1. Presentation for POL 328
Dr. Kevin Lasher

2. Post-Soviet
Russia

4. Politics in Russia, 1992-93 Implementing free market reforms
Economic pain of “shock therapy” versus high expectations
Unclear Executive-Legislative relations
Resentment over collapse of USSR (many left-over communists and “new” nationalists)
Little experience with democratic institutions
“Authoritarian” Yeltsin
Ambitious Speaker Khasbulatov and VP Rutskoi

5. President Yeltsin
Popular election to “President” of Russia in June 1991
Becomes President of Russian Federation upon collapse of USSR
Weak constitutional presidency, wants stronger presidency

6. President Yeltsin Yeltsin halfway between democrat and authoritarian
No unified party base
Some compromise, little lobbying, expects “legislative obedience”
Primary task to destroy old system and create market economy ASAP
Economic transformation over building new political institutions

7. President Yeltsin
Should have created new constitution and called for new elections in early 1992
Lengthy process to create new constitution through 1993 but unable to reach agreement

8. President Yeltsin Two Yeltsins
Extremely complicated politician and man – with great strengths and great weaknesses
Heavy drinking, isolation, depression, health problems, high energy/withdrawal syndrome

9. Russian Legislature Congress of Peoples’ Deputies Supreme Soviet
(1068 delegates)
Supreme Soviet
(252 delegates)

10. Russian Legislature
One-third reformist, one-third anti-reformist, one third “on the fence”
Opposition pressure builds almost immediately
Growing anti-reformist legislature by mid-1992/1993

11. Russian Legislature
Very little understanding of parliamentary democracy
Competition between executive and legislature for ultimate power
Unhappiness over severe pain of shock therapy economic reforms

12. Speaker and Vice-President
Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov VP Alexander Rutskoi

13. Speaker and Vice-President
Opposition to Yeltsin’s painful economic policies turns into opposition to Yeltsin
Khasbulatov and Rutskoi join forces to topple Yeltsin
Don’t back down even after pro-Yeltsin referendum in April 1993
Rutskoi does not “accept” ceremonial role of vice-president
Khasbulatov believes he should be Yeltsin’s Prime Minister

14. Speaker and Vice-President
Situation deteriorates through summer 1993

15. October 4, 1993

16. Post-1993 Plenty of blame for crisis and outcome
Yeltsin did demonstrate some ability for compromise
Opponents moved toward extremism
Horrible results not really surprising

17. Post-1993 New constitution passed which creates “super-presidency”
New elections with mixed results in 1993 and neo-communist majority in 1995
Yeltsin and former-communist PM Chernomyrdin find some “common ground” with new legislature
Everyone waiting for presidential election of 1996

18. Post-1993
Shock therapy and privatization are slowed, inflation is reduced but economy continues to shrink
Political system is somewhat stabilized, but economic problems continue
Many next-stage reforms resisted or blocked by Russian legislature
Example: Yeltsin unable to push through complete privatization of agriculture

19. 1993 Legislative Parties
Seats
Russia’s Choice (Reformist) 73
New Regional Politics (Centrist) 66
Liberal Democ. Party (Opposition) 64
Agrarian Party (Opposition) 55
CPRF (Opposition) 45
Russian Unity and Accord (Reformist) 30
Yabloko (Reformist) 28
Union of December 12 (Reformist) 26
Women of Russia (Centrist) 23
Democratic Party of Russia (Centrist) 15
Russia’s Path (Opposition) 14

20. 1993 Legislative Parties
Blocs
Seats
% Duma
Reformist
157
35%
Centrist
104
23%
Opposition
178
40%

22. 1995 Legislative Parties
Blocs
Seats
% Duma
Reformist
110
25%
Centrist 44
10%
LDP 49
11%
Communists
215
49%

23. Yeltsin-Legislature Relations
Yeltsin and legislature exhibited cooperation and confrontation through 1999
Prime Minister Chernomydin somewhat successful from
Not a lot of new reformist legislation passed
Economic problems continue
Yeltsin’s health problems impact executive-legislative relations

24. The End