1. Security for Safety: Enabling Digitalization of Railway Systems
CIPSEC workshop
Frankfurt am Main,
Dr. Jasmin Ćosić, DB Netz AG
M.Sc. Christian Schlehuber, DB Netz AG
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, under Grant Agreement no

2. Agenda 1. Introduction / Motivation 2.
Critical infrastructure and railway sector in Germany 3.
Motivation DB CIPSEC 4.
Future challenges in railway sector security 5.
Conclusion

3. Short intro - Railway (in Germany)
Biggest business premises in Germany
– with public access
33,500 km rail network
5,700 Stations (in Germany) as gate to railway transportation
48,800 heated railway switches (of 70,000 total)
Approx. 3,300 interlockings
1,323 electronic interlockings (ESTW)
trains/day
1 mlrd rail_km/year
cca 12.7 milion passengers/day
…..
4.652 milion passengers in 2017
Main Objective: Safe railway operation
National Safety Authority has to grant admission for every interlocking
Security getting more and more in focus 3 3

4. Introduction - Motivation
What is CRITICAL (BSI definition)
What is CRITICAL – „…everything that provide services to citizens, business and government…“
What is CRITICAL in railway section…..almost EVERYTHING
Railway system is very complex
Need special (specific) approach
Security vs. Safety
Most critical railway services:
Controls system & signaling
CCS (SCADA) network
Sales services
Communication (internetworking)
…..
Many Projects in domain of cyber security in railway section.
The sectors of CI in Germany (BSI)

5. Regulation in Germany
German „IT-Sicherheitsgesetz“ (IT-security law) 7/2015
EU Cybersecurity strategy
EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS) 8/2016 (concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and Information Security in EU)
Safety Standards in Germany
DIN EN50126 (Railway application: Specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety)
DIN EN50128 (Standard for safety-related software of the railway)
DIN EN50159 (Standard for safety-related communication in transmission systems)
IEC62443 (Security for IACS systems – Network and system security)

6. Specifics of railway infrastructure
Operating center (control room with several work stations)
Safety related components:
Interlocking system
Points, switches and axle counters
Assisting system – train number system and automated driveway system
Maintenance and Data Management (MDM) System
Connectors to the object controllers

7. Specifics of railway infrastructure
not specific but….
SCADA networks
Sales services
International communications
Meshed networks
….”Data center on the wheels” ……

8. Potential Damage and Assets to Protect
Disruption of traffic
Derailment of trains
Collision of trains
Assets from the safety point of view:
Integrity of the devices and the data
Availability of the system (= reliability + maintainability)
Financial loss
Injuries
Death

9. View on the Signaling System

10. New threats Safety is at risk Cyber-attacks
Utilization of COTS products
Use of open (rented) networks
Openness of infrastructure
Safety is at risk

11. To be competitive, railways have to evolve
1323/3300
* Directive on security of network and information system
** Computer-based interlocking systems in the era of digitalisation 11

12. To be competitive, railways have to evolve
To be competitive, railways have to evolve New features also pose new threats
1323/3300 12

13. To be competitive, railways have to evolve
To be competitive, railways have to evolve New features also pose new threats
1323/3300
 Safety is at risk 13

14. Safety Security Applications to ensure Safety – DB Pilot
Authentica-tion and key exchange
Secure asset and configuration management
Physical access detection
Data filtering
Data logging and aggregation
Reaction to critical events

15. View on CIPSEC Framework – DB Pilot
CIPSEC Framework applied to railway pilot

16. Vulnerability analysis & penetration testing
Future challenges
Vulnerability analysis & penetration testing
Do we know the system (all component)
Do we have a good technical documentation
How to make a good plan for vulnerability analysis or pen test?
Is software we use „enough“ good
Awareness, training and education
Do we have a good plan (can be implemented) for awareness?
Do we have a good plan (can be implemented) for training/education, who will make a education? 16

17. Future challenges Forensic analysis Recovery Tomorrow - New Tech……
Black box challenges, IoT challenges
Big Data analysis problem (cloud, „data centers on wheels“)
Methods and tools for forensic(s)
Legal side („black side“ of forensic)
Recovery
Do we have a „backup“ plan?
Do we have „backup“
and ….
Do we have a plan for „Business Continuity Management“ ???
Tomorrow - New Tech…… 17

18. Main challenges for security in railway CI were shown
Conclusion
Main challenges for security in railway CI were shown
Can „standard solution” can be applied to the rail sector
If can, how „standard solution” can be applied to the rail sector
How suficient protector could look like for interlocking systems
Knowledge dissemination – key aspect
Future challenges in railway security 18

19. Thanks for your attention! Questions?
Contact:
M.Sc. Christian Schlehuber
Dr. Jasmin Ćosić
DB Netz AG
@CIPSECproject
CIPSEC Workshop
Frankfurt/M 16/10/2018