1. Public Procurement and International Trade Agreements Summary of background memo
Mihály Fazekas
Central European University and Government Transparency Institute
4th International Symposium on Public Procurement, Paris, 26/10/2018

2. Main research question
Under which conditions do trade agreements in public procurement produce the intended positive impacts?
Impact mechanisms
Motivations and constraints
Policy tools

3. Main impact mechanisms: PP trade agreements->economic gains
Greater transparency
Eliminating discrimination
Improved tendering procedures
Improved remedies procedures

4. Weak motivations?
Political constraints: corruption and pork-barrel politics
Bureacuratic constraints: budget allocation logic
Monitoring&punishment: national or international

5. Thought experiment: eliminating home-bias
EU institutions in various MS
Meritocratic bureacracy
Little local entanglement
Little political affiliation
As close as it gets to a home-bias-free public buyer
Comparing EU institutions with national institutions
Think for example about CEDEFOP in Thessaloniki and local Greek buyers

6. EU institutions vs national buyers
Within country contract-level matching
Matched on contract value, main sector (2-digit CPV code), and year of contract award
Goods, works and non-consulting services
EU institutions awarding at least 50 contracts in , TED

7. Policy tools: international enforcement (partially) works
ECJ procurement ruling’s impact on market behavior (N=36)
Source: Fazekas, Mihály, & Tóth, Bence, (2017):  The effectiveness of the European Union in safeguarding competition in public procurement markets. GTI-WP/2017:04, Budapest: Government Transparency Institute.

8. Policy tools: international enforcement (partially) works
ECJ procurement ruling’s impact on market behavior (N=36)
Source: Fazekas, Mihály, & Tóth, Bence, (2017):  The effectiveness of the European Union in safeguarding competition in public procurement markets. GTI-WP/2017:04, Budapest: Government Transparency Institute.

9. Policy tools 2: Promoting good practices
Open procedures: 88% versus 85%
Long advertisement period: 83% versus 74%
Using objective/quantitative criteria: 75% versus 46%