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Royal Economics Society Conference April 19th, 2011
Trinity College Dublin Royal Economics Society Conference April 19th, 2011 Income Shocks and Household Risk-Coping Strategies: Evidence from Vietnam Carol Newman and Fiona Wainwright Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin
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Motivation (1) Literature highlights fact that exposure to income risk remains a serious cause of poverty in developing countries (Fafchamps, 2009) Nature of the shock incurred impacts on ability to cope (Dercon, 2002) Idiosyncratic shocks Spatially covariant natural shocks Natural disasters have been linked to: Declines in agricultural yields and incomes (Porter, 2008) Persistent effects on nutrition of children (Alderman et al., 2006) School attendance and enrolment (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997) Evidence suggests that idiosyncratic shocks are more common but can be smaller and easier to deal with (Townsend, 1994; Mordoch, 2001; Udry, 1991)
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Motivation (2) Idiosyncratic shocks can be insured at community level or through formal insurance contracts However, in developing economies formal insurance markets are not well developed Aggregate shocks are difficult to collectively insure and are rarely covered by formal insurance contracts Households must find alternative ways to smooth consumption in the face of shocks Risk management – managing ex ante the riskiness of the income generating process (income smoothing) – formal insurance, precautionary saving, income diversification Risk coping – dealing ex post with the consequences of income loss (consumption smoothing) – insurance claims, depletion of the stock of saving or borrowing 3
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What we do... Present an ex post theoretical model within an inter-temporal utility maximizing framework which we use to explain household’s decisions to insure against idiosyncratic risk and save to protect against uninsurable aggregate risk Using panel data from rural households in Vietnam we develop a test of the extent to which households smooth consumption over time and consider how this depends on the presence of insurance and savings instruments We consider savings stocks in the form of liquid assets as a form of self-insurance or risk-coping strategy against aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks
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Conceptual Framework (1)
HH is given a wealth endowment W in each period such that With no insurance HH maximizes: = precautionary savings level = random variable representing exogenous natural shock = exogenous idiosyncratic shock with known probability distribution FOC: Approximation for A:
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Conceptual Framework (2)
With insurance HH maximizes: = proportion of idiosyncratic risk that is covered FOCs: Approximation for A:
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Conceptual Framework (3)
Summary of theoretical predictions: Households save and purchase insurance to smooth consumption and so the realization of adverse income shocks should not affect consumption levels between one period and the next Households with insurance will precautionary save less than those without given that the uncertainty associated with income due to idiosyncratic risks is eliminated Policy implication: Model predicts that households will precautionary save due to the uncertainty associated with future income levels and so they will consume less than they would in the absence of this uncertainty and will save less in the form of other more productive types of investments.
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Empirical Considerations
Step 1: Test ability of households to consumption smooth in presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks Obtain parameters for a general consumption function that represents households consumption smoothing preferences For households that experience no shocks estimate: We use the estimated coefficients to predict household consumption in each period using the observed data on each explanatory variable in that period. Test the hypothesis that there is no difference between the predicted and actual observed level of consumption Failure to reject the null hypothesis provides evidence of consumption smoothing
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Empirical Considerations
Step 2: Empirical exploration of mechanisms of consumption smoothing Definition of shocks: Exogenous spatially covariant shocks: 1) economic (for example, crop price changes, key input price changes/shortages) 2) natural (for example, floods, typhoons, droughts etc) Idiosyncratic shocks: 3) insurable (for example, illness, injury or death of household member) 4) uninsurable (for example, crime/theft, divorce, family disputes etc) Fixed Effects model
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Data Vietnamese Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) 2006, 2008 and 2010 – 12 rural provinces in Vietnam
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Data Vietnamese Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) 2006, 2008, 2010; 12 provinces of Vietnam covering 2,000 households in a balanced panel Table 2a: Household Shocks and Recovery Statistics 2008 Shock 2008 Recovered 2010 2010 Recovered Any Shock 56% 45% 50% 53% Spatially covariant 73% 48% 71% 57% Idiosyncratic only 13% 49% 38% Both 30% 16% 60% Change in asset values Savings Livestock Crops Borrowing No shock 3,482 5,755 1,890 23 Shock -1,078 8,053 3,787 3,906 7,923 -1,054 -2,902 -1,718 3,715 -1,903 -1,859 2,103 12
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Purchased Voluntary Insurance
Data 55% of households have insurance in half of which are voluntarily purchased Profile of households with formal insurance (selected results) Dependent variable: Purchased Voluntary Insurance Time 2008 2010 Exogenous: Natural Shock 0.2996** 0.2099 Exogenous: Economic Shock 0.5389*** Idiosyncratic: Insurable Shock 0.2011 0.0296 Idiosyncratic: Uninsurable Shock 0.1130 0.0410 Number of shocks suffered *** Recovered from prior shock 0.0375 0.0837 Stock Of Savings Dummy 0.2241*** 0.3469*** Livestock Dummy 0.0740 Borrowings Dummy 0.1266* Crop Stores Dummy 0.1097 Total Wealth (VND) 0.1115*** 0.1861*** Income (VND) 0.0007** 0.0005** Education Level of Household Head 0.1891*** 0.2193*** 13
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Empirical Results (1) Stage 1: Consumption Smoothing t-tests (2008)
Overall No Insurance With Insurance < Median Liquid Assets > Median Liquid Assets < Median Income > Median Income Full sample Actual 6.37 Predicted 6.16 Difference 0.215*** n 2,039 No shock 6.29 6.12 0.172*** 892 Any shock 6.43 6.22 6.74 6.25 6.62 6.01 6.90 6.18 6.06 6.35 6.07 5.94 6.45 0.248*** 0.154*** 0.388*** 0.173*** 0.332*** 0.072** 0.448*** 1,147 687 460 604 542 609 538 14
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Empirical Results (2) Stage 1: Consumption Smoothing t-tests (2010) Continued 2008 Overall No Insurance With Insurance < Median Liquid Assets > Median Liquid Assets < Median Income > Median Income Idio shock Actual 6.51 6.36 6.73 6.25 6.89 5.99 7.00 Predicted 6.23 6.13 6.39 6.10 6.43 5.89 6.56 Difference 0.275*** 0.231*** 0.343*** 0.152** 0.453*** 0.093 0.447*** n 235 142 93 138 114 121 Nat shock 6.35 6.14 6.68 6.57 5.97 6.85 6.16 6.04 6.05 6.26 5.94 6.45 0.190*** 0.098*** 0.337*** 0.073* 0.306*** 0.035 0.395*** 880 542 338 438 441 501 379 15
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Empirical Results (3) Stage 1: Consumption Smoothing t-tests (2010)
Overall No Insurance With Insurance < Median Liquid Assets > Median Liquid Assets < Median Income > Median Income Full sample Actual 6.62 Predicted 6.23 Difference 0.390*** n 2,036 No shock 6.64 6.19 0.442*** 1,014 Any shock 6.60 6.36 6.86 6.40 6.80 6.28 6.93 6.26 6.10 6.44 6.11 6.41 6.01 6.52 0.339*** 0.258*** 0.428*** 0.284*** 0.394*** 0.271*** 0.409*** 1,022 535 487 519 502 523 499 16
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Empirical Results (4) Stage 1: Consumption Smoothing t-tests (2008) Continued 2010 Overall No Insurance With Insurance < Median Liquid Assets > Median Liquid Assets < Median Income > Median Income Idio shock Actual 6.53 6.29 6.92 6.20 6.93 6.13 6.97 Predicted 6.21 6.10 6.38 6.01 6.44 5.94 6.49 Difference 0.323*** 0.195** 0.531*** 0.188** 0.489*** 0.184** 0.477*** n 231 143 88 127 104 121 110 Nat shock 6.63 6.39 6.87 6.47 6.78 6.32 6.94 6.28 4.46 6.15 6.41 6.03 6.54 0.348*** 0.290*** 0.407*** 0.324*** 0.370*** 0.294*** 0.404*** 864 440 424 425 438 441 423 17
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Empirical Results (5) Main result from Stage 1:
Households smooth consumption when faced with income shocks Motivation for Stage 2: What role do precautionary savings and insurance play? Estimate:
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Interaction:Insurance
Empirical Results (6) Total Liquid Assets (Table 6 selected results) (1) Levels (2) (3) (4) (5) Interaction:Insurance (6) Interaction: Trans Income Shock -0.166*** Exogenous Shock -0.099** Exog: Nat -0.036 -0.034 -0.033 -0.005 Exog: Econ -0.185* -0.186* -0.183* Idiosyncratic Shock -0.160*** -0.153*** Idio: Insurable -0.134** -0.155** Idio: Uninsurable -0.072 -0.070 -0.071 Transfers 0.022 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.036 Transfers*Nat -0.041 Insurance Claim -0.096 -0.092 -0.124* Ins*Insurable Shock 0.159 19
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Interaction:Insurance
Empirical Results (7) Total Livestock Holdings (Table 7 selected results) (1) Levels (2) (3) (4) (5) Interaction:Insurance (6) Interaction: Trans Income Shock -0.034 Exogenous Shock 0.023 - Exog: Nat 0.001 0.007 0.106 Exog: Econ 0.050 0.053 0.064 0.057 Idiosyncratic Shock -0.154* -0.155* Idio: Insurable -0.184** -0.266*** -0.181** Idio: Uninsurable -0.069 -0.064 -0.062 Transfers 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.096 Transfers*Nat -0.150 Insurance Claim -0.279** -0.281** -0.282** -0.398*** Ins*Insurable Shock 0.632** 20
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Interaction:Insurance
Empirical Results (8) Total Savings (Table 8 selected results) (1) Levels (2) (3) (4) (5) Interaction:Insurance (6) Interaction: Trans Income Shock -0.243*** Exogenous Shock -0.191***. - Exog: Nat -0.194*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.334*** Exog: Econ -0.074 -0.067 -0.081 Idiosyncratic Shock -0.137* Idio: Insurable -0.156* -0.154* Idio: Uninsurable -0.001 Transfers -0.133** -0.132** -0.130** -0.206*** Transfers*Nat 0.206* Insurance Claim -0.179** -0.178** -0.175** -0.174** -0.172** -0.170** Ins*Insurable Shock -0.013 21
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Interaction:Insurance
Empirical Results (9) Cash Savings (Table 8a selected results) (1) Levels (2) (3) (4) (5) Interaction:Insurance (6) Interaction: Trans Income Shock -0.253*** Exogenous Shock -0.173**. - Exog: Nat -0.165** -0.160** -0.294*** Exog: Econ -0.208 -0.192 Idiosyncratic Shock -0.200** -0.198** Idio: Insurable -0.225** -0.226** -0.222** Idio: Uninsurable -0.011 -0.010 Transfers -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.213*** -0.276*** Transfers*Nat 0.188* Insurance Claim -0.166* -0.161* -0.159* -0.158* -0.160* -0.154* Ins*Insurable Shock 0.009 22
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Interaction:Insurance
Empirical Results (10) Borrowing (Table 10 selected results) (1) Levels (2) (3) (4) (5) Interaction:Insurance (6) Interaction: Trans Income Shock 1.073*** Exogenous Shock 0.878*** - Exog: Nat 0.655*** 0.657*** 0.640** Exog: Econ 0.899*** 0.897*** 0.901*** Idiosyncratic Shock 0.903*** 0.883*** Idio: Insurable 0.871*** Idio: Uninsurable 0.570* 0.573* Transfers 0.235 0.222 0.236 0.227 Transfers*Nat 0.021 Insurance Claim 0.010 0.018 0.001 -0.002 -0.050 Ins*Insurable Shock 0.229 23
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Summary of findings Households smooth consumption in the face of adverse income shocks Precautionary savings are an important mechanism Households deplete their total stock of liquid assets in response to exogenous economic shocks and idiosyncratic insurable shocks Financial savings, particularly cash and gold held at home, act as important buffers in the face of spatially covariant natural shocks Insurance markets play an important role in easing the depletion of livestock holdings in response to idiosyncratic shocks while external transfers are important for risk-coping in the face of natural disasters Borrowing is increased when households are faced with idiosyncratic and spatially covariant shocks, particularly for wealthy households.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Savings and insurance instruments are important for consumption smoothing where there are income risks Savings for precautionary purposes may lead to lower welfare outcomes in the long run given that they result in lower levels of consumption and use up resource that could be put to more productive uses This is exacerbated by the fact that, as predicted by our theoretical model, the uncertainty associated with income shocks may lead households to save excessively in these forms The presence of insurance instruments reduces the need to draw down some forms of precautionary savings in the event of adverse income shocks but there is strong evidence to suggest that insurance markets do not fully cover idiosyncratic risks Future work will investigate the interplay between consumption and investment decisions by risk averse households where income is uncertain and insurance markets fail.
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Questions and comments welcome
Thank you Questions and comments welcome
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Royal Economics Society Conference April 19th, 2011
Trinity College Dublin Royal Economics Society Conference April 19th, 2011 Income Shocks and Household Risk-Coping Strategies: Evidence from Vietnam Carol Newman and Fiona Wainwright Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin
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