1. ICAO PBN Symposium Regulatory and Certification Forum
Safety case – procedure ready for publication?
Jeff Cochrane, Manager CNS Service Design

2. NAV CANADA SMS Certification
Private, non-share capital corporation
2nd largest ANSP in the world
12 million aircraft movements
Over 18 million square km of airspace
4,900 employees
Regulated by Federal Government on Safety Performance
CARs Part VIII, Subpart 5 - Requirement for Safety Management System to be in force January 1st, 2008
Phased in over four years and completed this year 2

3. Overarching Objectives
Mission Statement
NAV CANADA facilitates the safe movement of aircraft, efficiently and cost effectively, through the provision of air navigation services on a long-term, sustainable basis.
Overarching Objectives
Maintain a safety record in top decile
Maintain ANS customer service charges in bottom quartile
Implement and maintain a modern, cost-efficient technology platform in the top quartile
Ensure a decline in customer service charges over the long term
Create a productive and fulfilling workplace, placing us amongst top Canadian employers
Identify and, where feasible, introduce measurable benefits which contribute to the reduction of the environmental footprint of the aviation industry.

5. Operational Risk Management
Safety Management System
Safety Planning
Operational Risk Management
Exchange of Safety Information
Safety Performance Measurement
Safety
Management Assurance
Operational Risk Management
The systematic and effective application of suitable risk-management techniques, employing system safety and human factors concepts to reduce the safety risks resulting from the provision, by NAV CANADA, of air navigation services and products to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

6. Safety Management Checklist

7. Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA)
Multi-disciplinary brainstorming
Systems approach to hazard identification
People
Procedures
Equipment
Operational environment
Best practices for indentifying and mitigating operational safety hazards and risks related to technical and human performance

8. RISK The product of probability and severity

9. RISK The product of probability and severity1
EXTREME RISK STOP ACTIVITY
VERY HIGH
RISK
ACTIVITY UNREALISTIC
HIGH RISK SIGNIFICANT MITIGATION NEEDED
MODERATE RISK - MITIGATION NEEDED
LOW RISK- MAY NEED MITIGATION 2
VERY HIGH RISK ACTIVITY UNREALISTIC
HIGH RISK SIGNIFICANT
MITIGATION NEEDED
MODERATE RISK – MITIGATION NEEDED
LOW RISK MAY NEED MITIGATION
MINOR RISK MINIMAL MITIGATION 3
MODERATE RISK –MITIGATION NEEDED
TRIVIAL RISK - LITTLE OR NO MITIGATION 4
LOW RISK - MAY NEED MITIGATION
MINOR RISK MINIMAL MITIGATION
TRIVIAL RISK LITTLE OR NO MITIGATION
NEARLY ZERO RISK- NO MITIGATION NEEDED
Range
10-3
10-4
10-5
10-6

10. Constraints and Assumptions
General
ATC Based
Customer Based

11. Hazards
Hazard - A latent condition or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to one or more undesirable outcomes.
Defined in terms of:
Context
Description
Causes
Outcome
Probability x Severity = Risk
Mitigations - effect on “P x S = Risk”
Residual risk is ALARP

12. Hazard Table – Mitigation Table
Mitigation - Measures taken to reduce risk by eliminating a hazard or reducing the probability and/or severity.
Mitigation measures complete when the residual risk is ALARP.
Matrix of mitigations across hazards

13. SMS success when:
We have a clear understanding of the technical, operational and organizational factors that affect safety
Current issues
Potential safety risks that could result from business and operational changes
We implement appropriate and effective mitigation
e.g. design of airspace, level of service, integration of flight deck with ATS services & products, design of systems/functionality, design of procedures, training programs, staffing, policies, procedures, instruction, supervision, briefings, alerts

14. Summary
Implementing new PBN procedures touches all disciplines requiring a focused effort of consultation supported by SMS processes