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Quantum-security of commitment schemes and hash functions

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Presentation on theme: "Quantum-security of commitment schemes and hash functions"β€” Presentation transcript:

1 Quantum-security of commitment schemes and hash functions
Dominique Unruh University of Tartu

2 Surprises with hash functions
Consider a hash function and a horse race β€œSpicy Spirit” wins… Player Bookie 𝐻("𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑦 π‘ π‘π‘–π‘Ÿπ‘–π‘‘", ) Player Bookie 231632 $$$ Commitments and hashes

3 Surprises with hash functions (II)
Consider a cheating player β€œWallopping Waldo” wins… Player Bookie Some fake β„Ž 𝐻("𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑦 π‘ π‘π‘–π‘Ÿπ‘–π‘‘", ) Player Bookie π‘Ÿ with 𝐻 π‘€π‘Žπ‘™π‘™π‘œπ‘,π‘Ÿ =β„Ž $$$ Commitments and hashes

4 Surprises with hash functions (III)
Player Bookie Classical crypto: 𝐻 is collision-resistant (infeasible to find π‘₯, π‘₯ β€² with 𝐻 π‘₯ =𝐻( π‘₯ β€² )) Consequence: Can open β„Ž to one horse only. Surprise: Does not hold for quantum adv (𝐻 might be coll.-res., and attack still works) Commitments and hashes

5 Surprises with hash functions (IV)
Player Bookie Some fake β„Ž π‘Ÿ with 𝐻 π‘€π‘Žπ‘™π‘™π‘œπ‘,π‘Ÿ =β„Ž |Ξ¨βŒͺ |Ξ¨βŒͺ used up! β€œCommitment”: A protocol that does not allow the player to change their mind. οƒ  This talk. Commitments and hashes

6 Commitments: scope of this talk
Hiding and binding Hiding seems well understood Statistically vs. computationally binding Weaker assms, everlasting security Interactive vs. non-interactive For simplicity Secure against quantum attacks Classical protocols Commitments and hashes

7 Classical definitions
𝑐 Commit: S R π‘š, 𝑒 Open: Computationally binding (classical-style): Hard to find: 𝑐 and π‘šβ‰  π‘š β€² and 𝑒, 𝑒 β€² s.t.: 𝑒 opens 𝑐 as π‘š 𝑒′ opens 𝑐 as π‘šβ€² ⟹ Adv. cannot change his mind Commitments and hashes

8 New definitions needed
Classical def of computationally binding: β€œWalloping Waldo” attack still possible! Collision-resistance Weaker than expected Stronger def? (NIST post-quantum competition?) Our proposal: β€œCollapse-binding” commitments Our proposal: β€œCollapsing” hash functions Commitments and hashes

9 Existing defs (binding)
Various prior def’s Brassard, CrΓ©peau, DamgΓ₯rd, Dumais, Fehr, Jozsa, Langlois, Lunemann, Mayers, Salvail, Schaffner Various problems: Need trapdoors (or even UC) Rewinding proofs difficult No parallel composition Do not imply knowledge of message Commitments and hashes

10 Collapse-binding commitments
Adv. A outputs commitment 𝑐 (classically), and valid openings π‘š,𝑒 (in superposition) Def: Collapse-binding = A cannot distinguish |π‘šβŒͺ A |π‘šβŒͺ |𝑒βŒͺ 𝑐 measure A A or |𝑒βŒͺ 𝑐 Commitments and hashes

11 Commitments and hashes
Why this def? Intuition: Adversary cannot produce several openings in superposition If he could, he’d notice measurement Formally: Weaker than β€œnon-existence of two openings” (perfect) Stronger than β€œhard to find two openings” (class.-style) kind of… A |π‘šβŒͺ |𝑒βŒͺ 𝑐 or measure Commitments and hashes

12 Commitments and hashes
Properties Perfect binding ⟹ collapse-binding ⟹ classical-style binding Avoids β€œchange of mind” Composes in parallel Rewinding friendly gives ZK arguments of knowledge Simple constructions from β€œcollapsing” hashes βœ” βœ” βœ” βœ” βœ” Commitments and hashes

13 Collapsing hash functions
Strengthening of β€œcollision-resistance” for quantum setting Adv. A outputs hash β„Ž (classically), and preimages π‘š (in superposition) Def: Collapsing = A cannot distinguish A |π‘šβŒͺ A |π‘šβŒͺ or Measure 𝑯(π’Ž) Measure π’Ž Commitments and hashes

14 Collapsing hash functions (ctd.)
Simple β€œcollapse-binding” commitments Statistically hiding Using collapsing hashes in existing constructions Drop in replacement for β€œcollision-resistance”? Random oracle is a collapsing hash Suggestion: β€œCollapsing” required property for hashes e.g., NIST post-quantum crypto competition Commitments and hashes

15 Collapsing hash funs – constructions?
Lossy function (LF): Indistinguishable whether injective, or highly non-injective (β€œlossy”) message … long … hash LF universal hash func looks injective β‡’ is collapsing injective on im(𝐿𝐹) Commitments and hashes

16 Commitments and hashes
Hashing long messages? Prior construction: Fixed compression factor (e.g., 2) For long messages: Merkle-DamgΓ₯rd 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑑 𝑣𝑒𝑐 𝐻 𝐻 𝐻 𝐻 β„Žπ‘Žπ‘ β„Ž π‘šπ‘ π‘” 1 π‘šπ‘ π‘” 2 π‘šπ‘ π‘” 3 π‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘‘π‘–π‘›π‘” Commitments and hashes

17 Commitments and hashes
Summary Classical definitions for commitments & hashes: insufficient! New definitions: collapse-binding / collapsing Constructions from lossy functions / lattice-assumptions Question: Collapsing hashes from OWF / coll.-resistance? Commitments and hashes

18 I thank for your attention
This research was supported by European Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa


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