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Key Establishment Protocols - 12.6 ~ 12.9 -
Seunggyu BYEON
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Contents 12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
12.7 Secret sharing 12.8 Conference keying 12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (i) Basic version of Diffie-Hellman key agreement (Exponential key exchange) The first practical solution to the key distribution problem Allowing two parties, never having met in advance or shared keying material To establish a shared secret by exchanging messages over an open channel
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (i) Diffie-Hellman key agreement (Exponential key exchange) Alice Bob π=23, πΌ=5 π΄= 5 6 πππ 23 π΅= πππ 23 π΄=8 π΅=19 πΎ= πππ 23 πΎ= πππ 23 πΎ=2 π₯=6 π¦=15 πΌ π₯ πΌ π¦ 1. One-time Setup 3. (a)(b) random π₯ and π¦ and sends πΌ π₯ and πΌ π¦ 2. Protocol Message Aο B : πΌ π₯ 3. (c)(d) receives πΌ π¦ and πΌ π₯ and shares πΌ π¦ π₯ = πΌ π₯ π¦
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (i) Diffie-Hellman key agreement (Exponential key exchange) 12.48 Note. Time-invariant Nature 12.49 Remark.
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (i) Diffie-Hellman key agreement (Exponential key exchange)
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (i) Diffie-Hellman key agreement (Exponential key exchange) 12.50 Note. Vulnerableness to not authenticated exponentials Alice Bob π=23, πΌ=5 1. One-time Setup π₯=6 π¦=15 π=π
π+1 3. (a)(b) Choose random π₯ and π¦ and sends πΌ π₯ and πΌ π¦ π΄= 5 6 πππ 23 πΌ π = πΌ πβ1 /πΉ(π) π΅= πππ 23 π΄=8 πΌ π₯ =8 πΌ π¦ =19 π΅=19 2. Protocol Message Aο B : πΌ π₯ πΌ π¦π πΌ π₯π πΎ= πβ = β1 6 =1 πΎ= 8 πβ = β1 15 =β1 Β±1 Β±1 3. (c)(d) receives πΌ π¦ and πΌ π₯ and shares πΌ π¦π π₯ = πΌ π₯π π¦ πΌ π₯π¦π πΌ π₯π¦π
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (ii) ElGamal key agreement in one-pass (half-certificated Diffie-Hellman) Diffie-Hellman variant providing a one-pass protocol with unilateral key authentication More simply Diffie-Hellman key agreement wherein the public exponential of the recipient is fixed and has verifiable authenticity
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (ii) ElGamal key agreement in one-pass (half-certificated Diffie-Hellman) Alice Bob 1. One-time Setup random π and πΌ π Included its public key π=23, πΌ=5, πΌ π =19 π=15 π₯=6 3. (a) A obtains Bβs public key A choose a random integer π₯ sends 2 π΄= 5 6 πππ 23 π΄=8 πΌ π₯ 2. Protocol Message Aο B : πΌ π₯ πΎ= πΌ π 6 πππ 23 πΎ= πππ 23 πΎ= πππ 23 3. (a) πΌ π π₯ = (b) πΌ π π₯ πΎ=2 πΎ=2
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iii) MTI two-pass key agreement protocols As in ElGamal key agreement, A sends to B a single message, resulting in the shared key K B independently initiates an analogous protocol with A, resulting in the shared key Kβ Each of A and B then computes k=KKβ mod p
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iii) MTI two-pass key agreement protocols Alice Bob Alice Bob π, πΌ, πΌ π = π§ π΅ 1. One-time Setup random π and πΌ π Included its public key π, πΌ, πΌ π = π§ π΄ π₯ π π π¦ 3. (a) A obtains Bβs public key A choose a random integer π₯ sends 2 πΌ π₯ 2. Protocol Message Aο B : πΌ π₯ πΌ π¦ π§ π΅ π₯ πΌ ππ₯ πΌ ππ¦ π§ π΄ π¦ 3. (a) πΌ π π₯ = (b) πΌ π π₯ πΎ πΎ πΎβ² πΎβ² = = πΌ ππ¦ π§ π΅ π₯ πΌ ππ₯ π§ π΄ π¦ π=πΎ πΎ β² πππ π = πΌ ππ₯+ππ¦
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iii) MTI two-pass key agreement protocols
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iii) MTI two-pass key agreement protocols β 12.54 Alice Charlie Bob 1. One-time Setup random π and πΌ π Included its public key π, πΌ, πΌ π = π§ π΄ π₯ π, πΌ, πΌ π = π§ π 3. (a) A obtains Bβs public key A choose a random integer π₯ and sends π¦ π, πΌ, πΌ π = π§ π΅ πΌ π₯ Change Source Indication πΌ π₯ 2. Protocol Message Aο B : πΌ π₯ πΌ π¦ π§ π΅ π₯ πΌ π¦ π§ π΄ π¦ 3. (a) πΌ π π₯ = (b) πΌ π π₯ πΎ πΎ = πΌ ππ¦ π§ π΅ π₯ π=πΎ πΎ β² πππ π
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iii) MTI two-pass key agreement protocols β 12.54 Alice Charlie Bob 1. One-time Setup random π and πΌ π Included its public key π¦ π, πΌ, πΌ π = π§ π΄ π, πΌ, πΌ ππ = π§ πΆ 3. (a) A obtains Bβs public key A choose a random integer π¦ and sends πΌ π¦ πΌ ππ¦ 2. Protocol Message Bο A : πΌ π¦ πΎ πΎ= πΌ πππ¦ πΎ believes that itβs shared with Bob believes that itβs shared with Charlie 3. (a) πΌ π π₯ = (b) πΌ π π₯ π= πΌ πππ¦+ππ₯
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iii) MTI two-pass key agreement protocols 12.55 Remark 12.56 Remark.
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iv) Station-to-Station Protocol (STS) the establishment of a shared secret key between two parties with mutual entity authentication and mutual explicit key authentication The protocol also facilitates anonymity β the identities of A and B may be protected from Eaves
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iv) Station-to-Station Protocol (STS) Alice Bob 1. One-time Setup π=23, πΌ=5 , π π΄ , π π΄ πππ π π΄ π₯=6 π¦=15 4. (a) A obtains Bβs public key A choose a random integer π₯ sends B π΄= 5 6 πππ 23 4. (b) computes πΌ π¦ and signs the concatenates of both exp., encrypts it using the key π΄=8 3. Protocol Message Aο B : πΌ π₯ AοB : πΌ π¦ , πΈ π π π΅ πΌ π¦ , πΌ π₯ Aο B : πΈ π π π΄ πΌ π₯ , πΌ π¦ πΌ π₯ π= πππ 23 πΌ π¦ = πππ 23 =19 πΌ π¦ , πΈ π π π΅ πΌ π¦ , πΌ π₯ 4. (c) computes the shared key, Decrypts the encrypted data, uses Bβs public key to verifyβ¦ π= πππ 23 4. (d) Decrypts the encrypted data, uses Aβs public key to verifyβ¦ Verification of π π΅ πΈ π π π΄ πΌ π₯ , πΌ π¦ Verification of π π΄ 4. (a) πΌ π π₯ = (b) πΌ π π₯ π=2 π=2
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12.6 Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques
Diffie-Hellman and related key agreement protocols (iv) Station-to-Station Protocol (STS) 12.58 Remark
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12.7 Secret Sharing 12.7 Secret Sharing γ΄γ·γ
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12.7.1 Simple shared control schemes
12.7 Secret Sharing Simple shared control schemes (i) Dual control by modular addition
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12.7.1 Simple shared control schemes
12.7 Secret Sharing Simple shared control schemes (ii) Unanimous consent control by modular addition 12.68 Remark
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12.7 Secret Sharing 12.7.2 Threshold schemes 12.69 Definition
12.70 Remark
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12.7 Secret Sharing Threshold schemes Shamirβs threshold scheme
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12.7.3 Generalized secret sharing
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12.7.3 Generalized secret sharing
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12.8 Conference keying Generalized secret sharing
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12.7.3 Generalized secret sharing
12.8 Conference keying Generalized secret sharing Burmester-Desmedt conference keying protocol
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12.7.3 Generalized secret sharing
12.8 Conference keying Generalized secret sharing Burmester-Desmedt conference keying protocol
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12.7.3 Generalized secret sharing
12.8 Conference keying Generalized secret sharing Unconditionally secure conference keying
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12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
Attack strategies and classic protocol flaws Attack 1: Intruder-in-the-middle
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12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
Attack strategies and classic protocol flaws Attack 2: Reflection attack
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12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
Attack strategies and classic protocol flaws Attack 3: Interleaving attack
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12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
Attack strategies and classic protocol flaws Attack 4: Misplaced trust in server
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12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
Analysis objectives and methpds Definition
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12.9 Analysis of key establishment protocols
Analysis objectives and methpds Definition
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