1. Submarines & Safeguards
ChenÉe Tracey
Research Sponsored by Brookhaven National Laboratory

2. introduction
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed not to pursue nuclear explosives and to safeguard their civilian energy sectors
Nuclear propulsion is not a nuclear explosive and is used by the military
Brazil has demonstrated interest in pursuing naval nuclear propulsion for use in nuclear-powered submarines

3. Questions that Need answers
Which part of nuclear-powered submarines are safeguarded?
Is Brazil likely to proliferate? If not Brazil, then who?
What are options for the international community to protect against proliferation with this technology?

4. introduction
In 2008, Brazil and France signed a contract to share submarine technology to help Brazil obtain diesel-electric attack submarines
Brazil plans to use this same technology to build nuclear reactors indigenously for six nuclear-powered submarines
Brazil would be the first NNWS to have nuclear-powered submarines
Uranium used to power the submarine is not subject to safeguards while it is used in reactor and can be removed from safeguards verification
Brazil has agreed to maintain enrichment below 20%

5. Why does brazil need a nuclear-powered submarine?
Protect oil and natural gas off the coast
Technological development and national independence
Prestige and importance

6. Protect the “Blue Amazon”
Compartments: Sonar, Missile Room, Control Room, Crew Rooms, Reactor
PWR provide energy

8. why nuclear-powered Submarines?
Nuclear-powered submarines are powered by nuclear material. They do not house nuclear weapons.
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)
Higher enriched nuclear material means more energy and time between refueling
PWRs have long core lives and require refueling every years when used with HEU
The submarine hull will have a hatch to facilitate refueling in lieu of cutting the internal structure of the submarine

9. IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes
IAEA INFCIRC 153 details the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and NNWS
A state can “exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement.”
Nuclear material is not subject to safeguards while it is being used in the naval reactor

10. IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes
There are a series of steps to be taken before the material is withdrawn from safeguards
State must inform the IAEA of the activity and that the material will be used in peaceful nuclear activity
State must inform the IAEA that the material will not be used for production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices
IAEA and the state must make an “arrangement” that the material will not be safeguarded for a certain length of time and where in the fuel cycle
Because nuclear-powered submarines are controlled by military, the IAEA does not have access to classified information and has difficulty pinpointing when fuel is removed from safeguards

11. Brazil and Nonproliferation
Brazil and Argentina signed the NPT in 1998 and are not signatories to the Additional Protocol
Brazilian officials believe it created a divide between “haves” and “have nots”
Nuclear Weapon States have made little to no progress on disarmament goals in the NPT
Former Brazilian Foreign Minister João Augusto de Araújo Castro stated “The NPT drafts propose limitations only for those countries that do not possess nuclear weapons and they include restrictions which are not essential to the objectives of proliferation.”

12. Cooperation between The iaea and abacc
Brazil is a member of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) created in 1991
ABACC enforces the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) in Brazil and Argentina
This agreement prohibits Brazil and Argentina from “carrying out, promoting, or authorizing directly or indirectly or from participating in the testing, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon.”

13. IAEA Loopholes and ABACC catchalls
Brazil’s SCCC Quadripartite agreement accounts for nuclear-powered submarines
“none of the provisions of the…Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy.”
Calls for Brazil and Argentina “to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities.”

14. IAEA and ABACC Cooperation
ABACC has certain liberties that the IAEA does not
ABACC’s safeguards include military bases
For example, Brazil inspected Argentina’s unfinished reprocessing plant, even though it is not safeguarded by ABACC
Both agencies conduct independent evaluations using same equipment, standards, and procedures for inspections
Miscommunications may occur due to chain of command

15. Policy recommendations
NWS should promote use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in nuclear- powered submarines
U.S. uses 93%; Russia uses 45%
France and China are using caramel fuel (uranium dioxide composite)
Lasts for upwards of 33 years in reactor core with 20% enrichment
US should recommit itself to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program
DOE launched this program in 1978

16. Long Term Options
Nuclear Weapon States recommitment to disarmament during the NPT Review Conference in 2020
Renewed commitment to promoting the Additional Protocol especially with Brazil and Argentina
Potential for Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and ABACC to negotiate a modified Additional Protocol with the IAEA
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group acknowledges ABACC

17. Thank You! ChenÉe Tracey Lchtracey@gmail.com