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Comments by Espen R. Moen

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1 Comments by Espen R. Moen
Mark Gertler, Luca Sala, Antonella Trigari, “An Estimated Monetary DSGE Model with Nominal Wage Bargaining” Comments by Espen R. Moen

2 About the paper Elaborates on a model by Gertler and Trigari that introduces search frictions in a model with Calvo pricing Structurally estimates the model Relevant for understanding the Shimer puzzle Hard to reconcile the standard search- and matching model with business cycle facts

3 Structure of model DSGE model Representative agents
Habit formation Two-layered production sector Manufacturing firms: labor and capital inputs, constant returns to scale Endogenous capital utuilization Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model Calvo pricing in retail firms, Calvo wage setting in manufacturing firms DMP –style search model of the labor market Wage bargaining Partly indexed wage contracts

4 Staggered wages complicates search model
Firms are heterogeneous, wages differ More difficult to calculate the value of search to workers All jobs are accepted The model is structurally estimated (which data set?) Some important parameters are assumed, while others are estimated (for instance the unemployment income)

5 Findings Replacement ratio: 0,75 Bargaining power of workers: 0,89
Lower than Hagerdorn and Manovskii, but higher than Shimer Bargaining power of workers: 0,89 Higher than usual Inefficient Wage rigidity improves the fit of the model

6 Comments Complex model
Hard to get intuition for the results What are the separate effects of each extension relative to the standard DMP-model? Interesting to see partial effect of sticky wages on the dynamic properties of the model

7 Theory issues Sticky wages for new hires?
Refer to Menzio and Moen, but this is not fully appropriate Degree of indexation – probably a choice variable Wage bargaining Complicated, as future hirings influence the bargaining game Shocks to the worker’s bargaining power- may give rise to relatively big effects on current wages Why not go for directed search and competitive search equilibrium? Some missing references


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