
contribution
rate
average
contribution
rate
Conceptual difference, even if payoffs and Δ p1 are kept constant!

12. Study II Framing of goaltype
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study II
Framing of goaltype
Exact same – gradual – payoff matrix in both goaltype-conditions.
Only difference: Group goal that participants are supposed to
suggest is either framed as minimal or maximal.

13. Study II: Results Participants contributions:
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study II: Results
Participants contributions:
Minimal goal condition: 63 % (SD=19.84)
Maximal goal condition: 75 % (SD=14.10)
Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.83)
Max
M = 2.41
SD = 1.35
Min
M = 3.43
SD = 1.76
F (1, 46) = 4.991, p = .015,
η2 = .10

14. Study II: Results Monetary punishment of OG-members
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study II: Results
Monetary punishment of
OG-members
Social exclusion of OG-members
Min
M = 5.38
SD = 1.38
Max
M = 4.35
SD = 1.64
Min
M = 4.79
SD = 1.79
Max
M = 3.57
SD = 1.95
F (1,46) = 5.422, p = .012,
η2 = .11
F (1,46) = 5.044, p = .015,
η2 = .10
Monetary punishment & social exclusion: r = .487, p = .001

15. Studies I – III: Summary
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Studies I – III: Summary
Combined sample
Similar experimental design and the same hypotheses and dv
- No interactions between the factors „study“ and „goal-type“
- No significant differences over the 3 studies with regard to
level of identification, negative emotions towards OG,
social exclusion, contribution; (exception: punishment)

16. Studies I – III: Summary
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Studies I – III: Summary
Effect of goal-type on moral outrage towards OG:
F (1, 153) = 14.27, p < .001, η2 = .09
Effect of goal-type on social exclusion of members of the OG:
F (1, 153) = 10.20, p = .002, η2 = .08
Effect of goal-type on monetary punishment of the OG:
F (1, 153) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .09
Behavioral measures: „Monetary punishment“ and „social exclusion“:
r = .577, p < .001

17. Studies I - III: Summary
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Studies I - III: Summary
outrage
towards OG
β = **
β = .582 **
goal-type
social exclusion
β = **
(-.088 n.s.)
Test of the indirect effect:
Bootstrapping (N=2000)
b=-.68, p=.0006, BCa(95%)=[ ,-.3257].

18. Studies I - III: Summary
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Studies I - III: Summary
outrage
towards OG
β = **
β = .534 **
goal-type
monetary punishment
β = **
(-.149 *)
Test of the indirect effect:
Bootstrapping (N=2000)
b=-.56, p=.0009, BCa(95%)=[ ,-.3182].

19. Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
VII Summary
Working experimental paradigm to research explicit negative
behavior towards OG-members
- H1: Minimal goal-representation leads to more explicit negative
behavior towards the OG than a maximal goal-representation
H2 : This relation is mediated by moral outrage towards
the outgroup.
Several replications of these results, excluding possible influence of
the research paradigm

20. Thank You! Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Thank You!

21. Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 71 %; SD=14,37
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I
Contributions:
Minimal goal condition: 71 %; SD=14,37
Maximal goal condition: 76 %; SD=21,61
Identification: M=5.25; SD=1.40,
Cronbachs α=.91
Monetary punishment / identification with IG: r=.279, p=.037
Moral outrage / identification with IG: r=.457, p=.001

22. Study I - Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.78)
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I - Results
Moral outrage towards OG
(Cronbachs α=.78)
Monetary punishment
Minimal goal
Maximal goal
Minimal goal
Maximal goal
M = 4.53
SD = 2.06
M = 3.30
SD = 1.97
M = 3.77
SD = 1.53
M = 2.92
SD = 1.50
F (1, 59) = 5.61, p = .011,
η2 = .09
F (1, 59) = 4.67, p = .018,
η2 = .08
No effect of relative difference in payoff on behavior and emotion!

23. Study I - Criticism Study II
Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups
Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect
Study I - Criticism
In minimal goal condition, goal level was given,
in maximal goal condition not.
→ Possible influence of authority/ justification/ attribution.
Study II
Self selection of group-goal
Goal selection: Participants were allegedly randomly selected
to suggest a contribution between 10% and 100%
as group goal.
New DVs: The „lottery item“ – Generalized social exclusion
Exclusion from future rounds